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Abstract: Maimon’s Post-Kantian Skepticism 
There is little doubt that Salomon Maimon was both highly respected by, and highly 
influential upon, his contemporaries; indeed, Kant himself referred to Maimon as the 
best of his critics. The appraisal and reformulation of the Kantian project detailed in 
Maimon’s Essay on Transcendental Philosophy played a significant role in 
determining the criteria of success for post-Kantian philosophy, and was thus crucial 
to the early development of German Idealism. Key aspects of Maimon’s 
transcendental philosophy remain, however, relatively obscure. In particular, it 
remains unclear to what degree Maimon’s skepticism is internal to the Kantian 
framework, and how this skepticism is related to Maimon’s so-called dogmatic 
rationalism. The central aim of this project is to present Maimon’s as a distinct form 
of post-Kantian skepticism: one which poses significant problems for Kant’s 
theoretical project and which motivates a reformulation of the critical framework. In 
Kant’s eyes, pre-Kantian forms of skepticism are insufficiently critical insofar as they 
involve a commitment to transcendental realism. By contrast, I argue that Maimon’s 
skepticism does not involve a commitment to transcendental realism and that it 
strikes at the heart of Kant’s critical project insofar as it constitutes what I term 
‘critical’ as opposed to merely ‘empirical’ skepticism. I further argue that Maimon’s 
rationalism provides the materials for a response to this form of skepticism. This 
thesis contributes to contemporary debates in the history of philosophy concerning 
the nature of Maimon’s coalition system and its relation to German Idealism, but also 
provides an alternative perspective on contemporary problems in the philosophy of 
perception concerning, in particular, the possibility of non-conceptual intentional 
content.  
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Introduction and summary of project 
Upon receiving a copy of Maimon’s Versuch über der Transzendentalphilosophie 
(VT), Kant wrote, in a letter to Herz, the mutual friend who had sent it, that:  
just a glance at it was enough to make me recognize its excellence, and not only that 
none of my opponents has understood me and the principle question [of the Critique 
of Pure Reason] as well as Mr Maimon, but also that only a few people possess such 
an acute mind for such profound investigations as he does (Ak. XI, 49).  
Kant’s sentiments were later echoed by Fichte:  
my respect for Maimon’s talents knows no bounds. I firmly believe that he has 
completely overturned the entire Kantian philosophy as it has been understood by 
everyone until now … no one noticed what he had done; they had looked down on 
him from their heights. I believe that future centuries will mock us bitterly (1988, pp. 
383-384).  
It is clear, then, that Maimon was held in high esteem by his contemporaries. Yet 
despite recent increased interest the exact nature of Maimon’s skeptical challenge to 
Kant remains unclear. If we are to take the assessment of his contemporaries 
seriously, Maimon’s skepticism should both be insightful and provide us with 
motivation to overturn the Kantian system from within. On many recent 
interpretations, however, Maimon’s skeptical challenge remains weak insofar as his 
criticisms of Kant’s transcendental idealism are thought to rest upon contentious 
readings of the Transcendental Deduction, or upon misunderstandings about the 
nature of the discursivity thesis.1 Further, there are doubts about the coherence of 
Maimon’s ‘coalition system’, with Maimon’s idiosyncratic style –his tendency is to 
treat individual aspects of the critical project in isolation2 – making it difficult to treat 
                                                
1 See, for example, Franks, 2003, p.208 
2 See Freudenthal, 2003b 
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what often seem to be disparate lines of argument as parts of a systematic whole.3 
This is reflected in the secondary literature, as Gideon Freudenthal remarked in a 
recent review of the English translation of the VT, in the lack of an established 
‘Maimonian’ position.4 In particular, it remains unclear exactly how Maimon’s 
skepticism is related to his dogmatic rationalism: is the dogmatic rationalism a 
response to the skepticism? Are skepticism and dogmatic rationalism two possible 
(mutually exclusive) responses to Kant’s critical philosophy? Or are skepticism and 
dogmatic rationalism compatible – two parts of a singular and coherent whole? My 
hope is that this project goes a small way to addressing some of these issues and its 
purpose is therefore, in part, historical. If Maimon’s skepticism is seen to be a 
consequence of his dogmatic rationalism then it need not pose a direct threat to 
Kant’s critical project, dogmatic rationalism being a Maimonian as opposed to 
Kantian innovation. If, on the other hand, dogmatic rationalism is a response to 
Maimonian skepticism, and if this skepticism is internal to the Kantian framework, 
then Maimon can be seen to further the Kantian project, or to develop it from within: 
his skeptical arguments help us to identify weaknesses in the Kantian project, and his 
rationalism helps us to address these. Here I argue in favour of the latter 
interpretation; that is, my position is that Maimon’s dogmatic rationalism serves as a 
partial response to what I will call his ‘critical skepticism’ – his doubts concerning 
Kant’s deduction of the categories. Maimon’s introduction of the infinite intellect as a 
                                                
3 See Beiser, 1993, p.287: ‘[Maimon’s] philosophy is an apparently paradoxical coalition of 
rationalism, skepticism and criticism. Whether these seemingly conflicting elements cohere, and if so 
how, is the central problem of interpreting Maimon’ 
4 See Freudenthal (2015). Beiser (1993, p.287) makes a similar claim, although more recently there has 
been a greater interest in Maimon and some of the issues that Beiser raises have therefore been 
addressed.  
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condition on the possibility of perception and on the possibility of mathematical 
judgment –his ‘dogmatic rationalism’ - serves as at least a partial response to this 
critical skepticism. Maimon remains an ‘empirical skeptic’, however, insofar as he 
holds that the synthesis of empirical determinations according to relations in space 
and time (e.g. by way of the concept of causality) can be made on only subjective and 
not objective grounds, and that judgments which employ these concepts have, 
therefore, merely subjective validity – that they are products of the imagination and 
stand in for the understanding in the production of knowledge, approximating but 
never attaining the level of complete, or infinite, understanding. I thus argue that 
Maimon’s criticisms of Kant pose a more serious threat to the Kantian project than is 
often thought, and I present Maimon’s own ‘coalition system’ as a systematic attempt 
to overcome these perceived shortcomings. 
My motivations go beyond the historical, however, insofar as I think that an 
examination of Maimon’s skepticism can help to shed light on two important post-
Kantian problems, and offers at least the beginnings of a solution to them. It seems 
that the continued success of Kant’s transcendental philosophy is increasingly 
dependent upon its being compatible with more modest appraisals of the 
mathematical and natural scientific knowledge that we possess; while there remains a 
need to provide a justification for the employment of formal explanation in the case 
of objects that are given a posteriori, the project of deducing these forms on the basis 
of pure logical forms, or self-evident first principles, seems both overly ambitious and 
anachronistic. Similarly, the problem of the quaestio juris, as it is understood by 
Maimon, has been a central focus in recent philosophy of perception. Maimon intends 
that his transcendental project will address precisely these concerns: his denial of 
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Kantian discursivity is meant to resolve the problems of receptivity, while his 
principle of determinability is developed as a means by which to distinguish 
legitimate from illegitimate forms of judgment on the basis of what is perceived in 
experience: i.e., without deriving legitimate forms of judgment from first principles.     
Before I turn to an outline of the project, it is worth noting some of its 
limitations. Firstly, my focus in this dissertation is Maimon’s relationship to Kant, 
and the development of his own ‘coalition system’ as a response to problems that he 
identifies in transcendental philosophy. As a consequence, I have not been able to 
consider a number of other important influences. In particular, the development of 
Maimon’s transcendental philosophy was in part a product of his reflections upon the 
work of Maimonides (after whom he named himself)5, and of the influence of the 
Hasidic movement that was, at that time, developing in Berlin. Yitzek Melamed has 
spoken on the topic of Maimon’s relation to Hasidism and in particular on its 
influence on the development of Maimon’s account of the infinite intellect.6 
Similarly, a number of book chapters and articles have addressed the question of 
Maimon’s relation to Maimonides. In particular, Samuel Atlas has written about the 
influence of Maimonides on Maimon’s resolution of antinomy.7 Another limitation 
pertains to my engagement with Kant’s works. In the introduction to the VT, Maimon 
writes: ‘[t]o what extent I am a Kantian, an anti-Kantian, both at the same time, or 
neither of the two, I leave to the judgment of the thoughtful reader’ (VT, GW II, 9-
10). I do not intend to answer this question here insofar as my concern is not 
                                                
5 See Bergman, 1967, chapter X 
6 Melamed, 2015 
7 See Atlas, 1948. See also Fraenkel, 2009 
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primarily to advance any particular reading of Kant’s theoretical philsophy (although 
in places I will attempt to do so). I remain neutral, for example, on the question of 
whether Kant’s argument in the transcendental deduction is progressive or regressive 
in form and consider the implications of Maimon’s skepticism for both readings. 
Neither is my aim, then, to answer the question of the accuracy of Maimon’s 
representation of Kant’s critical project. I hope only to show that Maimon raises 
questions that should be of concern to the critical philosopher in general.  
 
Outline of dissertation 
In Chapter One I provide an overview of some dominant forms of skepticism 
and attempt to locate Maimon’s with respect to these. I group these forms of 
skepticism into three kinds: 1) ancient skepticism, and in particular Pyrrhonian 
skepticism; 2) forms of modern skepticism, including those of Descartes and Hume; 
and 3) the skeptical challenges aimed at Kant’s critical project by his contemporaries, 
and in particular, by Jacobi and Schulze. Having outlined these forms of skepticism, I 
consider some Kantian responses to them. In the case of pre-Kantian forms of 
skepticism, I argue that Kant’s critical project serves as at least a partial response to 
these; Kant’s resolution of the Antinomies of Reason in particular can be understood 
as a response to a certain line of Pyrrhonian skeptical argument which exploits the 
apparent equipollence of certain metaphysical positions in order to undermine the 
science as a whole.  
Cartesian and Humean forms of skepticism are undermined insofar as the 
object of knowledge is no longer mind-independent but already entails some a priori 
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content that is supplied by the subject. The skeptic is therefore refuted on the basis of 
a rejection of his transcendental realist assumptions. I argue that despite his apparent 
rejection of the mind-independent as an object of knowledge, Berkeley too falls into 
the trap of transcendental realism, and that Kant’s arguments in the refutation of 
idealism and the fourth Paralogism serve as a response to this form of skepticism. I 
then turn to various forms of skepticism developed in response to Kant by his 
contemporaries. In particular, I consider those forms of skepticism that concern the 
thing-in-itself. I argue that these forms of skepticism cannot be considered truly post-
Kantian since they are reliant upon a pre-critical framework. Finally, I consider 
Maimon’s skepticism, which I argue is unique in that it does not concern the 
possibility of knowledge of mind-independent objects, as do the other forms of 
skepticism discussed. Instead, Maimon holds that there is space for skeptical doubt 
even when knowledge refers to objects that are produced, at least partially, by the 
subject. I argue that Maimon’s is a post-Kantian reformulation of Humean 
skepticism: although Maimon remains skeptical about the existence of natural 
objects, his skepticism does not depend upon the mediacy of our representations as it 
does for Descartes and does not, therefore, entail a commitment to transcendental 
realism. Neither does his return to Humean skepticism signal a return to 
transcendental realism, since Maimon accepts that the subjective / objective 
distinction, if it is to be made, must be made on the basis of grounds that are internal 
to knowledge.  
Maimon’s skepticism comprises two distinct lines of argument, which he 
claims correspond to the quid juris / quid facti lines of inquiry that Kant discusses in 
the introduction to the Transcendental Deduction. In Chapter Two I examine Kant’s 
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characterization of the distinction and his attempts to respond to these two kinds of 
question with respect to the concepts outlined in the Metaphysical Deduction. In 
particular, I draw attention to the difficulties in defining these terms, and in 
understanding the relation between the arguments of the Metaphysical Deduction and 
those of the Transcendental Deduction. A key point of contention here is whether a 
response to questions of the kind ‘quid facti’ is essential in determining the objective 
validity of the categories, or in responding to questions of the kind ‘quid juris’. 
Kant’s characterisation of Locke’s ‘attempted physiological derivation’ of the 
categories as concerning a quaestio facti, for example, has led some commentators to 
claim that the derivation of the categories is independent of questions of fact, with the 
implication being that Maimon’s skepticism need not pose a serious problem for 
Kant. I argue that the term ‘quaestio facti’ encompasses a range of possible questions, 
only one of which is exemplified by Locke’s attempt to account for what Kant calls 
our ‘possession’ of a priori concepts. While some of these have no bearing on Kant’s 
transcendental deduction of the categories, others are, at least on many contemporary 
interpretations, intrinsic to it, so that a failure to respond to the quaestio facti should 
equally mean a failure to respond to the quaestio juris.  
Having defined the quaestio facti in the previous chapter, in Chapter Three I 
examine what I will call ‘Maimon’s quaestio facti’. In line with the conclusions of the 
preceding chapter, I outline two possible forms of skepticism. Those forms of 
skepticism that concern matters of fact that are not essential in determining the 
validity of judgments I entitle ‘empirical skepticism’, while those which concern 
matters of fact which serve as conditions on this validity I entitle ‘critical skepticism’. 
My intention is to establish that Maimon’s quaestio facti constitutes a form of critical 
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as opposed to empirical skepticism. Further, I defend Maimon against claims that this 
line of argument must presuppose a regressive interpretation of the Transcendental 
Deduction. The central claim is not, as is often thought, that the categories apply only 
on the condition of a particular form of experience that must be merely presupposed, 
but instead that attempts to derive transcendental from formal logic fail, and that the 
transcendental status of some of the categories is therefore uncertain. 
In Chapter Four, I turn to what I will call ‘Maimon’s quaestio juris’, the 
outcome of which is, I argue, the adoption of what I call the ‘principle of complete 
rational determination’. The problem that this line of argument reveals is often 
characterized in relatively vague terms - as one of receptivity or of interaction 
between the faculties of understanding and intuition. The problem is that such 
criticisms, like Jacobi’s criticism of the thing in itself and Schulze’s skepticism, are at 
risk of falling outside the scope of the critical project, or of falling into the kind of 
rational psychology against which Kant warns us in the Paralogisms. The aim of this 
chapter is therefore to establish that Maimon’s arguments do not rest upon 
presuppositions about the transcendental status of the faculties, but instead identify 
problems that are internal to the Kantian framework. Although Maimon presents his 
quaestio juris as concerning the relation of a priori form to a posteriori matter, I 
argue that Maimon’s quaestio juris ultimately rests on his skepticism about the 
synthetic a priori in mathematics.  Maimon’s argument, as I present it here, is that a 
non-discursive employment of the understanding is a condition on the possibility of 
legitimate perceptual and mathematical judgments, and that, on these grounds, 
Maimon proposes that Kant’s discursivity thesis should be abandoned.  
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In Chapter Five I turn to Maimon’s ‘dogmatic rationalism’, which, I argue, 
attempts to address the weaknesses that Maimon believes his skepticism has revealed 
in Kant’s transcendental idealism. While it is in the VT that Maimon first introduces 
the idea of an infinite intellect for which the form and matter – or the formal 
construction and material actuality – of objects are identical, the idea is only fully 
developed in his later works, and in particular in the Verusch einer neuen Logik 
(Logik) and in the Kritische Untersuchungen über den Menschlichen Geist (KrU). 
Maimon’s claim here is that formal logic does not precede but is instead derived from 
transcendental logic. I examine Maimon’s ‘principle of determinability’ which I 
argue has its origins in a passage from Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, and which 
Maimon believes can serve as an alternative means of responding to the quaestio 
facti.  
In the final two chapters I offer an assessment of Maimon’s rationalism 
considered as a solution to the skeptical problems he raises. In his letter of response 
to Herz, Kant stresses the central role that a resolution of the antinomies of reason 
plays in the development of his critical philosophy. In Chapter Six I argue that a 
distinction between material and formal possibility plays an essential role in Kant’s 
resolution both of the antinomies of the KrV and the antinomy of teleological 
judgment that is resolved in the KU. The central question is therefore whether 
Maimon’s rationalism allows for a similar resolution. Maimon attempts to subsume 
the Kantian antinomies, together with several of his own from applied mathematics 
and physics, under one singular form, which he calls the ‘antinomy of thought’ – a 
move that is reflected in early development of German Idealism. The antinomies 
arise, according to Maimon, as a result of a limitation on the part of the finite 
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intellect: that it must judge in terms of determinable and determination so that the 
identity of form and matter can never be thought by it. I argue that attempts to resolve 
the antinomies in this manner ultimately fail insofar as they are dependent on an 
incoherent account of the subject. Finally, I turn to the criticisms which Hegel makes 
of Fichte in the Differenzschrift in order to support my claims.  
I conclude with Maimon, that although Kant successfully identifies the 
general terms by which valid non-empirical judgments might be possible, he does not 
provide us with an adequate means of distinguishing such judgments from invalid 
non-empirical judgments, as is required if there is to be a satisfactory response to the 
quaestio facti. Similarly, I argue with Maimon that a rejection of Kant’s account of 
receptivity, and of the absolute form / matter distinction is necessary, and that 
Maimon’s ‘principle of determinability’ can provide a principle for transcendental 
philosophy in general. Against Maimon, however, I argue that the grounding of the 
transcendental in an infinite understanding, or in the possibility of a thought of an 
object in general, is problematic. I turn to the opening sections of Fichte’s Grundlage 
for the materials for an amended form of Maimonian transcendental philosophy.  
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Chapter One: Kant and varieties of skepticism 
‘Skepticism’ Kant claims in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method is:  
a resting-place for human reason, where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings 
and make survey of the region in which it finds itself […]. But it is no dwelling-place 
for permanent settlement. Such can be obtained only through perfect certainty in our 
knowledge, alike of the objects themselves and of the limits within which all our 
knowledge of objects is enclosed. (A761 / B789).  
 
For Kant, skepticism is merely the second of three progressive phases of 
philosophical investigation, beginning with dogmatism and culminating in critique.8 
It would therefore seem that skepticism should have no place in the post-Kantian 
landscape; the properly critical philosopher should recognize the self-undermining 
nature of the skeptical position, and use this to carve out a region of certainty in 
which the (transcendental) metaphysician can operate. Yet Maimon proposes that 
Kant’s own critical system is subject to further forms of skeptical argument. How, 
then, should we conceive of Maimonian skepticism in light of Kant’s claim? Does it 
rest upon a misunderstanding of Kant’s critical project? Or perhaps it implies a return 
to a pre-critical standpoint? My position here will be that Maimon’s skepticism is 
unique amongst other dominant forms of skepticism in its being internal to the critical 
system, and, therefore, properly post-Kantian. In order to show that this is the case I 
                                                
8 ‘The first step in matters of pure reason, marking its infancy, is dogmatic. The second step is 
skeptical; and indicates that experience has rendered judgment wiser and more circumspect. But a third 
step, such as can be taken only by fully matured judgment, based on assured principles of proved 
universality, is now necessary, namely, to subject to examination, not the facts of reason, but reason 
itself, in the whole extent of its powers, and as regards its aptitude for pure a priori forms of 
knowledge. This is not the censorship but the criticism or reason, whereby not its present bounds but 
its determinate [and necessary] limits, not its ignorance to this or that point but its ignorance in regard 
to all possible questions of a certain kind, are demonstrated from principles, and not merely arrived at 
by way of conjecture’ (A761 / B789) 
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will, in this introductory chapter, consider three important forms of pre-critical 
skepticism. These include those traditionally considered pre-critical - Pyrrhonian, 
Cartesian and Humean – but also, I propose, many of the skeptical criticisms aimed at 
Kant’s theoretical project by his contemporaries. Such forms of skepticism, I claim, 
should not be considered critical or post-Kantian insofar as they presuppose a pre-
critical framework. The aim will be to determine the ways in which these forms of 
skepticism are pre-critical; to show that Maimon considers the Kantian project to be 
at least partially successful in addressing them, such that his skepticism does not 
depend upon a pre-critical standpoint; and to establish that Maimon’s own skepticism 
is distinct from these pre-critical forms of skepticism in a relevant way, so that his 
can be seen as constituting a distinct, post-Kantian skepticism.  
 
1.1 Pre-critical skepticism 
I begin by considering what it means to be a pre-critical skeptic, before turning to the 
question of how Kant intends that his ‘Copernican revolution’ should undermine 
these forms of skepticism. It is first helpful, however, to note some limitations of my 
analysis. There are important differences between the aims and methods of modern 
and ancient skepticism. As Forster has argued (1989, p.11), for example, ancient 
skepticism constitutes a particular kind of method – adopting a position of 
equipollence with respect to all knowledge, modern skepticism does not; modern 
skeptical arguments are made with respect to specific knowledge claims, and these 
skeptical positions often themselves entail commitments to various other knowledge 
claims. This distinction has important implications for Kant’s ability to respond to 
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skepticism; as will be seen, the critical method can be seen to depend, at least in part, 
on exploiting the dogmatic commitments of the skeptic in order to undermine his 
skeptical position. Clearly this is more difficult to do in the case of a skeptic who 
seeks to avoid dogmatic belief altogether, and it is for this reason that Forster 
ultimately concludes that Kant is unsuccessful in responding to ancient skepticism.9 
While Kant believes himself to have responded to the Pyrrhonian skeptic, Forster 
argues, as will be seen, that his reading of Pyrrhonian skepticism in fact overly 
narrows its scope. Kant’s relationship to the modern skeptics is similarly complex. 
While some commentators take Kant’s Transcendental Deduction to be an attempt to 
respond to the Humean skeptic, for example, others do not.10 It is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to engage with the substance of these debates and I will not therefore, be 
concerned with the question of whether Kant’s supposed anti-skeptical arguments are 
successful. Instead, I aim only to show that Maimon situates himself within the 
critical framework insofar as he does think that Kant is in a position to respond, at 
least partially, to these forms of skepticism, and that Maimon’s own skeptical 
concerns pertain to the critical framework itself. 
Secondly, although I will refer in particular to Cartesian skepticism, Kant’s 
concern is not only with Cartesian skepticism as it is presented in the First 
Meditation, but also as it manifests itself in the systems of the philosophers of the 
modern period in general (and in particular in that of Berkeley) to the extent that he 
believes that it motivates what he calls ‘empirical idealism’. In order to determine 
                                                
9 See Forster, 2008, chapter 12. 
10 For an account of why Kant should be considered as responding to the Humean skeptic in the first 
Critique and, in particular, in the Transcendental Deduction, see Strawson (1966). For an alternative 
account, see Ameriks, 2003. 
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what it means to be a pre-Kantian (and, by contrast, a post-Kantian) skeptic, it is 
therefore important not only to distinguish Maimon’s skepticism from those of 
Descartes and Hume, but also to distinguish his philosophical project from that of 
Berkeley.  
1.1.1 Kant and ancient skepticism 
By ancient skepticism, we usually intend one of two important schools: so-called 
academic skepticism, and Pyrrhonian skepticism. Of particular interest with respect to 
Kant’s critical philosophy is Pyrrhonian skepticism as advanced by Sextus Empiricus, 
according to whom: 
Skepticism is an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are 
thought of in any way at all, an ability by which, because of the equipollence in the 
opposed objects and accounts, we come first to the suspension of judgment and 
afterwards to tranquillity (Book I, iv, p.4) 
Pyrrhonian skepticism is thus primarily a therapeutic method as opposed to a 
position: a means of suspending judgment and attaining a (supposedly desirable) state 
of tranquillity. Suspension of judgment is supposed to arise when we recognise that, 
with respect to ‘things which appear’, there are equally compelling reasons to adopt 
the antithesis of any judgment as there are to adopt the thesis itself (ibid.). To adopt 
the skeptical method is, therefore, to seek to recognise what Sextus Empiricus calls 
‘equipollence’ with respect any proposition– an ‘equality with regard to being 
convincing or unconvincing’ (ibid.p.5).  
It is perhaps for this reason, then, that Kant holds that what he calls the 
‘Antinomies of Reason’ – four sets of two equally compelling and yet apparently 
mutually exclusive metaphysical propositions – lead to a ‘euthanasia of reason’ 
(A407/B434): that antinomy ‘subjects [reason] to the temptation … of abandoning 
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itself to a sceptical despair’ (ibid.) Reason is here stilled, as it is for the Pyrrhonian 
skeptics, for its own sake. Forster’s (2008) analysis is especially helpful in 
understanding the relationship between Kant and the Pyrrhonian skeptics.11 The 
Antinomies are indeed supposed, Forster argues, to be representative of the 
Pyrrhonian position: the opposing yet equally convincing sets of arguments that Kant 
outlines in the Antinomies are motivations for Pyrrhonianism is so far as they reveal 
the contradictions that are inherent to metaphysics and therefore encourage us to 
abandon the science altogether.12 Kant’s resolution of the antinomies by way of 
transcendental idealism is therefore supposed to serve as a response to the Pyrrhonian 
skeptic: the oppositions set up in the antinomies presuppose transcendental realism, 
and once transcendental realism has been rejected the opposition dissolves.13 In the 
case of the first two antinomies it is shown that thesis and antithesis both share a 
dogmatic assumption – that space and time are mind-independent, or properties of 
things in themselves. If this assumption is rejected, both the thesis and the antithesis 
are shown to be false. In the case of the third and fourth antinomies, the opposition is 
shown to depend upon the assumption of transcendental realism, with the opposition 
itself being shown to be illusory if the thesis of transcendental idealism is instead 
adopted. Both thesis and antithesis may be true since each can refer to different 
entities (or to the same entities but considered in different ways): the thesis applies to 
objects of spatiotemporal experience, while the antithesis applies to objects thought 
by way of the categories but not necessarily appearing in space and time. It is 
                                                
11 See Forster, 2008, chapters 4 and 8. 
12 Forster argues that Kant (illegitimately) restricted Pyrrhonian skepticism to metaphysical claims. See 
Forster, 2008, chapter 12. 
13 See 6.2.3 of this dissertation for a more detailed discussion.  
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important to note, however, that Kant’s supposed resolution of the antinomies does 
not necessarily serve as a response to Pyrrhonian skepticism. Forster argues (2008), 
for example, that Kant illegitimately restricts the scope of Pyrrhonian skepticism to 
metaphysical claims.14 If Pyrrhonian skeptic is a truly global skepticism then it cannot 
accurately be considered either pre or post-Kantian since it can be committed to 
neither transcendental realism nor to transcendental idealism.  
1.1.2 Kant and the modern skeptics 
Kant’s approach to modern skepticism takes various forms. In the A edition, Kant’s 
discussion of the relation between skepticism and empirical idealism appears in the 
fourth Paralogism. Although Kant does not mention him by name, it seems likely that 
his arguments there are addressed to Descartes. The Cartesian skepticism takes the 
existence of spatially external objects to be problematic because he holds that we 
cannot ever have direct perception of these objects, but only of the representations 
that arise within us as a result of an interaction with them. As Kant puts it, ‘all outer 
appearances are [according to the Cartesian skeptic] of such a nature that their 
existence is not immediately perceived, and … we can only infer them as the cause of 
given perceptions’ (A367). If we can only ever infer the existence of spatially 
external objects, then our claims to knowledge of such objects will always be 
vulnerable to the objection that our inferences may be incorrect. In the Meditations 
Descartes describes the various ways in which our inferences may indeed be 
mistaken.15 On Kant’s view the Cartesian dualist is thus an ‘empirical idealist’ 
                                                
14 See in particular Forster, 2008, chapter 12. 
15 See Descartes, 1641. 
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(A371). The empirical object is merely ideal, while the real object of knowledge lies 
beyond the realm of possible perception.  
Kant’s position is that this empirical idealism, and the associated skepticism, 
is a product of ‘transcendental realism’ - of a presupposition that a priori objective 
qualities are mind-independent - and that a rejection of transcendental realism should 
therefore also serve as a response to such skepticism.16 In the case of Cartesian 
skepticism, this is a result of ‘regard[ing] time and space as something given in 
themselves, independently of our sensibility’ (A369). Because events in space take 
place according to causal laws, this presupposition - that spatially external objects 
must also be external in the sense of being mind-independent- means that our 
experience of such objects must be mediated. As a consequence, the nature, and 
indeed existence, of the external object can only be inferred on the basis of our 
representation of it; we can have no direct or immediate access to the objects of 
perception. ‘All outer appearances’ Kant writes, ‘are of such a nature that their 
existence is not immediately perceived, and … we can only infer them as the cause of 
given perceptions. Therefore the existence of all objects of the outer senses is 
doubtful’ (A366-7).  
It is not skepticism with respect to the existence of the external objects itself 
that concerns Kant, however, but instead the relation between object and 
representation that the Cartesian position implies. Transcendental realism leads to 
empirical idealism because the appearance of an object can only ever be ideal in 
                                                
16 Kant’s transcendental idealism is sometimes defined purely in terms of the ideality of space and time 
(see, for example, Waxman, 2002, p.65). I define it more broadly as the claim that the conditions of 
objectivity are ideal, in order to encompass key Kantian innovations concerning, for example, the 
transcendental ideality of causality.  
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relation to the real, mind-independent object.17 This is true not only where space and 
time are taken to be properties of things in themselves but is also necessarily the case 
whenever qualities that are taken to be objective (or constitutive of the object) are at 
the same time taken to be mind-independent. If the mechanisms by which we 
experience objects as interacting are to be mind-independent, our knowledge of 
objects can only arise by way of these mechanisms. As a result, empirical idealism is 
manifest, according to Kant, even in the systems of philosophers who claim to be 
anti-skeptical. In the case of Descartes, for example, skepticism is eventually 
supposed to be overcome by means of ontological argument. Kant’s argument is that 
Descartes remains an empirical idealist, however, because he retains the mediacy of 
the perception of objects:  
The term ‘idealist’ is not, therefore, to be understood as applying to those who deny 
the existence of external objects of the senses, but only to those who do not admit 
that their existence is known through immediate perception, and who therefore 
conclude that we can never, by way of any possible experience, be completely certain 
as to their reality (A368-9).  
Moreover, Kant holds that Descartes’ position remains insufficiently critical 
in that, while he claims to doubt the existence of the spatiotemporal object, his doubt 
(which is grounded in the presupposition that representation can only approximate the 
external object, and that the external object can be known only mediately), already 
presupposes the reality of time and space. On Kant’s view it is this presupposition of 
transcendental realism that eventually leads to more radical forms of idealism. In the 
case of Berkeley, the dogmatic assumption that mediate perception yields knowledge 
of the intrinsic properties of mind-independent objects is abandoned. It may seem, 
                                                
17 ‘I am not … in a position to perceive external things, but can only infer their existence from my 
inner perception, taking the inner perception as the effect of which something external is the proximate 
cause’ (A368) 
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then, that Berkeley has avoided the trap of empirical idealism; he no longer considers 
perceptions of objects to be mediated by, for example, space or causal interactions, 
and perceptions are not, therefore, taken to be ideal or to represent or approximate 
‘real’ mind-independent objects. Kant’s argument, however, is that Berkeley remains 
an empirical idealist in that his rejection of material substance and his consequent 
anti-skepticism is dependent upon an implicit assumption of transcendental realism.18 
On the Kantian account, Berkeley’s rejection of mind independent substance leads 
him to reject extended matter only because he tacitly equates spatial externality with 
ontological externality, i.e. with mind-independence. In doing so, Berkeley assumes 
the standpoint of the transcendental realist in that he presupposes that extended 
substance must be mind-independent, or that spatial properties should be a feature of 
things-in-themselves. When Berkeley subsequently rejects the mind-independent on 
the basis that the very idea is contradictory, his transcendental realism therefore leads 
him to abandon extended substance along with it. ‘After wrongly supposing that 
objects of the senses, if they are to be external, must have an existence by themselves, 
and independently of the senses,’ Kant writes, ‘he [Berkeley] finds that, judged from 
this point of view, all our sensuous representations are inadequate to establish their 
reality’ (A369). 
                                                
18 The degree to which Kant’s representation of the Berkeleyan position is accurate, as well as the 
degree to which Kant’s own account of external objects differs to that of Berkeley, is a contentious 
issue. While some scholars have argued that Kant is not accurate in his portrayal of Berkeley as a 
subjective idealist, and that Kant’s own account does not, in fact, differ significantly from that of 
Berkeley, others have defended Kant, arguing that such criticisms depend upon a phenomenalist 
interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. For an example of the former, see Strawson,1966, 
p.21-22: ‘The doctrine that the material and the mental constituents of the natural world are alike only 
appearances turns out, in the end, to bear with unequal weight on bodies and states of consciousness. 
Kant, as transcendental idealist, is closer to Berkeley than he acknowledges’. For an example of the 
latter, see Allison, 1973a.  
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How, then, and to what extent, does Kant’s own ‘transcendental idealism’ 
allow him to avoid the trap of ‘empirical idealism’? In the fourth Paralogism of the A 
edition, Kant appears to give only a negative solution to the problem. In line with the 
rest of the Paralogisms, the aim of which is to expose transcendental illusions which 
occur when our inquiries are extended beyond the limits of possible knowledge, 
Kant’s aim here is to show only that the empirical idealism which characterizes 
modern skepticism is a form of transcendental illusion and that it is a result of the 
assumption of transcendent knowledge, or knowledge of things in themselves. Kant 
leaves open the possibility of an alternative to empirical idealism, therefore, but does 
not provide any refutation of this form of idealism. Nevertheless, he does emphasize 
the importance of empirical realism as an alternative to the idealist position. In the 
case of the empirical idealist, the transcendental illusion occurs because we take our 
experiential knowledge to be knowledge of things-in-themselves and on the basis of 
the inaccessibility of things in themselves remain skeptical: either, as in the case of 
the Cartesian skeptic, about the existence of mind-independent, spatial objects; or, as 
in the case of the Berkeleyan idealist, about the empirical reality of spatial and 
temporal qualities. Kant’s claim in the Paralogisms, then, is that both the Cartesian 
and the Berkeleyan positions are insufficiently critical in that they entail that we have 
some knowledge of things in themselves, when things-in-themselves should in fact be 
beyond the limits of knowledge. If we are to take Berkeley’s criticism of the mind-
independent seriously, Kant argues, then any claims that we may make about it 
(including that it is unknowable) should have no bearing whatsoever on our 
understanding of experiences, or of their material ground. This does not, of course, 
mean that we may not employ other arguments in order to reject the material. 
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However, it does provide Kant with one means of avoiding the problem of this 
specific form of modern skepticism in that it allows him to propose that we can have 
direct, immediate, access to the objects of experience.   
Earlier in the KrV Kant does, however, provide us with a motive for rejecting 
transcendental realism. In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant argues that space and 
time can themselves be neither concepts nor intuitions, as the empirical idealist holds 
that they are, but must instead be pure forms of intuition. As a consequence, they 
cannot be given to the experiencing subject as part of the content of intuition, nor can 
they be mere products of thought. Kant is able to refute the Berkeleyan position, then, 
on the basis that Berkeley’s rejection of extended matter is dependent upon his 
conflating spatial externality with mind-independence. It is not just that this 
conflation is dogmatic then, but that the arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic 
serve to refute it. Kant is able to avoid empirical idealism because the externality of 
the object is defined only in terms of spatiotemporal relations, and, since 
spatiotemporality is not a feature of things-in-themselves, spatial externality does not 
entail mind-independence. As a consequence, the reality of external objects can be 
maintained, while the spatiotemporal properties of those objects can at the same time 
remain immediately accessible:  
Matter is with him, therefore, only a species of representations (intuition), which are 
called external, not as standing in relation to objects in themselves external, but 
because they relate perceptions to the space in which all things are external to one 
another, while yet the space itself is in us (A370).  
The structure of Kant’s argument changes in the second edition of the KrV. 
Here, the fourth Paralogism is entirely rewritten, and the argument which had 
appeared there in the A edition is instead presented in an altered form, under the title 
of the ‘Refutation of Idealism’. As is clear from the name, the merely negative 
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response given to the problem of empirical idealism in the A edition is here replaced 
with a positive refutation of the idealist position. As discussed, dogmatic forms of 
empirical idealism, such as that of Berkeley, which make positive claims about the 
existence of extended substance, have already been undermined by the arguments of 
the A-edition fourth Paralogism and the Transcendental Aesthetic. The task of the 
Refutation of Idealism, however, is to answer not only to those forms of idealism that 
make positive claims on the basis of transcendent enquiry, but also to those which 
claim only to remain skeptical with respect to external objects: ‘The required proof 
must, therefore, show that we have experience, and not merely imagination of outer 
things’ (B275). Kant’s argument must show, therefore, that not only is immediate 
access to the objects of experience possible, but we are warranted in our supposition 
that such objects exist.19 Kant’s strategy in the Refutation of Idealism is to show that 
the existence of external spatial objects is a condition on the possibility of the 
(experience of the) experiencing subject. Since not even the Cartesian skeptic can 
doubt the reality of the experiencing subject, such an argument should convince him 
of the reality of spatially external objects. Kant’s claim is that inner sense – the 
experience of the subject as existing within time - is possible only on the assumption 
of experience of extended substance, so that the fact of inner sense should already 
entail the reality of objects of experience: 
I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination of time 
presupposes something permanent in perception. This permanent cannot, however, 
be something in me, since it is only through this perception that my existence in time 
can itself be determined. Thus perception of this permanent is possible only through a 
                                                
19 There is some debate surrounding the nature of Kant’s argument in the Refutation of Idealism. For a 
discussion of some of the problems of the interpretation of the Refutation of Idealism which I have 
offered here, see Guyer, 1983. 
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thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me 
(B275). 
In order that the experiencing subject be experienced by itself as an experiencing 
subject, or in other words, in order that there be ‘inner sense’, there must be 
something which endures throughout a temporal succession. Were this not the case, 
there would not be one singular and unified time stream but instead multiple, 
disparate time streams. In order that the experiencing subject experience itself as 
such, then, it is necessary that there be an enduring substance in experience. Because 
the experience of the subject, in the form of inner sense, is possible only as a result of 
the experience of a permanence in perception, however, the experiencing subject 
cannot be the originator of this permanence. Permanence can only, therefore, be 
provided in the form of outer sense, or of extended substance.20 
 
1.1.3 Kant and Humean skepticism  
So far I have considered only the first of the two forms of modern skepticism 
originally identified – the skepticism that results from empirical idealism. It seems 
that Kant seeks to undermine this form of skepticism by showing that it is 
insufficiently critical insofar as it presupposes that objective qualities are, or must be, 
mind-independent. I turn now to another form of modern skepticism: Humean 
                                                
20 See B277-8: ‘Not only are we unable to perceive any determination of time save through change in 
outer relations (motion) relatively to the permanent in space (for instance, the motion of the sun around 
the earth), we have nothing permanent on which, as intuition, we can base the concept of a substance, 
save only matter; and even this permanence is not obtained from outer experience, but is presupposed 
a priori as a necessary condition of determination of time, and therefore also as a determination of 
inner sense in respect of [the determination of] our own existence through the existence of outer 
things’  
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skepticism. 21 The Humean skeptic is not skeptical about the existence of objects of 
experience, as the Cartesian skeptic is, but instead about the inference from those 
objects to objects that are not themselves experienced. This inference, Hume argues, 
depends upon an employment of the concept of causality; we experience an object 
which we take to be an effect and infer, on the basis of this effect, another object as 
cause. Yet causality itself is not something that we directly perceive. What, then, is 
the origin of this concept? And are we justified in employing it, and, therefore, in 
making inferences about objects that are beyond any immediate perception? Hume’s 
position is that since we cannot directly perceive causality we must arrive at the idea 
of it by way of the ‘constant conjunction’ of perceptions in experience (Treatise, 
1.3.6); we have, in the past experienced a particular perception as following from 
another and the expectation that these presentations will in the future be similarly 
conjoined leads us to ascribe an objective relation of cause and effect to them. ‘The 
idea of cause and effect’, Hume writes,  
is derived from experience, which informs us, that such particular objects, in all past 
instances, have been constantly conjoined with one another: And as an object similar 
to one of these is supposed to be immediately present in its impression, we thence 
presume on the existence of one similar to its usual attendant. (Treatise, 3.1.6) 
The inference from cause to effect (or from effect to cause) therefore depends upon 
the principle that future events must resemble past events, and the validity of the 
inference will depend upon the soundness of this assumption. Hume’s position is that 
there is no reliable basis for it.  
                                                
21 There is some dispute about Kant’s knowledge of Hume, and the degree to which his account is 
accurate. For a discussion of this see Beiser (2009) and Forster (2008). 
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It is Humean skepticism, Kant claims, that first motivated his critical 
project,22 and the matter of Kant’s relation to Hume is, therefore, complicated. As 
Frederick Beiser has pointed out (2009, p.43), Kant does not include Hume among 
the empirical idealists, so that a response to his skepticism cannot straightforwardly 
take the form of a denial of the mind-independence of space and time as it does in the 
case of the other modern skeptics. Beiser argues that this is because Hume’s 
skepticism concerning causality means that he does not take experience of external 
objects to be mediated by causality in the way that the empirical idealists do. Hume, 
then, leaves open the possibility that our experience of external objects is immediate, 
so that he is committed neither to empirical idealism, nor to empirical realism. Kant 
does, however, consider Hume’s skeptical project pre-critical. This is because while 
Hume questions the mind-independence of causal relations, he does not extend this 
skepticism to the intrinsic properties of objects in general, and he remains, at least in 
this respect, therefore, a transcendental realist. In fact, Kant argues, had Hume 
extended his skepticism to the conditions of objectivity more generally, he would 
have been in a position to resolve his skepticism insofar as he would have recognised 
the role of the subject in constituting the objects to which the concept of causality is 
to be applied: 
Since [Hume] could not explain how it can be possible that the understanding must 
think concepts, which are not in themselves connected in the understanding, as being 
necessarily connected in the object, and since it never occurred to him that the 
understanding might itself, perhaps, through these concepts, be the author of the 
experience in which its objects are found, he was constrained to derive them from 
experience. (B127) 
                                                
22 See Ak. IV, 260 
 26 
Hume believes that the necessity entailed by the concept of causality cannot be 
accounted for by way of a priori concepts because he presupposes that the objects of 
experience are entirely mind-independent such that a priori concepts of the 
understanding could play no part in their constitution. Paul Franks calls this 
‘methodological naturalism’ (2007, pp.50-51); the presupposition is that ‘the methods 
of science are the only methods appropriate for understanding anything, including 
epistemic practices such as natural science itself’ (2007, p.50). As a consequence, 
when natural scientific methods fail to account for the validity of judgments such as 
those involving natural causality, the Humean skeptic is forced to ascribe merely 
subjective as opposed to objective legitimacy to the judgment. Hume, like Berkeley, 
Kant claims, therefore provides us with a motivation to progress towards the critical 
standpoint, but he does not himself attain it. Hume provides merely a ‘censorship’ but 
not a ‘criticism of reason’ (A761 / B789); he recognizes that an understanding of 
mind-independent objects is not possible, but he does not take the further step of 
determining the role of the understanding in constituting objects of experience and 
thus, as Franks argues, fails to recognise the possibility that certain concepts or 
judgments may be warranted independently of the methods of natural science. I will 
examine the nature of Kant’s response to Hume in more detail in chapters two and 
three. Kant’s general strategy in responding to him, however, is, again, to reject 
transcendental realism. Hume is able to remain skeptical about the application of 
certain concepts despite their apparent necessity because he distinguishes between 
subjective necessity, which determines how we must think about objects of 
experience, and objective necessity, which determines how things must actually be.  
Kant is able to respond to this form of skepticism because he holds that the object of 
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knowledge is already a product of the activity of the subject. If the application of 
particular concepts is a condition on the possibility of the thought of objects, it is also 
therefore a condition on the possibility of experience of them.  
1.2 The skepticism of Kant’s contemporaries 
So far I have considered Kant’s relation to the modern skeptics. I turn now to a 
number of different forms of skepticism which emerged in response to Kant’s critical 
project. In particular, I am concerned with two lines of skeptical argument. The first 
is most notably formulated by Jacobi in his famous claim that ‘without [the] 
presupposition [of the thing in itself] I could not enter into the system, but with it I 
could not stay within it’ (1787, p.223).  According to this line of argument, Kant’s 
own project remains insufficiently critical in that, although Kant denies that 
knowledge of the thing in itself is possible, the existence of the thing in itself remains 
an essential presupposition of his transcendental idealism. In particular, the thing-in-
itself is required in order that sensation be accounted for while at the same time the 
synthetic activity of the understanding with respect to the sensible matter is supposed 
to be a condition on the possibility of the object that is thought as the cause of 
sensation:  
The Kantian philosopher goes right against the spirit of his system whenever he says 
that the objects produce impressions on the senses through which they arouse 
sensations, and that in this way they bring about representations. For according to the 
Kantian hypothesis, the empirical object, which is always only appearance, cannot 
exist outside us and be something more than a representation (Jacobi, 1787, p.220).  
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Among the early post-Kantians, Pistorius, Schulze, and Maimon also hold this view.23 
Strawson has a similar concern in mind when he writes that ‘[t]he doctrine [of 
transcendental idealism] is not merely that we can have no knowledge of a 
supersensible reality. The doctrine is that reality is supersensible and that we can have 
no knowledge of it. There are points in plenty at which the doctrine takes swift 
plunges into unintelligibility’ (1966, 38). Here, Strawson echoes Jacobi’s concerns, 
arguing that:  
‘Kant denies the possibility of any knowledge at all of things, as they are in 
themselves, which affect us to produce sensible experience. It is evidently consistent 
with, indeed required by, this denial to deny also that the physical objects are those 
things, as they are in themselves, which affect us to produce sensible experience’ 
(1966, p.41).  
This notion that the thing in itself somehow grounds the sensible intuition is supposed 
to be problematic not only because it entails that we have knowledge of the thing-in-
itself, but also because it relies upon the application of the category of causality 
(which should be limited to the objects of experience) to things-in-themselves which 
are supposed to be external to experience. In Strawson’s terms, the relation between 
the faculty of intuition and the thing-in-itself is supposed to one of ‘affectation’: 
but when it is added that we are to understand by space and time themselves nothing 
but a capacity or liability of ours to be affected in a certain way by objects not 
themselves in space and time, then we can no longer understand the doctrine, for we 
no longer know what “affecting” means, or what we are to understand by “ourselves” 
(Strawson, 1996, p.41). 
Skepticism concerning metaphysical interpretations of the thing-in-itself also 
plays an important role in the work of the German Idealists. If interpreted as an 
                                                
23 See, for example, Pistorius, 1784, p.100 (review of Schulze’s Elucudations): ‘the most important, 
and in my opinion, essential error that pervades the authors entire system … [is] that according to it an 
objective intelligible world and things in themselves are assumed, as we put it in our provincial dialect, 
for no reason at all.’  
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ontologically distinct entity, the thing-in-itself is problematic in that it appears to be a 
remnant of the transcendental realism that Kant intended to overturn. Fichte, for 
example, advances a reformulation of the Berkeleyan argument. The very concept of 
the mind-independent thing-in-itself is contradictory for the same reasons that the 
thought of mind-independent matter is: 
According to Kant [… The thing in itself] is something which we merely append in 
thought to appearances, according to laws of thought that call for demonstration, and 
were demonstrated by Kant, and which we are obliged to append, according to these 
laws; something, therefore, which arises only through our thinking […] And this 
noumenon, or thing-in-itself, what further use do these commentators wish to make 
of it? This thought of a thing-in-itself is grounded upon sensation, and sensation they 
again wish to have grounded upon the thought of a thing-in-itself. Their earth reposes 
on a mighty elephant, and the mighty elephant – reposes on their earth. Their thing-
in-itself, which is a mere thought, is supposed to operate upon the self! (I 483) 
The scope of these forms of skepticism is limited, however. Firstly, they do 
not appear to take into account the technical sense in which Kant uses the term 
‘knowledge’. According to Kant, ‘[a]lthough we cannot know these objects as things 
in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in 
themselves; otherwise we should be in the absurd conclusion that there can be 
appearance without anything that appears’ (Bxxvi). For Kant, knowledge is possible 
only through the application of the categories of the understanding, which in turn 
apply only to objects that exist in space and time. This does not mean, however, that 
things in themselves cannot be thought. While they are not within the domain of 
transcendental logic, they are within the domain of general logic. Additionally, it is 
not necessarily true that the positing of a causal relation between the thing in itself 
and the experiencing subject entails a transcendent application of the category of 
causality. When Kant distinguishes the mathematical from the dynamical categories, 
he draws attention to the regulative, as opposed to constitutive, nature of the 
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dynamical categories, which include the category of causality. As will be discussed 
further in chapter six, the regulative nature of the application of these categories 
means that it is possible to attribute a spatiotemporal effect to a non-spatiotemporal 
cause.24 As a consequence, the application of the category of causality is not 
transcendent, so long as the effect is also subject to a distinct natural chain of 
causality. A final problem with these criticisms (or skepticisms concerning the thing-
in-itself) is that they appear to presuppose a metaphysical interpretation of the 
relationship between appearances and things in themselves. Alternatives to such 
readings are, however, possible. Indeed, Fichte’s criticisms in the passage quoted 
above are addressed not to Kant himself, but to particular commentators on Kant: 
‘[a]nd this noumenon or thing-in-itself, what further use do these commentators wish 
to make of it’ (I 483, emphasis added). Allison, too argues (2004) that the thing in 
itself should not be considered a distinct metaphysical entity at all, but that 
appearances and things in themselves should instead be thought of as two distinct 
ways of thinking about the same objects of experience. It seems, then, that post-
Kantian forms of skepticism which are concerned with the thing-in-itself apply only 
to particular, metaphysical, interpretations of the relation between appearances and 
things in themselves.25  
                                                
24 ‘The dynamical regress is distinguished in an important aspect from the mathematical. Since the 
mathematical regress is concerned only with the combining of parts to form a whole or the division of 
the whole into parts, the conditions of this series must always be regarded as parts of the series, and 
therefore as homogeneous and as appearances. In the dynamical regress, on the other hand, we are 
concerned not with the possibility of an unconditioned whole of given parts, or with an unconditioned 
part for a given whole, but with the derivation of a state from its cause. In this latter regress, then, it is 
not, therefore, necessary that the condition should form part of an empirical series along with the 
condition’ (A560 / B588) 
25 Paul Franks does offer a reformulation of Jacobi’s skepticism, which he argues is post-Kantian. See 
Franks, 2014.  
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1.3 Maimon’s post-Kantian Skepticism 
I turn now to Maimon’s own skepticism, which, I argue, should be considered post-
Kantian. Here, I consider the relation of Maimon’s skepticism to those discussed 
above, and argue that Kant’s rejection of transcendental realism does not in itself 
suffice to respond to the Maimonian line of argument. I also consider some 
interpretations of Maimon’s skepticism which appear to characterise his as a pre-
critical form of skepticism, and argue that these characterisations are misguided. The 
question of the exact nature of Maimon’s skepticism will be addressed over the 
course of the dissertation. The important distinction that I want to draw here, 
however, is that Maimon’s post-Kantian skepticism, unlike the pre-critical forms of 
skepticism outlined above, does not presuppose transcendental realism. In other 
words, in order to adopt the position of the Maimonian skeptic we are not committed 
to any particular position with respect to how things may be independently of our 
experience of them. As will be seen, two distinct lines of argument are usually 
thought to comprise Maimon’s skepticism, and these correspond to the ‘quaestio 
facti’ and the ‘quaestio juris’ which Kant himself introduces in the Transcendental 
Deduction. For ease of expression I will refer to these throughout as ‘Maimon’s 
quaestio facti’ and ‘Maimon’s quaestio juris’ respectively, although it should be 
noted that although quaestio translates as ‘question’, I use this term to refer to the 
relevant Maimonian line of argument and not to the question itself. 
1.3.1 Maimon and the early commentators on Kant 
The above claim (that Maimon’s skepticism is post-Kantian insofar as it does not 
presuppose transcendental realism) distinguishes mine from two other lines of 
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interpretation. According to some commentators, Maimonian skepticism, together 
with the skepticisms of Hume and Schulze, constitutes a form of transcendental 
realism in that knowledge is taken to involve a relation between subjective 
representations and things in themselves. Breazeale, for example, groups these three 
forms of skepticism together under the title of ‘critical skepticism’ and claims that: 
we can see that [the argument of the critical skeptic] involves a premise that will 
prove to be the crux of the dispute between transcendental idealism and critical 
skepticism: namely, the assumption that “genuine knowledge” requires access to a 
realm of independently existing things in themselves’ (2013, p.238).26  
According to Schulze, Kant’s transcendental idealism remains dogmatic in its 
assumption that the categories have their origin in the mind of the subject, for the 
same reasons that Kant himself thinks that transcendental realism remains dogmatic. 
‘If”, Schulze argues, ‘things-in-themselves [are] entirely unknown to us as the 
Critique of Pure Reason claims, we cannot know at all which determinations can be 
produced in the mind because of their influence on it, and which cannot.’ (Schulze, 
1792, p.145). Against this kind of skepticism, the Kantian strategy would be not so 
much to respond to the skeptic as to refuse to engage with him: the skeptic is 
operating with a pre-critical conception of what knowledge should be. For the critical 
philosopher, knowledge is a relation between judgments and the objects of experience 
which warrant them, but Schulze’s skepticism takes knowledge to consist in a relation 
between a faculty-in-itself and independently existing objects of experience: ‘a 
conclusion is actually being drawn from the constitution of representations and 
                                                
26 See also Breazeale, 2013, p.239: ‘a critical skeptic (of which the most distinguished contemporary 
example for Fichte was unquestionably Salomon Maimon) will nevertheless continue to insist that 
there is something more to “objectivity” than “necessity and universality,” and will at this point 
reiterate his demand that genuine knowledge requires some kind of verifiable correspondence between 
representations and things in themselves.’  
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thoughts in us to the constitution of objects in themselves, outside us.’ (Schulze, 
1792, p.99). As Breazeale argues, while the kind of knowledge that the skeptic seeks 
is not attainable, this does not mean that we cannot have an alternative account of 
knowledge: one that is not susceptible to these skeptical doubts.27  
As has been pointed out by Beiser, however, it does not make sense to place 
Maimon in this group of skeptics, or to think that he is concerned with knowledge as 
a relation between representations and mind-independent states of affairs. 28 In the 
‘Letters of Philaletes to Aenisidemus’ (appended to the Logik), Maimon criticizes 
Schulze’s skepticism precisely because it retains this pre-critical understanding of 
knowledge: 
Your [Schulze’s] skepticism only differs from [the critical skepticism] in that, as 
regards the being or non-being of things in themselves and their properties, critical 
philosophy not only holds that so far nothing certain has been established about them 
in accordance with universally valid principles, but also that nothing can be so 
established in principle. Your skepticism, although it appears on the surface to stand 
even more radically opposed to dogmatism than critical philosophy, is in fact much 
more in sympathy with it (Logik, GW V, 299-300, trans. Giovanni) 
Maimon’s position, then, is that Schulze’s is not in fact a true critical 
skepticism – it rests upon dogmatic assumptions in that it supposes that knowledge 
describes a relation between objects of experience and mind-independent states of 
affairs – an assumption that is revealed in his belief that knowledge of mind-
independent things-in-themselves remains a theoretical possibility.  ‘My skepticism, 
on the contrary,’ Maimon claims, ‘far from saying anything in support of dogmatism, 
                                                
27 According to Breazeale, this is Fichte’s strategy in addressing Maimonian skepticism. See 
Breazeale, 2013, chapter 2. 
28 See Beiser, 2003, p.238. Charlotte Katzoff too, I think, makes this mistake (See Katzoff, 1975). 
Katzoff argues that Maimon’s skepticism is not post-Kantian in that it rests upon a dogmatic 
interpretation of Kant’s theory of knowledge according to which the subject/object distinction 
transcends experience (and manifests itself as an object-in-itself and a subject-in-itself), and that 
Maimon incorrectly believes that Kant has grounded knowledge in a subject-in-itself. 
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stands opposed to it even more so than critical philosophy does’ (Logik, GW V, 300, 
trans. Di Giovanni). Maimon accepts the Kantian account of knowledge as a relation 
between judgments and objects of experience, but he doubts the possibility of even 
this kind of knowledge within the Kantian framework. ‘Critical philosophy’, he 
writes, ‘accepts the actual thinking of objects in accordance with conditions grounded 
in the faculty of cognition a priori as a fact of consciousness, and only shows in 
which way they are conditions. Skepticism puts that same fact in doubt’ (Logik, GW 
V, 301-302 trans. Di Giovanni). Maimon’s commitment to transcendental idealism 
can, I think, be seen most clearly in the following passage from the Logik: 
That in knowledge which remains unchanged throughout all changes in the subject, is 
the objective. That, however, which changes along with changes in the subject, is the 
merely subjective in knowledge. We can determine as little of the subject itself 
(outside the I) as of the object of knowledge itself outside the faculty of knowledge 
(the object in itself), … If the objective is to be distinguished from the merely 
subjective in knowledge (which distinction is of great importance in the whole of 
philosophy), then we must look for this distinction not in the ground (in the source) 
but instead in the faculty of knowledge itself. (Logik, GW V, 176-177, emphasis 
added) 
Whether or not we presuppose a subject / object relation that is external to the faculty 
of knowledge, cognisance of the subjective / objective distinction itself requires that 
there is a ground that is internal to the faculty of knowledge. If we are capable of 
distinguishing between subjective and objective, in other words, then there must be 
some basis within experience on which we do so.  
A second line of interpretation takes Maimon’s skepticism, and as a 
consequence his rationalism, to result from his position with respect to Kant’s thing-
in-itself, and for reasons that closely resemble those that Jacobi cites. Maimon rejects 
the given in experience, so this line of argument goes, because he is skeptical about 
Kant’s thing-in-itself. Since the thing-in-itself is supposed to serve as a mind-
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independent ground of experience, its removal means that Maimon must account for 
the totality of experience purely in terms of the activity of the subject. Hugo Eduardo 
Herrera (2010), Samuel Atlas (1964), and Charlotte Katzoff (1981) in particular, are 
advocates of this line of interpretation. ‘Maimon’s philosophy’, Atlas writes for 
example: 
is thus based, first, on the disproof of metaphysical entities, such as things-in-
themselves, understood as substances bearing appearances, and, second, on the 
reflective analysis of the phenomena of consciousness as such, establishing the 
necessity for a complete correlation between consciousness and its object. (1964, 
p.20, emphasis added) 
While it is true that Maimon denies that the thing-in-itself can be thought as 
the mind-independent ground of appearances, my position is that Maimon’s 
rationalism and his denial of the merely given are not dependent upon his position 
with respect to things-in-themselves. One reason is that Maimon, like Fichte, does not 
believe that these criticisms concerning the thing-in-itself pose a real problem for 
Kant because he does not take Kant’s thing in itself to be a metaphysically distinct 
entity which stands as the cause of the representation. Criticisms concerning a 
particular conception of the thing-in-itself are therefore aimed not at Kant himself but 
instead only at particular commentators on Kant. As is reflected in his criticism of 
Schulze, Maimon does not think that things-in-themselves are the unknowable source 
of appearances, but instead that the Kantian thing-in-itself is by definition 
unknowable in that it does not conform to the conditions of judgment: 
Kant very often uses the word ‘given’ in connection with the matter of intuition; by 
this he does not mean (and nor do I) something within us that has a cause outside us, 
for this cannot be perceived directly, but merely inferred. … ‘given’ signifies only 
this: a representation that arises in us in an unknown way (VT, GW II, 203, emphasis 
added) 
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It is clear from the above passage that Maimon does not think that Kant remains 
dogmatic with respect to things in themselves, and Maimon’s position on the thing-
in-itself should not itself, therefore, require a reformulation of Kant’s transcendental 
idealism. A further implication of the passage, however, and a further reason for 
rejecting the claim that Maimon’s skepticism is, primarily, a skepticism about things-
in-themselves, is that a denial of the mind-independent thing-in-itself does not in 
itself require that we account for the totality of experience purely in terms of the 
activity of the subject. We can simply accept that there is an aspect of experience that 
we are unable to account for, and can remain neutral as to the question of its source. 
If Maimon is to deny that there is a merely given component of experience, then his 
argument must therefore be made on grounds that are internal to knowledge.  In 
chapter four I argue that Maimon’s treatment of the given is a consequence of his 
quaestio juris line of argument, which concerns Kant’s discursivity thesis. Maimon’s 
claim, I propose, is that complete rational determination is a condition on the 
possibility of perceptual judgment: a claim is that independent of his position with 
respect to the thing-in-itself.  
1.3.2 Maimon and modern forms of skepticism 
I have argued, then, that Maimon should be considered post-Kantian insofar as he is 
not a transcendental realist. This should mean that his skepticism does not result from 
empirical idealism, and that his position is therefore distinct from those of Descartes 
and Berkeley. Maimon is, in fact, an empirical realist: when we have experience of an 
object, this experience does not happen indirectly by way of a representation in the 
way in which the Cartesian skeptic thinks that it does. ‘If I say: I am conscious of 
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something,’, Maimon claims, ‘I do not understand by this something that is outside 
consciousness, which is self-contradictory; but merely the determinate mode of 
consciousness, i.e. of the act itself’ (VT, GW II, 29-30).29 Thus, we perceive objects 
of experience directly, and any skeptical claims must concern the object of 
perception. Maimonian skepticism, then, does not concern the relation between 
representations and the mind-independent objects they are taken to represent, nor 
between judgments and mind-independent objects of judgments. Instead, the 
distinctive Maimonian claim is that we can remain skeptical about the application of 
concepts such as that of causality to objects of experience even where those objects of 
experience are mind-dependent or, in other words, where the subjective / objective 
distinction is internal to the faculty of knowledge.  
I have so far argued that Maimon’s empirical realism distinguishes him from 
the Cartesian skeptic. As discussed, however, Humean skepticism does not 
necessarily presuppose empirical idealism, and Maimon’s empirical realism will not 
in itself, therefore, distinguish his skeptical standpoint from that of Hume. Maimon’s 
rejection of transcendental realism does, I suggest however, mean that his skeptical 
position is distinct from Hume’s. Hume is skeptical about the inference from present 
states of affairs to other non-perceived states of affairs because he holds that the 
inference is made on the basis of concepts (in particular that of causality) that appear 
to have no empirical or rational basis. Kant’s response is to show that such inferences 
are valid because concepts such as that of causality are themselves constitutive of 
                                                
29 See also VT, GW II, 30: ‘The word “representation”, used of the primitive consciousness, … leads 
us astray; for in fact this is not representation, i.e. a mere making present of what is not now present, 
but rather presentation, i.e. the representation of what was previously not as existing’  
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objectivity (or objective states of affairs) in general. Maimon concedes this Kantian 
point: objectivity is not merely given but must be constructed; certain synthetic a 
priori forms of judgment are valid not because they are rationally grounded, nor 
because they derive from experience, but because they are concerned with the 
necessary structure of knowledge itself.  
According to Maimon’s quaestio facti line of argument, however, Kant has 
not provided an adequate response to the Humean skeptic in that he has failed to 
respond to the demands of the quaestio facti; on the one hand, Kant has established 
that a priori determination is a condition on the possibility of subject/objectivity, and 
on the other he has determined that the application of the categories, including that of 
causality, is a condition on a certain kind of objectivity. Maimon does not think that 
Kant has done enough, however, to show either that the a priori determination 
happens by way of the particular categories that are outlined in the Metaphysical 
Deduction, or that our experience is of the particular kind that would require the 
application of those categories. As a consequence, Kant has established against Hume 
only that the mathematical and transcendental judgments can have objective validity, 
but not that they in fact do.  
1.3.3 Maimon and ancient skepticism 
Maimon’s skepticism remains closer to the modern than to the Pyrrhonian variety 
insofar as his is not a global skepticism, nor a skeptical methodology, but instead an 
attempt to further Kant’s critical system by identifying vulnerabilities within it. 
Maimon is skeptical, for example, about the actuality of natural causality while 
remaining committed to the central Kantian claim: objectivity is constructed by, as 
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opposed to given to, the subject. As discussed, it is Kant’s view that a resolution of 
antinomy is possible once we reject the premise of transcendental realism. As will be 
argued in chapter six, Maimon’s rationalism does make a resolution of the antinomies 
of reason problematic. Maimon does at least think, however, that a resolution of the 
antinomies along Kantian lines is possible within his own system. He at least does not 
think himself to be, therefore, vulnerable to Pyrrhonian skepticism in the form of 
metaphysical antinomy. Like Kant, Maimon holds that the antinomies arise because 
we confuse objects of experience with things in themselves. As will be seen in 
chapter six, in Maimon’s case, this means that we attempt to represent the fully 
rationalised object to ourselves in space and time, when spatiotemporality is itself a 
product of incomplete rationalisation.  
1.4 Conclusion 
In the above I have identified three key groups of pre-Kantian skepticism – 
Pyrrhonian, modern and early post-Kantian, and have argued that these forms of 
skepticism rest upon pre-critical foundations. As a consequence, I have argued that 
Maimonian skepticism, which does not presuppose transcendental realism, and which 
is not, therefore pre-critical, constitutes a distinct, post-Kantian variety of skepticism. 
In this respect, I distinguish the reading that I offer in the course of this dissertation 
from a number of other lines of interpretation, which identify Maimon’s skepticism 
with that of either Hume or Descartes or with early commentators on Kant. Maimon’s 
skepticism thus poses a serious threat to Kant’s critical project insofar as it reveals 
problems that are internal to the Kantian account of knowledge. 
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Chapter Two: ‘Quid juris?’, ‘quid facti?’ and the problem of 
objective validity 
I turn in the next three chapters to the details of Maimon’s skepticism. It is well 
established that Maimon’s skeptical concerns can be divided into two distinct lines of 
argument: the quaestio juris and the quaestio facti - terms which he borrows from the 
introduction to Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. It is much less clear, however, 
exactly what Maimon understands by these terms; in particular, Maimon’s claim that 
Kant’s response to the ‘quaestio juris’ must ‘presuppose as indubitable the fact that 
we possess a set of experiential [synthetic a priori] propositions’ (VT, GW II, 5), and 
his claim that the answer to the quaestio facti is, for Kant, simply a matter of 
judgment about which nothing more can be said,30 may appear misguided in light of 
contemporary readings according to which the quaestio facti is supposed to have been 
addressed in the Metaphysical Deduction and the actuality of synthetic a priori 
propositions is supposed to be established in the Transcendental Deduction. Neither is 
it obvious how we are to understand the relation between these two lines of 
Maimonian argument. On some accounts, they remain entirely distinct - two different 
                                                
30 See for example, VT, GW II, 70-71: ‘I come now to the quid facti? Kant mentions this merely in 
passing, but I hold it to be of great importance with respect to the deduction of the categories. Its 
meaning is this: how do we know from our perception that b succeeds a that this succession is 
necessary, whereas the succession of the very same b upon c (which is equally possible) is accidental? 
Kant indeed notes (and rightly) that the answer to this question depends only upon the power of 
judgment and further that no rules can be given for this.’ And VT, GW II, 128: ‘if I perceive 
something preceding and something necessarily following it (without looking to their matter, but to the 
particular determination of succession in general), then I judge that the succession of these objects one 
after the other is objective (whether the perception is itself correct amounts to the answer to the 
question quid facti? It is based only on the power of judgment and no further rules can be given for 
this)’ (emphasis added). 
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strategies for undermining the Kantian system31 – while on others they are  mutually 
dependent, and essential to the development of Maimon’s own transcendental 
system.32 The position that we take on these issues has important implications not 
only in terms of the degree to which Maimonian skepticism poses a problem for Kant, 
but also for our understanding of Maimon’s own rationalism. In order to better 
understand Maimon’s skepticism, in this chapter I examine the distinction as it is 
presented by Kant in the KrV. I hope to show that this confusion around the relation 
between ‘quid juris’ and ‘quid facti’ lines of inquiry is not limited to the secondary 
literature on Maimon, but has its origins in Kant’s own account, and intend that an 
explication of this account will therefore help to clarify Maimon’s position.  
2.1 The origins of the distinction 
The quaestio juris (‘quid juris?’) and the quaestio facti (‘quid facti?’) translate as ‘the 
question of right’ (‘by what right?’) and ‘the question of fact’ (‘what fact?’) 
respectively. The distinction appears in the context of the Transcendental Deduction, 
the aim of which is to establish the objective validity of the categories that have been 
enumerated in the preceding chapter – the Metaphysical Deduction. Surprisingly, 
given the degree of influence that it has had, Kant’s discussion of the distinction itself 
is very brief. He says only that: 
Jurists, when speaking of rights and claims, distinguish in a legal action the question 
of right (quid juris) from the question of fact (quid facti); and they demand that both 
be proved. Proof of the former, which has to state the right or the legal claim, they 
entitle the deduction. (A84/B116) 
                                                
31 See, for example, Beiser 1993, chapter 10. 
32 See, for example, Bransen, 1991. 
 42 
Some work is therefore required if we are to make sense of this legal distinction in 
the context in which Kant employs it. Dieter Henrich’s historical account of the legal 
process of deduction to which Kant refers is helpful here.33 The method of deduction, 
and the corresponding quid juris, quid facti distinction, has its origins in eighteenth-
century property law. While Kant is concerned with our entitlement to make 
particular kinds of judgments, or to employ particular concepts, the original, juridical, 
deduction concerns entitlement to some particular property. A deduction is 
appropriate in this case because the rights associated with this kind of entitlement are 
not absolute but merely hypothetical, or acquired. As such, it is necessary to 
determine both what should constitute legitimate possession (‘quid juris?’), and the 
nature of the acquisition of the possession in any particular case (‘quid facti?’). The 
concern is that the possession is illegitimate or without grounds, and the aim of the 
deduction is to ‘legally trace the possession somebody claims back to its origin’ 
(Henrich, 1989, p.35), with the intention that doing so will establish this legitimacy.34 
The quaestio facti is therefore satisfied once a full account of the circumstances 
surrounding the acquisition is provided, and the quaestio juris is satisfied once it has 
been determined that the relevant rights in fact apply in these circumstances.35 
Importantly, both the quaestio juris and the quaestio facti must be satisfied if the 
possession is to be determined to be legitimate: to determine that a particular set of 
                                                
33 See Henrich, 1989. 
34 See Henrich, 1989, p.35: ‘In order to decide whether an acquired right is real or only presumption, 
one must legally trace the possession somebody claims back to its origin. The process through which a 
possession or a usage is accounted for by explaining its origin, such that the rightfulness of the 
possession or the usage becomes apparent, defines the deduction. Only with regard to acquired rights 
can a deduction be given. This implies that by definition a deduction must refer to an origin’. 
35 See Henrich, 1989, p.36: ‘To answer [the quaestio juris], one has to focus exclusively upon those 
aspects of the acquisition of an allegedly rightful possession by virtue of which a right has been 
bestowed, such that the possession has become a property’. 
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circumstances holds cannot by itself establish the legitimacy of possession because 
the rights associated with the concept of legitimate possession amount to more than 
can be established simply by examination of the facts of possession. Similarly, even if 
a possession can be traced back to some particular feature of an acquisition, the 
legitimacy of the possession cannot be determined until it has been established that in 
this particular case those circumstances do in fact hold. The method of deduction that 
Henrich describes is specific to the Roman law tradition, but the distinction between 
questions of right, or law, and questions of fact exists in many contemporary legal 
systems,36 where a jury is appointed to determine questions of fact, while a judge is 
concerned with the question of law37 – in this case, whether a particular law applies. 
A quaestio juris may arise, for example, in cases where a defendant claims 
diminished responsibility. While there is a question of fact concerning the mental 
state of the defendant, there is also a question of law concerning whether the partial 
defence applies such that, for example, a charge of manslaughter instead of murder 
may be appropriate.38 
2.2 The problem of objective validity and the legitimacy of concepts 
How, then, does this legal analogy map onto Kant’s argument in the Transcendental 
Analytic? Kant first expands on the meaning of the quaestio juris in relation to 
                                                
36 Even here, the distinction proves problematic. See Smith, J.W, 2009. 
37 This division of responsibility is interesting in light of Kant’s later claim, which Maimon picks up 
on, that questions of fact are simply a matter of judgment, and that no laws can be given for these. See 
A133/B172  
38 See Loughnan, 2012, p.236: ‘Whether a particular defendant has the requisite abnormal mental state 
is a question of fact for the jury., although the question of whether a particular clinical condition can 
give rise to such a state is a question of law’. 
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empirical concepts, and his discussion there provides an insight into the more general 
problem of legitimacy: 
Many empirical concepts are employed without question from anyone. Since 
experience is always available for the proof of their objective reality, we believe 
ourselves, even without a deduction, to be justified in appropriating to them a 
meaning, an ascribed significance. But there are also usurpatory concepts, such as 
fortune, fate, which, though allowed to circulate by almost universal indulgence, are 
yet from time to time challenged by the question: quid juris. This demand for a 
deduction involves us in considerable perplexity, no clear legal title, sufficient to 
justify their employment, being obtainable either from experience or from reason. 
(A84-85 / B117) 
So-called empirical concepts supposedly have an empirical warrant: if we want to 
apply the concept ‘dog’ in experience, for example, there are a number of intuitable 
determinations that we can point to in order to justify this application.39 We might 
point out that the creature has four legs, that it makes a barking noise, or even that if 
we examine its DNA under certain conditions we find that it resembles that of other 
animals that we call dogs. Usurpatory concepts on the other hand do not appear to 
have any empirical warrant, making our application of them problematic. If I wish to 
argue that a particular event is a consequence of fate, for example, there do not appear 
to be any empirical grounds that I can point to in order to justify my claim. In the 
terms of the legal analogy, I might say that I have a well-developed concept of what it 
means in abstract terms to commit the crime of theft, but unless there are clearly 
defined empirical markers which determine, for example, ownership, then no matter 
how much empirical evidence I call upon in response to a quaestio facti, I will never 
be able to justify a charge of theft. It is important to distinguish this kind of 
                                                
39 While Kant’s position in the first Critique appears to be that there is no quaestio juris with respect to 
empirical concepts, whether this was, in fact, Kant’s view is a matter of debate. It is sometimes argued, 
for example, that Kant attempts, in the third Critique, to address a quaestio juris with respect to 
empirical concepts. See, for example, Ginsborg (2006a, 2006b) and Kitcher (1986).  
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skepticism, then, from the skepticism that arises with respect to the quaestio facti. 
There are instances where we cannot be sure that we are correct in applying a 
particular concept and not another. We may find, for example, that there is just as 
much empirical evidence in support of our applying the concept of ‘dog’ as that of 
‘fox’. Our application of the concept remains justified however, although not 
necessarily correct, as long as we can point to empirical determinations which 
warrant it.40  
2.3 A priori concepts, or a priori judgments? 
Kant’s concern, at least in the Transcendental Deduction, is not ultimately with 
empirical warrant, or with so-called empirical concepts, but instead with what Kant 
often refers to as ‘a priori concepts’, or with the categories that have been outlined in 
the Metaphysical Deduction. ‘Now among the manifold concepts which form the 
highly complicated web of human knowledge,’ he writes: 
there are some which are marked out for pure a priori employment, in complete 
independence of all experience; and their right to be so employed always demands a 
deduction. For since empirical proofs do not suffice to justify this kind of 
employment, we are faced by the problem how these concepts can relate to objects 
which they yet do not obtain from any experience. The explanation of the manner in 
which concepts can thus relate a priori to objects I entitle their transcendental 
deduction (A85/B117) 
The above passage immediately presents us with a problem, however. In his previous 
discussion of fate and fortune, concepts were supposed to be usurpatory: the problem 
was that the concepts had no corresponding intuitive content so that their application 
in experience could not be justified. Here, however, Kant does not refer to a priori 
                                                
40 For a more detailed examination of Kant’s account of the application of empirical concepts see 
Kitcher, 1990, chapter 8: ‘Cognitive Constraints on Empirical Concepts’.  
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concepts at all, but instead to concepts that are ‘marked out for a priori employment’. 
These two formulations appear to address subtly different skeptical concerns. If the 
issue lies with the concepts themselves, and their lack of intuitable content, then a 
response to the quaestio juris will take the form, primarily, of identifying 
corresponding intuitive content – or of establishing that particular intuitive 
determinations can serve as a warrant for the application of the concept. If, on the 
other hand, the issue lies with the a priori application of concepts then an empirical 
warrant is, by definition, insufficient, and a response to the quaestio juris should 
instead establish that the relevant judgment has universal applicability. While in the 
former case a quaestio juris might concern our right to employ certain concepts (e.g. 
that of causality) within experience, in the latter case, the quaestio juris concerns our 
right to make particular kinds of judgments – i.e. those that express necessity and 
universality (e.g. that every event has a cause). In the former case, then, a response to 
the quaestio juris will require only that we establish that we are justified in applying 
the relevant concepts in experience, while in the latter case a response to the quaestio 
juris will require that we show that certain kinds of judgments are necessarily true of 
all objects of experience. Which is it, then - the a priori status of the concepts 
themselves, or the a priori nature of certain judgments that involve them - that means 
that a deduction is required?  
At first glance, this distinction might appear relatively trivial. Perhaps the two 
formulations are different ways of expressing the same problem: a priori concepts are 
just concepts that are to be employed in a priori judgments or, conversely, a priori 
judgments are simply judgments that employ a priori concepts. Closer analysis 
reveals difficulties in this strategy, however. Suppose that we wish to define apriority 
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primarily in terms of warrant; a judgment is a priori if it is warranted independently 
of experience.41 Analytic judgments, since they are supposed to be a priori should be 
included under this definition: analytic judgments are a priori because they are 
warranted independently of experience. Yet analytic judgments often employ 
concepts that Kant himself would consider empirical, i.e. which do not have an a 
priori origin. If I claim that ‘the red apple is red’, this is an analytic judgment that is 
warranted independently of experience and should on this definition therefore be a 
priori, yet neither the concept of red nor the concept of apple is usually thought to be 
a priori. Maimon himself makes this point when he writes that ‘[i]f I say that the red 
in a is identical to the red in b, then the proposition is analytic even though the 
objects of the comparison are given intuitions’ (VT, GW II, 67). 
It cannot be straightforwardly the case, then, that so-called a priori concepts 
are defined in terms of their employment in a priori judgments. Perhaps we can 
narrow the scope of the term ‘a priori concept’ by defining it as follows: ‘a priori 
concepts can only be employed in a priori judgments, where a priori judgments are 
warranted independently of experience’. In this way, we exclude concepts that have 
their origin in experience, and which are primarily employed in empirical judgments, 
but which can nevertheless be employed in analytic judgments. The problem, 
however, is that many of the concepts which Kant defines as a priori can be 
employed in a posteriori judgments. While the judgment “every event has a cause” is 
supposed to be a priori, the judgment “fire is a cause of smoke” is supposed to be an 
empirical judgment. If, on the other hand, we wish to define the apriority of 
                                                
41 Kant himself appears to adopt this position when he writes that: ‘in view of their [the categories] 
subsequent employment, which has to be entirely independent of experience, they must be in a position 
to show a certificate of birth quite other than that of descent from experiences’ (A86-87/B118-119). 
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judgments in terms of the apriority of the concepts that they employ, we run into 
similar problems: if we claim, for example, that an a priori judgment employs only 
non-empirical concepts, then we, again, exclude certain analytic judgments. 
It seems, then, that we must abandon any effort to define the apriority of 
concepts and the aprioty of judgments in terms of one another. It cannot be the case 
that the a priori concept is defined as such by its employment in a priori judgments, 
nor that a priori judgments are defined by their employment of a priori concepts. 
This seems to leave us with two options. One is to continue to talk of a priori 
concepts but to define them independently of a priori judgments. Again, there are two 
ways in which we can do this. On the one hand, we can maintain the focus on the 
application of concepts as opposed to the concepts themselves, but avoid the problem 
of analytic judgments, by defining the a priori in terms of its universal applicability: 
we can say something like ‘a concept is a priori if it applies to all objects of 
experience’ or ‘a concept is a priori if it can be employed in synthetic a priori 
judgments’. If this is Kant’s intention, however, then his argument in the 
Transcendental Deduction appears to be question begging. On the other hand, we can 
emphasize the status of the concept itself. Here, we can define apriority in terms of 
origin: empirical concepts have their origin in experience, while a priori concepts 
have an origin that is independent of experience (this is usually taken to mean that 
they have their origin in the subject). The other option is to abandon talk of a priori 
concepts entirely: apriority is properly a feature of judgments and not of concepts, 
and Kant’s arguments in the Transcendental Deduction establish the validity of 
particular kinds of judgments (e.g. all events in nature are causally determined), and 
not particular kinds of concepts.  
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In summary, then, it seems that a transcendental deduction may be aimed at 
establishing, or accounting for, the validity of one of the following: 
(1) Concepts which are to apply universally to objects of experience and 
which do not therefore require an empirical warrant42 
(2) Concepts which have a non-empirical origin – which are not arrived at by 
way of experience43 
(3) A priori judgments: judgments which can be warranted independently of 
experience44 
The dominant trends in the secondary literature take Kant to be concerned 
with either (1),  (2) or (3).45 Kant can, I think, however, be seen to conflate (2) and 
(3). Kant appears to move between the two formulations as if they are synonymous. 
He talks of ‘a priori concepts’ throughout the KrV. In particular, at the end of the A-
deduction, he writes: 
If the objects with which our knowledge has to deal were things in themselves, we 
could have no a priori concepts of them. For from what source could we obtain the 
concepts? If we derived them from the object (leaving aside the question how the 
object could become known to us), our concepts would be merely empirical, not a 
                                                
42 By ‘objects of experience’ here, I intend natural objects as opposed to, for example, the object of 
aesthetic experience. 
43 Senderowicz provides a helpful overview of this line of interpretation. See Senderowicz 2005, p.62: 
‘The subjective origin of pure concepts is in this context equivalent to their non-experiential origin. 
Pure concepts are possibly not instantiated by objects (appearances) of experience. A priori judgments 
are possibly false.’  
44 It is, I think, possible, for example, to read Kant as claiming that the categories themselves derive 
from experience, but that the judgments which they refer to are conditions upon experience. In this 
case, the concepts themselves do not have an a priori origin, but merely an a priori warrant.  
45 For examples of (1) see Senderowicz, 2005, and Freudenthal, 2003. There is sometimes a tendency 
in the secondary literature on Maimon to adopt reading (1), perhaps because, as I discuss in chapter 
three, Maimon himself can be seen to advance this reading.; for examples of (2) see Guyer, 2010; 
Proops, 2003; Allison, 2015; Strawson 1966; Horstmann, 1981. Strawson claims, for example, that: 
‘To say that a form of intuition or a concept of an object in general is a priori is, for [Kant], not 
primarily to say that it embodies a limiting condition of any experience of which we can form a 
coherent notion. It is primarily to say something about the source or origin of the corresponding feature 
of experience’ (1966, p.49). For examples of (3) see Ameriks, 1978 and Lau, 2015. 
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priori. And if we derived them from the self, that which is merely in us could not 
determine the character of an object distinct from our representations (A128-129) 
The implication here is clear – apriority has to do with the origin of concepts: 
concepts which we arrive at by way of experience are empirical, while concepts that 
‘derive from the self’ are a priori.46 Similarly, in a later note he writes that ‘[t]he 
universality and necessity in the use of the pure concepts of the understanding betrays 
their origin and that it is either completely impermissible and false or else must not be 
empirical’ (Ak, 18:267, trans. Guyer, 2005). Elsewhere, however, he implies that it is 
the a priori relation of concepts to objects that is at issue: 
The objective validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests … on the fact that, 
so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience 
become possible. They relate of necessity and a priori to objects of experience, for 
the reason that only by means of them can any object whatsoever of experience be 
thought. (A93/B126) 
Yaron Senderowicz (2005) has argued along similar lines, but concluded that it is 
commentators on Kant who are mistaken in conflating these two positions.47 Kant 
cannot be concerned with the objective validity of a priori concepts, Senderowicz 
argues, because apriority already entails objective validity. Senderowicz’ account I 
think, however, fails to recognize the dual sense in which Kant himself uses the term 
a priori: as can be seen by the fact that Senderowicz calls upon passages where a 
priori judgments are said to have universal necessity and, therefore, objective 
validity.48  In this way, then, I follow John Callanan (2011) in holding that Kant does 
                                                
46 My interpretation here is in line with John Callanan’s (see Callanan, 2011). While there are reasons 
to think that Kant allows for the position that so-called a priori concepts are arrived at by way of 
experience, as I will argue later in this chapter, the ultimate origin of the concepts remains, I think, 
subjective.  
47 See Senderowicz 2005, chapters 2 and 3. 
48 See Senderowicz, 2005, chapter 2. 
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not instigate the ‘normative turn’ or the disentanglement of the question of non-
empirical origin from the question of a priori warrant.49 For the present purposes, 
however, the distinction is important because it has implications for our 
understanding of the form of Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Deduction, to 
which I now turn.    
2.4 The form of Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Deduction 
(1) and (2) correspond to two common formulations of the quaestio juris; on (2), the 
quaestio juris must be formulated as a kind of ‘what right?’ question: ‘what right do I 
have to apply concepts that have no corresponding intuitive content to objects of 
experience?’. The problem is that these concepts, because they have a non-empirical 
origin, do not have any corresponding intuitive content, and a response to the 
quaestio juris will therefore require that some corresponding intuitive content be 
identified. For this reason, it is sometimes claimed that the quaestio juris is not 
satisfied until the arguments of the Analytic of Principles have been made.50 On (1), 
however, the quaestio juris can be formulated as a kind of ‘how possible?’ question: 
‘how is it possible that concepts can apply a priori to objects of experience?’. This 
reading allows us to make sense of Kant’s claims at A94/B127 that Hume was forced 
to adopt the skeptical position as a result of his failure to recognize the possibility of 
the synthetic a priori: 
                                                
49 See Callanan, 2011. Senderowicz also criticizes proponents of (2) on the basis that Kant’s notion of 
apriority should already entail objective validity, in which case a transcendental deduction should not 
be necessary in the case of concepts that are already thought to have a non-empirical origin - see 
Senderowicz, 2005. Senderowicz’s argument itself depends, however, on the conflation of these two 
kinds of supposed apriority – that of concepts and that of objects, and therefore, I think, fails as a 
criticism of the proponents of (2).  
50 See, for example, Thielke, 2006. 
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David Hume recognized that, in order to be able to do this [to obtain knowledge 
which far transcends all limits of experience51] it was necessary that these concepts 
should have an a priori origin. But since he could not explain how it can be possible 
that the understanding must think concepts, which are not themselves connected in 
the understanding, as being necessarily connected in the object, and since it never 
occurred to him that the understanding might itself , perhaps, through these concepts, 
be the author of experience in which its objects are found, he was constrained to 
derive them from experience, namely, from a subjective necessity (that is, from 
custom) (emphasis added) 
The implication here is that Kant believes that he is able to offer an alternative to the 
Humean position because he can account for the possibility that a priori truths can 
nevertheless have an objective warrant; in other words, by answering a kind of ‘how 
possible’ question.  
Divisions in the secondary literature between those commentators that take 
Kant to be concerned with the objective validity of certain forms of judgment, and 
those that take him to be concerned with the objective validity of certain concepts, 
also have some overlap with the distinction between so-called progressive and 
regressive readings of Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Deduction.52 On 
regressive interpretations, knowledge of a certain kind is presupposed, and the 
validity of the categories is shown to be a condition on the possibility of that 
knowledge. On progressive readings, on the other hand, the objective validity of 
certain concepts or certain judgments is supposed to be established solely on the basis 
that human cognition is discursive, and not on the basis of any presuppositions about 
the nature or actuality of discursive knowledge. Those commentators that take Kant 
                                                
51 By ‘knowledge which transcends all limits of experience’ here, it might be tempting to think that 
Kant has in mind transcendent metaphysical knowledge. This would not fit, however, with the general 
argument that Kant makes in the Transcendental Deduction and I therefore think this is best 
understood as knowledge which involves necessary connection and which is therefore beyond the 
limits of induction.  
52 Senderowicz argues that not enough attention has been paid to the role of our understanding of 
Kant’s account of apriority in our understanding of his argument in the Transcendental Deduction. See 
Senderowicz, 2005.  
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to be concerned with establishing the objective validity of concepts that have a non-
empirical origin (2) tend to advocate a progressive reading: the arguments of the 
Transcendental Deduction establish that the categories have objective validity 
because synthesis of the manifold by the subject takes place by way of them.53 To 
return to the distinction made above, Kant determines that the categories have 
objective validity. In the case of the progressive reading, the objective validity of the 
categories thus depends on their being ‘in a position to show a certificate of birth 
quite other than descent from experiences’ (A86-87/B119), and, therefore, on their 
being shown to derive from pure forms of thought that are intrinsic to the subject. The 
Metaphysical Deduction is therefore a key component in establishing the validity of 
the categories insofar as Kant there sets out to show that the categories derive from 
the pure logical forms of thought.54 According to Strawson, for example, the 
objective validity of the categories is ensured not because it is only by the application 
of them that we can discern an object of experience in the manifold of intuition, but 
because the unity that we find in the manifold when we do discern an object in this 
way, has already been supplied by the subject, and must have been to the extent that 
as this synthesis of the manifold according to the categories is already a condition on 
the possibility of a manifold of intuitions being attributable to a single subject: 
We shall find that its fundamental premise is that experience contains a diversity of 
elements (intuitions) which, in the case of each subject of experience, must somehow 
be united in a single consciousness capable of judgment, capable, that is, of 
conceptualizing the elements so united. We shall find that its general conclusion is 
                                                
53 See, for example, Allison, 2015, p.180: ‘the understanding has an extra-logical function through 
which it introduces a ‘transcendental content’ into its representations’ and Proops, 2003. 
54 See, for example, Proops, 2003, p.220: ‘the question of a concept’s legitimacy turns upon facts about 
its origins’ 
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that this unity requires another kind of unity or connectedness on the part of the 
multifarious elements (Strawson, 1966, p.50) 55 
Similarly, on Henrich’s reading, §20 of the Transcendental Deduction establishes that 
the application of the categories is a condition on the unity of intuition in general 
(‘that intuitions are subject to the categories insofar as they, as intuitions, already 
possess unity’ (1969, p.645)), but §26 is supposed to establish, further, that the 
manifold of sensible intuition is a unity of this kind: that it is a condition of 
experiences being attributable to a single subject that intuitions are unified in this 
way. The categories therefore serve as conditions on the possibility of unity both at 
the level of the sensible intuition of an object and at the level of the thought of it. As 
a consequence, the synthesis of apprehension is not only a condition on the possibility 
of the experience of objects, but also of ‘perception, that is, empirical consciousness 
of the intuition’ (B160):  
 In this manner it is proved that the synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, 
must necessarily be inconformity with the synthesis of apperception, which is 
intellectual and is contained in the category completely a priori. It is one and the 
same spontaneity which in one case, under the title of imagination, and in the other 
case, under the title of understanding, brings combination into the manifold of 
intuition. (B161) 
Those commentators that take Kant to be concerned with the validity of the 
universal application of particular concepts - (1) - on the other hand, tend to be 
proponents of the regressive reading: the application of the categories is, so this 
reading goes, a condition on the possibility of objectivity, or knowledge, in general, 
which must itself be merely presupposed. These readings ask how certain forms of 
                                                
55 Passages such as the following support this line of interpretation: ‘All synthesis, therefore, even that 
which renders perception possible, is subject to the categories; and since experience is knowledge by 
means of connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are 
therefore valid a priori for all objects of experience’ (B161) 
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judgment are possible, and transcendental idealism turns out to play an essential role 
in the response to this question. The success of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction is 
thought to depend upon his showing that certain a priori forms of judgment (e.g. the 
judgment that every event has a cause) are conditions on the possibility of knowledge 
in general.56  On the most extreme regressive interpretations, the actuality of synthetic 
a priori judgments such as that all natural objects are subject to causal laws is 
presupposed, and the Transcendental Deduction shows that this is possible because 
the categories are employed in the synthesis of the manifold (this reading is 
particularly common in the Maimonian literature). According to more moderate 
variants of the regressive interpretation, knowledge in general is presupposed, and the 
employment of certain concepts is shown to be a condition on the possibility of such 
knowledge, ensuring that those concepts have universal applicability. Within the 
regressive interpretation there is an important distinction to be made between those 
interpretations which take the starting point of the transcendental deduction to be the 
possibility of objective knowledge, and those which take the starting point to be 
judgment or knowledge in general. Ameriks’ account serves as an example of the first 
kind. According to Ameriks, Kant establishes the objective validity of the categories 
by showing their application to be a condition on the possibility of objectivity, and 
thus objective knowledge, in general. As a consequence, the argument is not complete 
                                                
56 See Ameriks, 1978. According to Ameriks, the transcendental deduction of the categories is best 
understood by examining the arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic (which, as will be seen, Kant 
claims provide a transcendental deduction of space and time). Since the Transcendental Aesthetic 
argues from the premise that mathematical knowledge is objectively valid to the thesis of 
Transcendental Idealism, Ameriks argues that the Transcendental Deduction should be interpreted 
along similar lines.  
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until the Principles, where the reasons for this dependence are revealed. 57 Chong-Fuk 
Lau’s interpretation serves as an example of the second. Lau argues that the 
categories attain ‘second-order objective validity’ as a result of their necessary 
employment in judgments which express ‘first-order objective validity’ (i.e. empirical 
judgments). As such, the category does not acquire validity through its applicability 
to empirical objects, ‘but rather in [its] validity to the structure by virtue of which 
empirical concepts can be related to objects and acquire first-order objective validity’ 
(2015, p.457). Kant appears to argue along these lines in the second analogy, for 
example, when he claims that: 
the relation of appearances (as possible perceptions) according to which the 
subsequent event, that which happens, is, as to its existence, necessarily determined 
in time by something preceding in conformity with a rule – in other words the 
relation of cause and effect – is the condition of the objective validity of our 
empirical judgments, in respect of the series of perceptions, and so of their empirical 
truth; that is to say, it is the condition of experience. (A202/B247) 
On Lau’s interpretation it is not necessary that Kant determine that we do in fact have 
experience in order to determine the validity of the categories – the claim is simply 
that the application of the categories is implicit in all knowledge.  
It is important to note here that these two versions of the regressive argument 
answer to subtly different demands; on Ameriks’ interpretation, it must be shown that 
the categories are conditions on the possibility of objects of experience whereas on 
Lau’s interpretation, it must be shown that the categories are conditions on the 
possibility of knowledge. Both, however, must establish not only that the categories 
                                                
57 See Ameriks, 1978. Ameriks argues that Kant establishes the objective validity of the categories by 
showing that objective experience, and therefore objective knowledge in general, is dependent on the 
validity of the categories.  
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play such a role in the case of human judgment or knowledge, but also that they are 
necessary forms of knowledge in general.58  
2.5 The quaestio facti 
I hope to have established in the above, then, that there are multiple ways of 
interpreting Kant’s quaestio juris, and thus multiple ways of understanding the 
Transcendental Deduction as a response to it. I turn now to a consideration of the 
quaestio facti. It is often thought that a response to the quaestio facti serves as the 
premise of the transcendental deduction.59 The strongest evidence in support of this 
claim appears to be that when he introduces the distinction between the quaestio juris 
and the quaestio facti, Kant appears to claim that proof of the validity of the 
categories requires that both be resolved: 
Jurists, when speaking of rights and claims, distinguish in a legal action the question 
of right (quid juris) from the question of fact (quid facti); and they demand that both 
be proved. Proof of the former, which has to state the right or the legal claim, they 
entitle the deduction. (A84/B116, emphasis added) 
On progressive interpretations, the quaestio facti is therefore often taken to concern 
the supposed a priori origin of the categories, or the fact of synthetic unity: the 
arguments of the Transcendental Deduction establish that if the categories derive 
from a priori forms of thought then they have objective validity insofar as it is 
                                                
58 It is important to note one further area of uncertainty. The claim here is that the categories are 
legitimate because their application is a condition on the possibility of judgment in general. Kant 
distinguishes, however, between two types of judgment: judgments of experience and judgments of 
perception. Judgments of experience entail objectivity, while judgments of perception do not. There is 
some debate around whether Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Deduction establishes only that 
judgments of experience entail the application of the categories, or whether judgments of perception do 
too. For a detailed discussion of this see Longuenesse, 1998, chapter 7 and Allison, 2012, chapter 2.  
59 See, for example, Proops, 2003 and Henrich, 1989. 
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through the application of them to the sensible manifold that experience is possible.60 
Alternatively, the transcendental unity of apperception is sometimes thought to serve 
as both the answer to the quaestio facti and the premise of the transcendental 
deduction. Henrich (1989, p.43), for example, appears to make this claim.  In the case 
of the regressive interpretation, on the other hand, the quaestio facti is thought to be 
empirical in nature: it is the ‘fact of objective experience’ or the ‘fact of knowledge’ 
from which the deduction of the categories proceeds.61 
Kant’s later discussion of Locke presents a problem for these readings, 
however, and in particular for the progressive reading.62 Here, Kant appears to 
consider Locke’s ‘attempted physiological derivation’ of the categories to be one 
possible means of addressing the quaestio juris, and rejects it on the grounds that it 
‘concerns a quaestio facti [and so] cannot strictly be called deduction’. Instead, Kant 
claims, ‘I shall … entitle it the explanation of the possession of pure knowledge’: 
                                                
60 For examples of commentators who take the quaestio facti to be concerned with the a priori origins 
of the categories see Allison, 2001, p.82: ‘The concern of the quid or quaestio facti is thus with the 
mode of origination of a concept. More specifically, it is with whether a concept has an a priori or an 
empirical origin. The underlying assumption is that the former mode of origination is at least a 
necessary condition for any non-empirical use of a concept; and in the Critique of Pure Reason it is the 
so-called Metaphysical Deduction that supposedly establishes such an origin for the pure concepts of 
the understanding by deriving them from the logical functions of judgment. Accordingly it is in the 
Metaphysical Deduction that the quid facti is addressed in the first Critique’. See also Proops, 2003. 
Proops argues that, since the quaestio facti in the legal analogy usually concerned a question of origin 
the quaestio facti in the case of the deduction of the categories should also be concerned with a 
question of origin: ‘in most deductions the first step to be taken in justifying one’s claim would have 
been to establish one’s parentage’ (Proops, 2003, p.220) and ‘The Deduction’s factum is not merely a 
fact in which certain claims originate. Although it is at least that, it is, in addition, a fact specifically 
about origins, namely, the fact that the concepts of cause, substance, and so forth, have origins that are 
a priori’ (Proops, 2003, p.220-221). For an example of a commentator who takes the quaestio facti to 
be concerned with the fact of transcendental apperception see Henrich, 1989, p.43. 
61 See, for example, Ameriks, 1978. 
62 This passage also poses more serious problems for the progressive reading in that it appears to 
suggest that the origins of the categories are not a priori. I think, however, that the threat is mitigated 
by Kant’s claim that experience is the ‘de facto’ mode of origin, with the implication being that 
experience may help us to arrive at a conscious awareness of these concepts, but that it does not serve 
as their ultimate origin.  
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Such an investigation of the first strivings of our knowledge, whereby it advances 
from particular presentations to universal concepts, is undoubtedly of great service. 
We are indebted to the celebrated Locke for opening out this new line of enquiry. But 
a deduction of the pure a priori concepts can never be obtained in this manner; it is 
not to be looked for in any such direction. For in view of their subsequent 
employment, which has to be entirely independent of experience, they must be in a 
position to show a certificate of birth quite other than that of descent from 
experience. Since this attempted physiological derivation concerns a quaestio facti, it 
cannot strictly be called deduction, and I shall therefore entitle it the explanation of 
the possession of pure knowledge. (A86-87/B119) 
Similarly, Kant writes in a later note that: ‘[t]he quaestio facti is the way in which one 
has first come into the possession of a concept’ (Ak 18:267, trans. Guyer, 2005). If an 
explanation of our possession of the concepts that make up the categories of the 
understanding responds to the quaestio facti, then it does not seem to be the case that 
an answer to the quaestio facti is essential in responding to the quaestio juris at all. 
Put differently, it does not seem that the response to the quaestio facti serves as the 
premise of the transcendental deduction. As a result, some commentators have argued 
that the quaestio facti is entirely distinct from the question of the premise of the 
transcendental deduction. Guyer claims, for example, that the quaestio facti ‘refer[s] 
to empirical evidence for the legitimate employment or “objective reality” of merely 
empirical concepts’ (2010, p.119, emphasis added), and is not, therefore, relevant in 
the context of a priori concepts. Similarly, Senderowicz argues that ‘in the context in 
which they are asked, Kant does not conceive the ‘quaestio facti’ and the ‘quaestio 
juris’ as two questions which both need to be addressed within the same epistemic 
enterprise’ (Senderowicz, p.73).63 In the case of a priori concepts, Senderowicz 
                                                
63 See also Senderowicz, 2005, p.73: ‘a priori concepts are revealed to the mind by abstracting them 
from empirical objects. The empirical objects from which one abstracts are given with their conditions 
of objectivity. The data from which one abstracts is, in other words, a priori laden. But although such a 
method reveals to the mind that it is possible to remove the properties ‘which experience teaches’ from 
the objects of experience and to be left with some general features of these objects, it cannot account 
for the lawfulness of a priori use that is an essential part of the content of the abstracted concepts.’ 
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argues, we can arrive at an awareness of the a priori structure of experience by means 
of an abstraction from its contingent sensible properties (i.e. by means of a Lockean 
abstraction), but this cannot tell us anything about the origin of those concepts which, 
because they are supposed to apply necessarily in experience, cannot lie in experience 
itself.  
Neither of these two lines of interpretation is entirely satisfactory, however. In 
order to remain consistent, both seem to require that we overlook a key Kantian 
claim. When we equate a response to the quaestio facti with the premise of the 
transcendental deduction, it seems that we must ignore the claim that Locke’s 
‘attempted physiological derivation concerns a quaestio facti’.64 On the other hand, 
however, if we limit the quaestio facti to the project of accounting for ‘the possession 
of pure knowledge’, we cannot simultaneously make sense of Kant’s legal analogy, 
according to which a response to the quaestio facti should play a central role. Neither, 
it seems, can we make sense of Kant’s claim that the Lockean ‘explanation of the 
possession of pure knowledge’ (A87/B119) is nevertheless useful with respect to a 
priori concepts.65 (A86/B119). 
These difficulties can be resolved, I propose, in the following way. Firstly, I 
suggest that the quaestio facti should be conceived more broadly, as concerning 
                                                
64 In fact, Proops rejects Henrich’s account on precisely these grounds; the transcendental unity of 
apperception cannot serve as a response to the quaestio facti, Proops argues, because a quaestio facti is 
in need of a proof, and no proof of the transcendental unity of apperception can be found in the KrV. 
See Proops, 2003, p.220: ‘a factum stands in need of a proof. Consequently, to complete his 
interpretation Henrich would need to show how the Unity of Apperception could be established by 
means of a proof’. 
65 See A86/B119: ‘Such an investigation of the first strivings of our faculty of knowledge, whereby it 
advances from particular perceptions to universal concepts, is undoubtedly of great service. We are 
indebted to the celebrated Locke for opening out this new line of enquiry’. 
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empirical states of affairs.66 This does, I think, have at least some textual support. 
Kant’s claim, for example, is not that Locke’s account concerns the quaestio facti but 
only a quaestio facti: ‘Since this attempted physiological derivation concerns a 
quaestio facti [eine quaestionum facti67], it cannot strictly be called deduction’ 
(A87/B119).  In this case, it is possible to make sense both of the demand that the 
quaestio facti be resolved, and of the characterisation of the explanation of the 
possession of pure concepts as concerning a form of quaestio facti. The story that I 
give about the way in which I arrive at a particular concept concerns empirical states 
of affairs and, therefore, a quaestio facti. Not all forms of quaestio facti have to do, 
however, with the story of my acquisition of concepts – that, for example, fire is the 
cause of heat is also a matter of empirical fact. Thus, when Kant claims that there is a 
demand that the quaestio facti be resolved, we need not think that the relevant 
quaestio facti concerns our acquisition of the pure concepts of the understanding.  
Secondly, I suggest that Kant does not intend that a response to the quaestio 
facti must serve as the premise of the transcendental deduction. It is not necessarily 
the case then, as Allison and Proops argue that it is, that the Metaphysical Deduction 
responds to a quaestio facti (in fact, that it does not is already implied by my claim 
that the quaestio facti is concerned with empirical matters of fact). Proops in 
particular argues that the Metaphysical Deduction must serve as a response to the 
quaestio facti on the basis of Kant’s claim that ‘‘[j]urists, when speaking of rights and 
claims, distinguish in a legal action the question of right (quid juris) from the 
                                                
66 See, for example, Ak 20:275: ‘[t]he principle, that all knowledge derives from experience alone … 
concerns a quaestio facti, and the fact is admitted without hesitation, but whether it can also be 
deduced from experience alone … this is a quaestio juris’  
67 In the A-edition this is: ‘eine quaestio facti’. 
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question of fact (quid facti); and they demand that both be proved’ (A84/B116, 
emphasis added). In fact, however, Kant’s claim here is not that a response to the 
quaestio juris requires a response to the quaestio facti, but only that the legal process 
requires that both are resolved. In order to make sense of this distinction, it is helpful 
to return to the contemporary legal analogy. There, the quaestio juris and the quaestio 
facti are divided according to who takes responsibility for answering them: as 
discussed, in the case of the quaestio juris, it is ultimately the judge that is 
responsible, while in the case of the quaestio facti, it is a matter for the jury. This is, 
presumably, because no definitive rules can be given for determining matters of fact - 
they always involve some degree of empirical judgment and, therefore, some degree 
of uncertainty. In order to support her claim that a particular charge is warranted, the 
judge may draw upon one or more matters of fact, but these will be distinct from the 
quaestio facti that the jury will attempt to answer (which will result in a judgment of 
guilty or not-guilty). This same principle applies, I suggest, in the case of Kant’s 
transcendental deduction of the categories. If I want to assert that ‘fire causes heat’, I 
will need to be in a position to respond to two kinds of question: I will need to show 
that I am justified in employing the concept of cause at all (and, perhaps that I am 
justified in employing it in this particular case), but even if I can show that I am 
justified in doing so, I will still need to show that my statement is true. Moreover, it is 
possible for me to determine the legitimacy of the judgment – fire and heat are 
extended in time, objects extended in time are subject to the category of substance, 
substances stand in causal relations to one another – without determining the truth of 
the judgment -perhaps fires are not in fact among the various causes of heat. Even 
after the arguments of the Transcendental Deduction have been made, then – even 
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after I have shown that the category of causality is valid – there will still be a quaestio 
facti to answer in relation to any particular claim (i.e., a judgment of true or not-true). 
Even if I have determined the validity of the problematic concept of causality by way 
of a transcendental deduction, in order to determine the truth of the judgment I must 
nevertheless make an appeal to matters of empirical fact (i.e. I must resolve the 
quaestio facti). Conversely, no amount of empirical evidence will be sufficient to 
determine the truth of the judgment ‘fire causes heat’ unless I have established my 
right to employ the concept of causality (unless, that is, I have resolved the quaestio 
juris). Most importantly for my purposes here, responding to this quaestio facti will 
not be a matter for the philosopher, just as responding to the legal quaestio facti is not 
a matter for the judge. While transcendental logic does supply rules for the 
application of the categories in experience,68 and thus has the advantage that it can be 
shown to apply to objects a priori,69 making use of these rules, as will be seen in 
chapter three, nevertheless entails that we make judgments about matters of fact (for 
example that smoke always succeeds and never precedes, fire) for which no further 
rules can be prescribed. Determining the truth of such a judgment will therefore be a 
                                                
68 See A135/B174: ‘Transcendental philosophy has the peculiarity that besides the rule (or rather the 
universal condition of rules), which is given in the pure concept of the understanding, it can also 
specifiy a priori the instance to which the rule is to be applied.”. A further implication is that it is 
arguable that a complete response to the quaestio juris entails the arguments of the Analytic of 
Principles. For a more detailed account of this position see Thielke, 2006. Thielke argues that it is this 
prescription of rules for the application of the categories that distinguishes them from the so-called 
usurpatory concepts: ‘The legitimate status of the categories stands in contrast to the usurpatory 
concepts “fate” and “fortune”, since as Kant aims to show, the categories can be schematized while 
‘fate’ and ‘fortune’ cannot.’ (Thielke, 2006, p.456) 
69 See A135/B175: ‘the advantage, which it possesses over all other didactical sciences, with the 
exception of mathematics, is due to the fact that it deals with concepts which have to relate to objects a 
priori and the objective validity of which cannot be demonstrated a posteriori’ 
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matter for what Kant calls ‘mother-wit’ (A133/B172) – a judgment that is made on an 
individual basis or, perhaps, reached by a consensus of the scientific community.70 
2.6 The quaestio juris and mathematics 
Before concluding this chapter and turning to Maimon’s criticisms of Kant’s 
arguments in the Transcendental Analytic, I would like briefly to consider Kant’s 
discussion of the quaestio juris in the context of mathematics. In a particularly 
intriguing passage from the introduction to the Transcendental Deduction, Kant 
suggests that a transcendental deduction of the form that he intends to carry out with 
respect to the categories, has already been carried out with respect to the concepts of 
space and time: 
[A]lthough it may be admitted that the only kind of deduction of pure a priori 
knowledge is along transcendental lines, it is not at once obvious that a deduction is 
indispensably necessary. We have already, by means of a transcendental deduction, 
traced the concepts of space and time to their sources, and have explained and 
determined their a priori objective validity. Geometry, however, proceeds with 
security in the knowledge that it is completely a priori, and has no need to beseech 
philosophy for any certificate of the pure and legitimate descent of its fundamental 
concept of space. (A87/B119-120) 
 
It seems very likely that Kant is referring to the arguments of the Transcendental 
Aesthetic, where the status of space and time as a priori forms of intuition is 
supposed to have been established. When Kant writes that he has ‘traced the concepts 
                                                
70 In fact, Kant himself alludes to this when he writes, in the Analytic of Principles, that ‘judgment is a 
peculiar talent which can be practised only, and cannot be taught. It is the specific quality of so-called 
mother wit; and its lack no school can make good. For although an abundance of rules borrowed from 
the insight of others may indeed be proffered to, and as it were grafted upon, a limited understanding, 
the power of rightly employing them must belong to the learner himself; and in the absence of such a 
natural gift no rule that may be prescribed to him for this purpose can ensure against misuse. A 
physician, a judge, or a ruler may have at command many excellent pathological, legal, or political 
rules, even to the degree that he may become a profound teacher of them, and yet none the less, may 
easily stumble in their application. For, although admirable in understanding, he may be wanting in 
natural power of judgment.’ (A133-134/B172-173).  
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of space and time to their sources, and … explained and determined their objective 
validity’, the claim is that he has shown the object of the concepts of space and time 
to be a priori: he has ‘traced’ the origin of the concept and found that this origin lies 
in the subject, in the a priori form of intuition.71 By Kant’s own admission, however, 
a transcendental deduction is not strictly necessary in the case of mathematics 
because mathematical judgments are supposed to be self-evidently true a priori. It 
seems that there are two implications of this passage. There are implications for 
certain extreme regressive readings insofar as Kant’s claim that a transcendental 
deduction is not strictly necessary because of the a priori truth of mathematical 
judgments suggests that the transcendental deduction of the categories, since Kant  
does deem it necessary, cannot proceed on the presupposition of synthetic a priori 
judgments in metaphysics or the natural sciences.72 A second implication has to do 
with the nature of the quaestio juris. While the strategy in the case of the 
transcendental deduction of the categories is to show that concepts that are usually 
thought of as somehow derived from experience, in fact have their origin in the 
understanding, and in the activity of the understanding in unifying the manifold, 
                                                
71 It is interesting to note here that Kant talks of transcendental deduction primarily in terms of the 
origin of concepts: in the case of space, the origin of the concept is supposed to be the pure form of 
intuition. In the case of the Transcendental Aesthetic, however, a resolution of the quaestio juris 
entails that we say something about the origin of the object to which the concept is to apply, and not to 
the concept itself. This further reveals, I think, that the project of transcendental deduction need not 
necessarily rest upon determining the origin of concepts as Kant appears to think that it is, but instead 
on determining the legitimacy of judgments. 
72 This also, I think, poses problems for the interpretations that Melissa McBay Merrit offers (see 
McBay Merrit, 2010). According to McBay Merrit, the arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic 
serve as a transcendental deduction because it identifies a corresponding intuitive content: ‘The 
Transcendental Expositions, then, show that the concepts of space and time – as presented in the 
Metaphysical Expositions – do indeed refer to something real, something that actually exists’ (2010, 
p.10). As I have argued, however, that the concepts of space and time have objective validity is already 
supposed, Kant thinks, to be self-evident in the case of mathematics. If all that the Transcendental 
Aesthetic has achieved is to establish this fact, then it remains unclear exactly what work it is really 
doing.  
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Kant’s strategy in the transcendental deduction of space and time is, I propose, 
entirely the reverse. The conceptual foundations of mathematics are usually taken to 
derive, if they derive from anything at all, only from further, conceptual principles: in 
Kant’s terms, mathematics is generally thought to be an analytic as opposed to a 
synthetic science. Kant’s innovation, then, is to show that the warrant in the case of 
mathematical judgments is not in fact conceptual but intuitive: that the conceptual 
foundations of the a priori science of mathematics derive from something that is non-
conceptual – the forms of intuition. In this way, then, the arguments of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, insofar as they serve as a transcendental deduction of space 
and time, serve to establish the possibility of a particular kind of judgment: the 
synthetic a priori, and to show that mathematics constitutes a body of this kind of 
knowledge.73 By extension, then, we can consider the arguments of the 
Transcendental Deduction, too, to establish the possibility of a body of synthetic a 
priori knowledge: the foundations of natural science. The transcendental deduction of 
the categories, then, establishes the fact of the objective validity of the categories, but 
in doing so it also establishes the conditions on the possibility of that fact. An 
analysis of Kant’s claims about the nature of the transcendental deduction of space 
and time reveals, then, that the method of transcendental deduction serves a dual 
purpose: it establishes both that a particular concept or judgment is objectively valid 
(this is implied by Kant’s claim that a transcendental deduction is not strictly 
                                                
73 This reading is supported, I think, by Kant’s claim that ‘In the course of this investigation [the 
Transcendental Aesthetic] it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible intuition, serving 
as principles of a priori knowledge, namely space and time.’ (A22/B36, emphasis added); and his 
description of the aims of the transcendental exposition of space: ‘Geometry is a science which 
determines the properties of space synthetically and yet a priori. What, then, must be our 
representation of space, in order that such knowledge of it may be possible?” (A40/B40) and of time: 
“our concept of time explains the possibility of that body of a priori synthetic knowledge which is 
exhibited in the general doctrine of motion.’ (A32/B49). 
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necessary in the case of mathematics) and how or why a concept or judgment is 
objectively valid (as is implied by his characterisation of the arguments of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic as a form of transcendental deduction) – a distinction that 
will later become important in understanding Maimon’s posing of a quaestio juris in 
the context of mathematics.  
2.7 Conclusion 
There are two conclusions which I would like to draw on the basis of the above, and 
which will be key in the remainder of the dissertation: 
 
1. A transcendental deduction serves two purposes: 1) it establishes that a 
particular concept or judgment has objective validity and 2) it establishes why 
or how that concept has objective validity. For this reason, then, a quaestio 
juris can be seen to pose two questions: it concerns the fact of objective 
validity, but it also concerns the conditions of its possibility.  
 
2. The quaestio facti and the quaestio juris must both be resolved if the truth of a 
judgment is to be determined. A response to the quaestio juris is not 
necessarily dependent on a response to the quaestio facti, however, and it is 
therefore possible to determine the legitimacy of a judgment independently of 
its truth.  
 
Further, however, my hope is that the above discussion will help to make sense of the 
diversity that characterizes the various interpretations of Maimon’s skeptical 
arguments, which I will consider in chapters three and four. To assess Maimon’s 
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claims from the standpoint of a contemporary Kantian can be difficult because there 
is no singular Kantian standpoint from which to do so. We cannot make sense of 
Maimon’s claim that Kant’s transcendental idealism remains susceptible to 
skepticism along the lines ‘quaestio juris’ unless we know which of the above forms 
of quaestio juris he has in mind. When Maimon raises the quaestio juris with respect 
to a concept, does he have in mind the objective validity of the application of 
concepts or judgments? And is the quaestio juris primarily a question of possibility, 
or of validity? Similarly, when he raises the quaestio facti, is he concerned with the 
question of how we come to acquire concepts within experience, with the derivation 
of the categories of the understanding from the pure forms of judgment, with the 
supposed objectivity of experience, or with the question of the a priori nature of the 
application of the categories? My intention in the next two chapters is to answer these 
questions, and to show that Maimon’s skepticism does in fact pose a serious problem 
for Kant.  
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Chapter Three: Maimon’s quaestio facti as a form of critical 
skepticism 
At the end of the last chapter I concluded that the success of Kant’s transcendental 
deduction of the categories need not necessarily rest upon a complete response to the 
quaestio facti. Skepticism about the legitimacy of concepts (which I will call critical 
skepticism74) is distinct from skepticism about the truth of any particular judgment 
which employs that concept (which I will call empirical skepticism). On Kant’s 
argument in the introduction to the Transcendental Deduction, empirical concepts 
maintain their legitimacy even though we can never be certain that our application of 
them is correct. The concept of the Yeti, for example, may be subject to empirical 
skepticism – we may doubt that such a creature exists - while at the same time being 
resistant to critical skepticism – we may be justified in applying the concept because 
there are empirical warrants for doing so (the degree to which these warrants should 
be considered adequate is, in the terms of Kant’s legal metaphor, a matter for the 
jury). Similarly, in the case of judgments involving the categories, these judgments 
can be legitimate and not, therefore, susceptible to critical skepticism, while at the 
same time being susceptible to empirical skepticism: we might, for example, hold that 
the category of causality is legitimate while at the same time remaining skeptical 
about the correctness of particular causal judgments – which is, after all, simply a 
matter of judgment. If we want to define this distinction more precisely, I suggest that 
the following general rule may prove helpful. In the case of empirical skepticism – 
                                                
74 It should be noted that my use of the term ‘critical skepticism’ here differs from ‘critical skepticism’ 
as characterised by Breazeale. See 1.3 of this dissertation.  
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i.e. skepticism of the form quaestio facti – a completed induction, or the totality of 
possible experience or of empirical facts, should be sufficient settle the matter. The 
skeptic about the existence of the Yeti should be considered an empirical skeptic 
because the totality of possible experience should provide us with a decisive answer 
one way or the other; the Yeti either exists or it does not. In the case of critical 
skepticism, however, the matter remains undecided even if we are presented with the 
totality of possible experience.75 If I am skeptical about the objective validity of the 
concept of fate, for example, no amount of empirical evidence will be sufficient to 
reassure me because the relevant warrants cannot in principle be given to me in 
experience.  
What really matters to Kant, as I hope I have shown in chapter two, is not 
empirical skepticism – he is not concerned with the question of whether fire causes 
heat – but critical skepticism – i.e., the question of whether we are justified in 
employing the category of causality at all. A consequence of this, and one which will 
prove important in the context of the present chapter, is that one does not necessarily 
have to respond to the quaestio facti in order to respond to the quaestio juris;76 i.e., 
one does not have to show that our particular causal judgments are true – that they 
correspond to actual instances of causality - in order to determine that the application 
of the concept of causality is in general valid. Indeed, one need not necessarily hold 
                                                
75 Hume himself appears to make a similar point. See Treatise of Human Nature 1.3.6: ‘It may be 
thought, that what we learn not from one object, we can never learn from a hundred, which are all of 
the same kind, and are perfectly resembling in every circumstance. As our senses shew us in one 
instance two bodies, or motions, or qualities in certain relations of success and contiguity; so our 
memory presents us only with a multitude of instances, wherein we always find like bodies, motions, 
or qualities in like relation. From the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there 
never will arise any new original idea, such as that of a necessary connexion; and the number of 
impressions has in this case no more effect than if we confined ourselves to one only’. 
76 This is a point that Henrich himself makes with respect to the Kantian legal analogy. See Henrich, 
1989, p.36: ‘It is important to realize … that the quaestio juris can be answered in a satisfactory way 
even if the quaestio facti meets with insurmountable difficulties’ 
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that there are in fact any actual instances of causality at all, just as one can remain an 
empirical skeptic about the Yeti while at the same time holding that the concept has 
objective validity.  
If Maimon’s skepticism is to pose a real problem for Kant, it therefore seems 
that the skeptical concerns that it raises must be of the critical as opposed to the 
merely empirical kind; armed with the totality of possible experience, or armed with a 
completed induction, we should still not be in a position to respond to the Maimonian 
skeptic. While Maimon’s skepticism is of the form quaestio facti, then, it must, if it is 
to be successful in undermining Kant’s anti-skeptical arguments, be of the kind that 
does have consequences for Kant’s response to the quaestio juris. In this chapter I 
argue that Maimon’s skepticism is indeed of the critical as opposed to the merely 
empirical kind, insofar as a failure to resolve Maimon’s quaestio facti does have 
implications for Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories, i.e., for his ability 
to respond to the quaestio juris.  
3.1 The application of concepts in experience and the ‘fact of experience’ 
Maimon mentions the quaestio facti explicitly only twice in the VT, and on both 
occasions his concerns appear to constitute empirical, as opposed to critical, 
skepticism insofar as he is concerned with the truth as opposed to the validity of 
judgments involving the categories. The claim appears to be that Kant gives us no 
reliable means of distinguishing between instances where a category (and in 
particular the category of causality) applies, and instances where it does not: 
I come now to the question quid facti? Kant mentions this merely in passing, but I 
hold it to be of great importance with respect to the deduction of the categories. Its 
meaning is this: how do we know from our perception that b succeeds a that this 
succession is necessary, whereas the succession of the very same b upon c (which is 
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equally possible) is accidental? Kant indeed notes (and rightly) that the answer to this 
question depends only on the power of judgment and further that no rules can be 
given for this. (VT, GW II, 70-71) 
if I perceive something preceding and something necessarily following it (without 
looking to their matter, but to the particular determination of succession in general), 
then I judge that the succession of these objects one after the other is objective 
(whether the perception is itself correct amounts to the question quid facti? It is based 
only on the power of judgment and no further rules can be given for this) (VT, GW 
II, 128) 
Maimon claims here that the quaestio facti is ‘of great importance with respect to the 
deduction of the categories’. In both of the above passages, however, the quaestio 
facti with which Maimon is concerned seems to be one that is tangential to the 
deduction of the categories: that is, its resolution does not appear to serve as a 
premise of the transcendental deduction. Maimon himself seems to acknowledge this 
when he writes that ‘Kant indeed notes (and rightly) that the answer to this question 
depends only on the power of judgment and no further rules can be given for this’ and 
that ‘whether this perception is itself correct amount to the question quid facti? It is 
based only on the power of judgment and no further rules can be given for this.’, 
echoing Kant’s own claim that determinations of truth or falsity are a matter for 
‘mother-wit’(A133/B172).77 Why, then, does Maimon think that the quaestio facti 
nevertheless does pose a serious problem for Kant?  
 
                                                
77 Beiser, I think, (and to a lesser degree Peter Thielke – See Thielke, 2008) misinterprets Maimon on 
this point. According to Beiser, Maimon’s claim is that Kant’s transcendental deduction of the 
categories ultimately fails because Kant cannot give a complete account of when the categories should 
and should not be employed, so that we cannot be certain that our application of the categories is, in 
any instance, correct. See Beiser, 2003, p.236-237: ‘Hume pointed out and Kant conceded, all that 
experience ever shows is constant conjunction. This means that in any specific case, we cannot be sure 
that the category of causality really does apply to our experience’. As I have argued, however, the 
success of the transcendental deduction is not, at least not straightforwardly, dependent upon Kant 
having established the certainty of particular causal judgments.  
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3.1.1 Kant’s argument in the Prolegomena 
The tendency in the secondary literature has been to argue that in raising doubts about 
the truth of particular kinds of empirical judgments, Maimon does ultimately seek to 
undermine the validity of the categories by placing the premise(s) of the 
transcendental deduction in question.78 The claim is that Maimon takes Kant to 
merely presuppose the actuality of synthetic a priori judgments in the foundations of 
natural science (see for example Freudenthal, 2003 and Bransen, 1989), or that 
Maimon acknowledges that the categories are conditions on the possibility of 
objective experience, but doubts that our perceptions do in fact amount to objective 
experience (see, for example, Thielke, 2008 and Senderowicz, 2003). It is usually 
argued, however, that Maimon’s argument rests upon misunderstandings about the 
nature of Kant’s argument in the KrV. In particular, Paul Franks has argued that 
Maimon’s understanding of the arguments of the Transcendental Analytic, like that of 
many of the other early post-Kantians, was heavily influenced by Johann Friedrich 
Schultz who was, in turn, heavily influenced by Kant’s Prolegomena.79 The 
arguments of the Prolegomena are, by Kant’s own admission, regressive, or analytic, 
in contrast to the supposedly progressive, or synthetic, method of the KrV.80 While in 
the KrV the application of the categories is shown to be a condition on the possibility 
of experience in general, in the Prolegomena it is shown to be a condition only on a 
particular kind of judgment, namely judgments of experience. ‘While all judgments 
of experience’, Kant writes, ‘are empirical (i.e., have their ground in immediate sense 
                                                
78 See, for example, Thielke, 2008, Senderowicz, 2003; Freudenthal, 2003; Franks 2003; Bergman, 
1967, chapter 4; and Bransen, 1989, chapter 4.  
79 See Franks, 2007; Franks, 2003, p.216; Franks, 2005, pp. 177-180 
80 See Prolegomena, Ak. IV, 263.   
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perception) … all empirical judgments are not judgments of experience’ 
(Prolegomena §18). Judgments of experience, then, are a particular subset of 
empirical judgments. Kant contrasts these with what he calls ‘judgments of 
perception’ (ibid.): 
Empirical judgments, so far as they have objective validity, are judgments of 
experience; but those which are only subjectively valid, I name mere judgments of 
perception. The latter require no pure concept of the understanding, but only the 
logical connection of perception in a thinking subject. But the former always require, 
besides the representation of the sensuous intuition, particular concepts originally 
begotten in the understanding, which produce the objective validity of the judgment 
of experience. (Prolegomena, §18) 
Judgments of experience make reference to a supposedly objective state of affairs 
(e.g. the sun warms the stone), while judgments of perception make reference only to 
subjective perception (the stone is warm). The claim is that the categories are 
employed in judgments of experience, but not in judgments of perception. According 
to Franks, Maimon thus takes Kant to merely presuppose that “we make judgments of 
experience, … which claim necessary and universal connections among sensible 
appearances” and to show that ‘we could not make judgments of experience … unless 
we presupposed universal principles’ (Franks, 2003, p.218). If the categories are valid 
insofar as their employment is a condition on the possibility of objective knowledge, 
then in order to doubt the objective reality of the categories Maimon need only claim 
that there are no true judgments of experience but only judgments of perception: to 
doubt ‘whether we possess experiential propositions’ (VT, GW II, 186). While we 
may think that we are justified in claiming that the sun warmed the stone, he argues, 
in fact we are only ever justified in claiming that we experienced the heat associated 
with the sun followed by the warming of the stone. 
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3.1.2 Kant’s arguments in the Analogies 
Considered in light of the arguments of the Analytic, however, Maimon’s argument is 
generally thought to be problematic. Here I will briefly summarize the arguments of 
the Analytic, and of the Analogies in particular, before considering how Maimon’s 
skepticism might apply to them. As discussed in chapter two, by the end of the 
Transcendental Deduction the adherence of all possible objects of experience to the 
principle of natural causality is supposed to have been established (either absolutely, 
according to progressive readings, or conditionally, according to regressive readings). 
The arguments of the Transcendental Deduction alone do not help us in determining 
the validity of particular employments of the concept, however, because we do not 
yet know what constitutes an object of experience: as Kant will later argue in the 
Transcendental Dialectic, for example, the application of the concept of substance to 
the subject is illegitimate because the concept can be legitimately applied only to 
objects that are extended in time, and we have no experience of the subject as 
extended in this way.81 The Analytic of Principles is therefore intended to address this 
problem by establishing rules for the legitimate application of the categories, and the 
Analogies, specifically, are supposed to establish rules for the application of the 
categories of relation, including that of causality.82  
Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy is that ‘[a]ll alterations take place in 
conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect’ (A189/B232): we are 
entitled to apply the category of causality, then, whenever an alteration of a substance 
                                                
81 See KrV B412-413 
82 It is for this reason that Thielke argues that the quaestio juris is not satisfied in the Transcendental 
Deduction itself, but only after the arguments of the Principles. See Thielke, 2006. 
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occurs, or wherever there is taken to be objective as opposed to merely subjective 
succession. In order to prove that this is the case, Kant argues that the perception of 
objective as opposed to merely subjective succession is itself dependent upon the 
application of the category of causality; all perceptions are successive, and succession 
alone does not therefore necessarily entail alteration, or objective succession.83 In 
order to distinguish objective succession (alteration) from subjective succession, we 
make use of the schematised category of causality - where the temporal relation 
between presentations is thought as necessary (i.e. where one must always precede 
and the other follow), the succession is taken to be objective; where it is thought to be 
contingent, the succession is taken to be merely subjective. Suppose for example, 
Kant argues, that I have two distinct experiences: one as I move around a house, 
viewing it from different angles, and another of a ship moving downstream. In the 
former case, although my perceptions are successive, I do not judge there to be an 
alteration in the house itself, but only in my perception of it. In the latter case, where 
my perceptions are again successive, I instead judge there to be an alteration in the 
ship itself - I take it to have moved downstream. In both cases all that I am presented 
in intuition is subjective succession. How, then, can I distinguish between objective 
alteration and mere subjective succession? Kant’s claim is that I can do so only on the 
basis of the application of the category of causality (meaning that the category of 
causality necessarily has objective validity): if I take a temporal sequence to be 
determined with respect to which perception precedes and which succeeds (i.e. which 
is the cause and which the effect) then I judge the succession to be objective. If, on 
                                                
83 See A189/B234: ‘The apprehension of a manifold of appearance is always successive. The 
representations of the parts follow upon one another. Whether they also follow one another in the 
object is a point which calls for further reflection, and which is not decided by the above statement’  
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the other hand, I hold the relation between preceding and succeeding perceptions to 
be merely contingent, then I judge that the succession is merely subjective. In the 
case of the house, I could have moved around it differently, so that my perceptions of 
it arrived in a different temporal order. In the case of the ship, however, I could not: 
my perceptions of objective succession are somehow constrained.  
Clearly a denial of judgments of perception will not, therefore, be sufficient to 
respond to the arguments of the Analogies, since even the judgment that ‘the stone 
became warmer’ will necessitate the application of the categories of relation, without 
which experience of objects such as stones and fires, which are taken to exist 
externally to us, would not be possible at all. In order to remain skeptical about the 
application of the category of causality in light of the arguments of the Analogies, 
then, it seems that Maimon must hold that we do not have objective experience at all; 
Maimon’s claim must be that because our judgment that a particular temporal 
sequence is determined as opposed to contingent, is dependent upon induction, Kant 
remains susceptible to Humean skepticism. 
Let us suppose, then, that this is in fact the Maimonian position. It may be the 
case that we are mistaken in thinking that there is such a thing as alteration at all; that 
all we are ever really presented with is contingent, and therefore subjective, 
succession; and that we are never justified in applying the concept of causality.84 
                                                
84 See, for example, VT, GW II, 187-188: ‘Kant proves the reality of the concept of cause (or the 
necessity with which b follows a, but not the other way around, i.e., succession according to a rule) as 
follows: apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive (whether this is subjective or 
objective). So the objective can only be distinguished from the subjective by the perception that in the 
former case the sequence is necessary in accordance with a rule, but in the latter it is merely 
contingent. Now I maintain that a necessary sequence in accordance with a rule is not to be found in 
perception, i.e., I deny the fact: if a sequence is supposed to be necessary because I am unable to 
perceive one sequence while perceiving another, then it could not be distinguished from a merely 
contingent sequence, since the perception of one sequence during the perception of another is 
impossible in this case too.’ 
 78 
Since, for Kant, experience just is this determination of objective states of affairs by 
way of the application of the categories of relation to merely subjective succession, to 
deny that the categories of relation do in fact have such an application is to deny the 
‘fact of experience’. 85  Put in the terms of the Kantian example, with respect to the 
category of causality it may be that our perception only ever resembles that of the 
house, and not that of the boat: that there is no objective alteration. On this reading, 
then, Maimon is said to be skeptical either about the ‘fact of experience’ or the ‘fact 
of synthetic a priori knowledge’.86  
The success of this line of argument, however, is questionable. In order to see 
why this is the case it is, I think, helpful to draw on a distinction that Wayne Waxman 
makes with respect to the aims of the Analogies.87 Waxman distinguishes his own 
reading, which he claims establishes the ‘objective reality’ (2003, p.64) of the 
concept of causality, from what he argues is a dominant but misguided reading, which 
takes the arguments of the Analogies to be concerned with establishing the ‘epistemic 
indispensability’ (ibid.) of the relevant concept. This latter reading (which I will call 
the ‘epistemic reading’) attempts to make sense of the Analogies in isolation from 
other arguments that Kant makes in the Analytic and which are concerned with 
objective reality. My intention here is not to argue in favour of one or other of these 
readings, but the distinction can, I think, help to shed light on the ways in which 
                                                
85 See B218-219: ‘Experience is an empirical knowledge, that is, a knowledge which determines an 
object through perceptions. It is a synthesis of perceptions, not contained in perception but itself 
containing in one consciousness the synthetic unity of the manifold of perceptions. This synthetic unity 
constitutes the essential in any knowledge of objects of the senses’. 
86 For examples of the former see Senderowicz 2003 and Bergman, 1967.  For examples of the latter 
see Freudenthal, 2003, p.148: ‘Maimon’s criticism of Kant’s answer to the quid facti (i.e. whether we 
have synthetic judgments a priori) can be summarized thus: Suppose that we have a priori knowledge 
of necessary general principles or laws of nature; how could we know that the empirical cases we 
observe are instantiations of these?’. 
87 See Waxman, 2003, p.63. 
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Maimon’s skepticism can, and cannot, pose a problem for Kant. On the epistemic 
reading, Kant responds to the Humean skeptic by showing that the application of the 
relevant concept is a condition on the possibility of objectivity insofar as it is only on 
the basis of the application of the concept that we are able to distinguish between 
subjective and objective at all. The Humean position is that an objective but non-
causal succession (or a non-causal alteration in a temporally extended substance) is 
possible, and the argument of the second Analogy is therefore anti-skeptical insofar 
as it establishes that the skeptical position already presupposes the objective validity 
of the concept of causality. Clearly, on this reading, Maimon’s skepticism as I have 
presented it so far need not pose a problem for Kant. As Thielke argues, ‘it seems that 
Kant would agree with Maimon that there can be no inference from the subjective 
order of sensations to an objective order of states of the world’ (2001b, p.443). 
Similarly, proponents of certain forms of the regressive reading will believe Kant’s 
arguments to be equally unaffected by Maimon’s skepticism. Lau, for example, holds 
Kant to establish second-order objective validity only on the basis of first-order 
objective validity: Kant’s arguments concern the necessary implicit structures of our 
knowledge claims and do not, therefore, depend upon the objective reality of the 
relevant concepts.88  
 On Waxman’s own reading, however, the arguments of the Analogies are 
intended to establish the objective reality of the relevant concepts, and a skepticism 
about this objective reality should therefore be of concern to Kant. Waxman’s 
argument hinges on the Kantian claim that time cannot itself be perceived.89 This, he 
                                                
88 I have made use here of the distinction between objective reality and objective validity that is 
advanced by Aaron Bunch (See Bunch, 2010). 
89 See A189/B233. 
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argues, implies that temporal and spatial properties can themselves be determined 
only on the basis of the application of the relevant concepts, so that the presentation 
of any form of temporal succession is already indicative of the objective reality of the 
concept of causality:  
‘principles of pure understanding like the Analogies are supposed not simply to be 
valid of nature but to create it; that is, they not only hold of our experience of objects 
(as with Hume) but are constitutive of the objects themselves which make such 
experience possible. (Waxman, 1993, p.71) 
Maimon’s skepticism is of relevance to this line of argument, then, but does it really 
pose a problem for it? It seems not. If Kant’s claim is that a priori concepts of the 
understanding are the means by which the synthesis of the sensible manifold in the 
imagination is first possible (i.e. that without this synthesis there could be no 
temporal determination at all), then Maimon appears to be mistaken in thinking that 
objects (or objective succession) might not be instantiated in experience: their 
instantiation in experience is already a condition on the possibility of even subjective 
succession. In neither case, then, does Maimon’s quaestio facti appear to constitute a 
truly critical skepticism. In the case of the epistemic reading, the question of the 
objective reality of objects is tangential to the question of their validity. On 
Waxman’s reading, the question of the objective reality of objects is bound up with 
the question of their validity, but Maimon fails to acknowledge that the arguments of 
the Analogies are supposed to ensure this objective reality.  
3.2 The reality of the category of causality 
So far it has seemed that Maimon’s quaestio facti line of argument does not pose 
significant problems for Kant – Maimon either misconstrues the aims of the 
Transcendental Analytic insofar as he takes it to be concerned with the objective 
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reality of the categories, as opposed to their validity, or he misrepresents the 
arguments insofar as he fails to acknowledge that the categories are involved even at 
the level of intuition. I propose, however, that further examination of Maimon’s 
argument reveals that his concerns extend beyond the instantiation of objects in 
experience, and that his skepticism does pose problems for both epistemic and 
ontological readings of the Analogies. Moreover, this line of skeptical argument, 
since it concerns the conditions of objectivity apples to both regressive and 
progressive readings.   
In a passage which follows from his initial discussion of the quaestio facti, 
Maimon writes: 
Kant derives the concept of cause from the form of the hypothetical judgment in 
logic. But we could raise the question: how does logic itself come by this peculiar 
form, that if one thing a is posited, another thing b must necessarily also be posited? 
… we do not come across it at all in this context where predicates are stated 
categorically of the subject and properties of the essence …So we have presumably 
abstracted it from its use with real objects, and transferred it into logic; as a result we 
must put the reality of its use beyond doubt before ascribing reality to it as a form of 
thought in logic; but the question is not whether we can use it legitimately, which is 
the question quid juris, but whether the fact is true, namely that we do use it with 
actual objects. (VT, GW II, 71-72 emphasis added) 
This passage, among others, casts doubt, I suggest, on Senderowicz’s claim that 
Maimon does not hold that ‘Kant’s conceptual scheme of objectivity is refutable, i.e., 
that there are other, conceivably true, schemes of objectivity, but rather that the 
concepts of objective experience and objective judgment might prove empty’ (2003, 
p.177), and on Thielke’s related claim that ‘it is important to realize that Maimon 
does not deny that the concept of causality has any legitimate meaning; his point is 
only that we cannot demonstrate how it can be justifiably applied to particular 
instances.’ (2008, p.604). As this passage reveals, the fact which ultimately stands in 
need of proof in order that the validity of the categories be determined is not the fact 
 82 
of the instantiation of categories of the understanding, but the fact of their being 
categories of the understanding at all. Maimon’s claim is that, while certain a priori 
concepts or forms of judgment might determine how the manifold is taken up in 
conscious experience, we have no means of knowing that the concept of causality, at 
least as Kant defines it, is one of these. 
 Maimon’s argument here depends upon a further line of argument that 
remains relatively underdeveloped in the VT and which concerns Kant’s 
Metaphysical Deduction. In the introduction to that chapter, Kant claims that general 
logic contains ‘the absolutely necessary rules of thought without which there can be 
no employment whatsoever of the understanding’ (A52/B76). The aim of the 
Metaphysical Deduction is to show that the categories correspond to these universal 
forms of judgment. Once the Transcendental Deduction has determined that objects 
of experience, too, must conform to these forms if they are to be cognized by the 
subject, the objective validity of the categories will have been established. The 
argument of the Metaphysical Deduction is, therefore, key: if the categories 
correspond to, or derive from, basic and necessary forms of thought, then the 
synthesis of the manifold of intuition must occur by way of those forms of thought, 
and the categories must have objective validity. If, on the other hand, the categories 
can be shown not to be pure, but instead to derive from experience, then Kant’s claim 
that they are employed in (or correspond to logical forms that are employed in) the 
original synthesis of the manifold, will be at best questionable; how can a form of 
thought that derives, at least in part, from experience nevertheless be employed prior 
to that experience and, further, be a condition upon it? And what right do we have to 
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suppose that it has objective as opposed to merely subjective validity? Maimon’s 
skepticism, I propose, exploits this weakness.  
In order to establish that the category of causality has objective validity, we 
must determine that it corresponds to an a priori form of thought, namely the form of 
the hypothetical judgment. While Maimon agrees with Kant that the causal judgment 
does correspond to the form of the hypothetical judgment, he is skeptical about the 
objective reality of the hypothetical judgment itself. 90 If the hypothetical form of 
judgment is to be basic, Maimon argues, then we should employ it in the full range of 
judgments and not just those that are empirical. In fact, however, it seems that we 
make hypothetical judgments only with respect to empirical states of affairs:  
In the pure a priori sciences, such as mathematics, we never come across them 
[hypothetical judgments]; although I can say things like, ‘if a straight line is the 
shortest between two points’ this is only a peculiar manner of speaking, that in this 
case does not mean anything in particular (because it is tantamount to saying ‘a 
straight line is…’, which would in fact be a categorical judgment). It follows that 
hypothetical judgments must have been adopted per analogiam from somewhere 
else, where they do seem to mean something. But we come across such hypothetical 
judgments only in our judgments about natural events; and if this too is denied by 
claiming that in fact we do not have any judgments of experience (expressing 
objective necessity), but only subjective judgments (that have become necessary 
through habit), then the concept of a hypothetical judgment would be and would 
remain merely problematic. (VT, GW II, 183-184) 
Hypothetical judgments are not made in the a priori sciences, and Maimon’s 
argument is therefore that the legitimacy of hypothetical judgments is itself uncertain.  
We are, Maimon thinks, equally entitled to attribute the hypothetical judgment, as 
Hume attributes the causal judgment, to a psychological phenomenon – habit, or the 
association of ideas – as to an a priori form of judgment: ‘[i]t is merely an association 
                                                
90 See, for example, VT, GW II, 184: ‘But we come across such hypothetical judgments only in our 
judgments about natural events; and if this too is denied by claiming that in fact we do not have any 
judgments of experience (expressing objective necessity), but only subjective judgments of experience 
(that have become necessary through habit), then the concept of a hypothetical judgment would be and 
would remain merely problematic’. 
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of perceptions,’ Maimon writes, ‘not a judgment of the understanding (VT, GW II, 
73).91  Maimon reiterates this point in the Wörterbuch, where he addresses ‘the 
Kantian’ directly: 
With regards to the natural sciences, one can apply only the forms of identity and 
contradiction a priori to objects [given] a posteriori (because they are valid of all 
objects in general). They therefore have their reality before the objects to which they 
are to apply. In contrast, the general forms have no reality in advance of their use, in 
which they are related to determinate objects. They therefore first attain their reality 
through their use; this use must therefore first be proven as fact. If one believes that 
David Hume is justified in doubting the use of these forms, so is he also justified in 
doubting their reality. Now the means by which we arrived at [these concepts] can be 
explained, however, through the principle of association. Consequently, you are not 
justified in taking their reality in the understanding as a new principle. Finally, your 
explanation is circular, in that you take these forms to be necessary conditions of 
experience, which you presuppose as fact, so that you can prove the reality of these 
forms. You must therefore show that the principle of association does not suffice to 
explain these forms. You must further show that these forms already have their 
reality in the understanding a priori. Or you must prove the fact, that we use them 
with objects of experience; if you want to overthrow the skeptical system. 
(Wörterbuch, GW III, 46-49) 
Our ascription of reality to the form of the hypothetical judgment therefore depends 
upon our establishing the validity of its employment in empirical judgments: in 
showing, that is, that causality is a feature of experience. But this is precisely what 
the arguments of the Metaphysical Deduction, together with those of the 
Transcendental Deduction, are supposed to prove.92  
In itself, we might think that Maimon’s objection concerns a relatively minor 
point: it pertains to the details of Kant’s table of categories, and a response to it is 
possible by way of relatively small adjustments rather than a complete reformulation 
                                                
91 See VT, GW II, 184. 
92 See also Logik, GW V 24: ‘it is well known that the Critique of Pure Reason deduces the 
transcendental principle of causality from the logical form of the hypothetical judgment. Now, 
however, I have shown that this form has no meaning other than the categorical meaning, and that it is 
used in logic merely as a result of a deception with respect to its use’. 
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of the Kantian project. 93  It turns out, however, that the problem that Maimon 
identifies with respect to the category of causality is symptomatic of a wider issue. In 
the ‘Short Overview of the Whole Work’, Maimon writes that ‘[t]he table of the 
logical forms in judgments, and hence the table of categories as well, seem to me to 
be suspect’ (VT, GW II, 183-184): 
What are assertoric and what apodictic judgments, and how are these kinds of 
judgments distinguished from one another? If mathematical axioms are assertoric 
judgments (because … we do not have any insight into the ground of their necessity 
a priori), then there are in fact no apodictic-categorical judgments because the 
axioms themselves are certainly categorical, but they are not apodictic. (VT, GW II, 
184)94 
By the time that he begins to develop his logic, Maimon is skeptical not only about 
the form of the hypothetical judgment, but about all forms of judgment with the 
exception those of quality.95  Moreover, Maimon claims that it is not possible to 
derive transcendental from general logic, and that general logic should instead be 
derived from transcendental logic:96 
To conceive of these logical forms as containing their exact determinations in 
themselves, and as therefore independent of transcendental principles, has the 
consequence, that some of these forms have received no determinate meaning … and 
others [have received] an incorrect meaning. (Logik, GW V, 20-21) 
They [the critical philosopher] should first have searched for the reality of the 
principle of causality in transcendental logic; they would then have found that 
consciousness of its use cannot provide any proof of its reality, in that it can be 
                                                
93 Maimon is by no means the only commentator to have questioned Kant’s table of categories. For an 
assessment of Kant’s table of categories with respect to more recent developments in logic, see 
Strawson, 1966, pp.45-47.  
94 In the Antwort, which was published in the same year as the VT, Maimon again appears to extend 
his skepticism beyond the category of causality, writing that ‘a distinction needs to be made between 
the genuine logical forms and what are passed off as such forms in the logic books’ (Antwort, p.62-63) 
95 See KA, 146, GW VI, 158: ‘only the division of judgments according to their quality is a 
fundamental division’.  
96 It is worth noting that Kant himself acknowledged that the infinite judgment was particular to 
transcendental logic, and that in general logic the infinite and affirmative judgments are identical (see 
A71-72/B97) My claim here that Maimon holds that general logic derives from transcendental logic is 
at odds with Roubach’s reading. See Roubach, 2003. 
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explained as a deception of the imagination. This principle therefore remains a mere 
thought without any possible presentation, consequently the promised form also has 
no meaning’ (Logik, GW V, 24)1.  
The Logik and the Kathegorien des Aristoteles (KA), both published in 1794, 
contain a more systematic analysis of the categories. In the KA, where he provides a 
‘Propaedeutic to a New Theory of Thought’, Maimon addresses the categories of 
quantity, relation and modality in order to show that they are not, as Kant claim, 
basic, but instead merely derivative. Judgments of quantity, he claims, for example, 
‘have no philosophical origin and are taken from their use in general life. They are, in 
fact, abbreviated derivations or combinations of several judgments without any 
quantity’ (KA, GW VI, 170). A complete account of Maimon’s argument is, I think, 
unnecessary here, and requires an explanation of his ‘principle of determinability’, 
which I will not consider fully until chapter five.97 My claim, however, is that 
Maimon’s skepticism concerning the ‘fact of experience’, when taken together with 
his skepticism concerning the a priori status of the categories, does pose a serious 
threat to the Kantian project; if general logic is to be derived from transcendental 
logic, as Maimon thinks it must, then it must be proven that we do in fact employ the 
categories in the synthesis of the manifold – in Maimon’s terms, we must determine 
‘whether the fact is true, namely that we do use [the relevant category] with actual 
objects’ (VT, GW II, 72). 
3.3. An alternative account of causality 
With this amended account of Maimon’s quaestio facti in mind, I turn now to a 
reconsideration of Kant’s argument in the Analogies. Maimon sets the Kantian a 
                                                
97 See 5.2 of this dissertation.  
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challenge: to prove that we do in fact employ the category of causality in the 
constitution of objectivity, or experience. The reality of the categories is itself to be 
the basis for their enumeration. Proof of this reality cannot therefore depend upon the 
a priori status of the categories, or forms of judgment, and the arguments of the 
Analogies, in themselves and independently of the arguments of the Analytic more 
generally, must therefore determine the objective validity of the categories. As 
Waxman (2003) argues, on certain regressive readings the Analogies can be 
considered in isolation from the rest of the KrV. Perhaps, then, the Analogies 
themselves can provide a response to the Maimonian skeptic. The claim in the 
Analogies is that it is only by way of the concept of causality (i.e., the determination 
of perceptions with respect to which precedes and which succeeds) that experience of 
external objects is possible at all. If I do not apply this particular concept to my 
perceptions, it is argued, then I will take them to be merely subjective as opposed to 
objective. Maimon’s skepticism can, I suggest however, respond even to these lines 
of argument. Maimon is skeptical about the Kantian account of causality insofar as he 
does not think that Kant is right in thinking that we do distinguish in this way in 
experience between cause and effect.98: ‘we can only recognize the relation of cause 
and effect within objects of experience, but … we cannot have any cognition of the 
terms of this relation, i.e. which the cause is and which the effect’ (VT, GW II, 222). 
In support of this claim, Maimon provides the following example: ‘a body a moves 
towards a body b, collides with it, and sets it in motion as well’ (VT, GW II p.220) 
According to the Kantian definition, the motion of a should be considered the cause 
                                                
98 Paul Franks, too, argues that Maimon is ultimately skeptical about Kant’s definition of causality. See 
Franks, 2003.  
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of the motion of b because the perception of the motion of a necessarily precedes the 
perception of the motion of b. Maimon argues, however, that the motion of a is not in 
fact the cause of the motion of b, because it is only the impact of a and b that causes 
the motion of b: ‘had the motion of a begun only on its contact with b, then the 
motion of b would have had to have followed no less than it did in the present case, 
where the motion of a began prior to this contact’ (VT, GW II, 221). It is only at the 
exact point of impact, then, that the motion of a can be considered the cause of the 
motion of b. At this point, however, the two bodies are treated as one, with the kinetic 
energy divided between them upon their (re-)separation. Cause and effect, then, do 
not straightforwardly follow on from one another in the way that Kant thinks that 
they do: while in applied mathematics the transfer of energy between a and b is, for 
the sake of convenience, treated as an ‘impulse’ – energy being transferred from one 
object to another - in fact at the (infinitely small) moment of impulse there are not 
two bodies at all, or a distinct cause and effect, but instead only one, singular body.  
 Maimon instead offers an alternative to the Kantian account of causality: in 
order that we perceive that an alteration occurs in an enduring substance (i.e. in order 
to think that a succession is objective) the difference between successive states must 
be minimal. Maimon refers to this as the ‘principle of continuity’ (VT, GW II, 139): 
when we notice that something happens suddenly (without continuity), if for example 
a small child were to instantaneously turn into a giant, then we cannot persuade 
ourselves that it is the same thing and has only altered, rather we think they are 
different things (in this case where the difference is so great, the similarity does not 
matter); it is just as impossible for us to believe that Peter and Paul are the same 
person because the universal concept of person is identical in both of them, and were 
we to see before us first Peter and then Paul in his place, we would not judge that 
Peter had become Paul, but that Peter had disappeared and Paul taken his place 
(without us knowing how). This leads us to search for the cause of this appearance, 
i.e. the continuity in it, and to fill in the gaps in our perceptions in order to make 
them into experiences. For what else is understood by the word “cause” in the 
doctrine of nature than the development of an appearances and its resolution, so that 
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between it and the preceding appearance the desired continuity is found. (VT, GW 
II, 139-140, emphasis added)99 
If I am presented with minimal perceptual alterations, then I will attribute these to a 
single substance. If, however, I am suddenly presented with a discontinuity in this 
alteration, then I will not attribute this change to the same underlying substance. 
Perhaps I will instead assume that I have been presented with a different substance 
entirely – that I am now looking at a different object.  Or I will attribute this sudden 
dramatic alteration to an external cause. This Maimonian alternative to the Kantian 
account may not be particularly convincing, but it is important to note that we do not 
have to accept the Maimon alternative in order to accept his general line of argument: 
if we can think of alternative means by which we might perhaps attribute objectivity 
to perceptions then we have no reason to favour Kant’s account over any other.  
3.4 Conclusion 
In the introduction to the chapter, I argued that Maimon’s quaestio facti argument 
could be considered successful if it amounted to a form of critical as opposed to 
merely empirical skepticism. On several different readings, Maimon’s skepticism 
fails as a challenge to Kant, either because it does not constitute a form of critical 
skepticism, insofar as it concerns the correctness of particular applications of the 
concept as opposed to its validity, or because it fails to recognize the progressive 
nature of the arguments of the Transcendental Deduction. I propose, however, that 
                                                
99 See also VT, GW II, p.142-143: ‘Since representations are always successive we cannot know 
whether the objects succeed one another in themselves as they do in our subject … But we can 
recognise this by means of the following distinguishing mark: when we find an appearance whose 
determination cannot be made continuous with the preceding determination of the very same 
appearance but only with that of another appearance, then we judge that the determinations do not 
follow one another (in the very same determinable) but that they are simultaneous (in difference 
determinables)’. 
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Maimon’s argument as I have presented it here does constitute a form of critical 
skepticism and that it poses a serious problem for the Kantian project. The form of 
skeptical argument that Maimon presents concerns the legitimacy of the concepts 
themselves, as opposed to the correctness of any particular application of them. The 
claim is that there is no clear rational or empirical basis on which to determine the 
reality, and therefore the legitimacy, of the categories. If the reality of the categories 
is to be determined rationally then it must be determined that the form of the 
hypothetical judgment, for example, is necessarily employed in all rational thought – 
that it does not itself derive from experience, as Hume holds that it does. 
Alternatively, if the reality of the categories is to be determined empirically, then it 
must be shown that all experience is necessarily of the kind that requires their 
application: ‘[Kant] must further show that these forms already have their reality in 
the understanding a priori. Or [he] must prove the fact, that we use them with objects 
of experience; if [he] want[s] to overthrow the skeptical system.’ (Wörterbuch, GW 
III, 48-49).100  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
100 An understanding of Maimon’s quaestio facti has, I think, important implications for our 
understanding of §1 of Fichte’s 1794 Wissenschaftslehre, which Fichte himself claims serves as a 
response to the Maimonian skeptic. There, Fichte exploits key Maimonian insights – that 
transcendental logic does not derive from general logic but general logic instead derives from 
transcendental logic; and that the subject/object distinction therefore has its origins in the imagination, 
in order to respond to Maimon’s own skeptical concerns. If we cannot straightforwardly derive 
experiential concepts from the pure form of thought itself, then we will need to identify a principle for 
their discovery. And this is exactly what Fichte finds, in the Grundlage, in the unity of the 
experiencing subject. For this reason, I think that it is misleading to take Fichte to be responding, as 
Thielke takes him to be (see Thielke, 2001a) to Maimon’s concerns about Kant’s cognitive dualism.   
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Chapter Four: Maimon’s Quaestio Juris and the limits of 
rational determination 
In the preceding, I have argued that Maimon’s quaestio facti constitutes a distinct 
post-Kantian form of skepticism, and that this skepticism poses significant problems 
for Kant. To the degree that my arguments succeed, then, the central aim of the 
dissertation has already been accomplished. The aim of the present chapter, however, 
is to consider a further, and closely related, line of Maimonian skeptical argument: his 
quaestio juris. Maimon’s quaestio juris and his quaestio facti are often taken to be 
two forms of skepticism (indeed, in chapter two I identified questions of the form 
‘quid facti’ with empirical skepticism, and questions of the form ‘quid juris’ with 
critical skepticism). As will be seen, however, while Maimon’s quaestio juris 
employs skeptical arguments, rationalism, as opposed to skepticism, is the intended 
outcome. Broadly speaking, Maimon is skeptical about the possibility of objectively 
valid mathematical and perceptual judgment on the presupposition of Kant’s 
discursivity thesis, and, since he is convinced that we do in fact make objectively 
valid perceptual and mathematical judgments, he rejects the discursivity thesis. The 
quaestio juris that Maimon raises is thus of the ‘how possible’, as opposed to the 
‘what right’ form discussed in chapter two.101 A broader aim of this project will be to 
                                                
101 See 2.4 of this dissertation. This is most clearly illustrated by a footnote to the VT (GW II, 363-
364): ‘For Kant … the meaning of the question quid juris? is this: we know from experience that we 
connect forms of thought determined a priori with objects determined a posteriori in a necessary way, 
but so long as we cannot discover anything a priori in the objects, this is impossible, and so this 
connection a mere illusion. So what is this a priori that justifies us in treating it as real? As for me, I 
also take a fact as ground, but not a fact relating to a posteriori objects (because I doubt the latter) but 
a fact relating to a priori objects (of pure mathematics) where we connect forms (relations) to 
intuitions; and because this undoubted fact refers to a priori objects, it is certainly possible, and at the 
same time actual. But my question is: how is it comprehensible?’ (emphasis added). 
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show that Maimon’s quaestio juris, and the denial of discursivity that it involves, lays 
the foundations for a possible response to the quaestio facti such, I argue, as can be 
seen in the early formulations of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.102 For the purposes of 
this chapter, however, my aim is to reconstruct this Maimonian line of argument, and 
to determine in what sense, and to what degree, it necessitates a denial of discursivity.  
The structure of Maimon’s quaestio juris closely resembles that of Kant’s 
own response to a form of quaestio juris, namely the question of the validity of the 
categories. In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant establishes (at least the possibility 
of) the objective validity of the categories by arguing that what I will call ‘intentional 
content’ is, and must be, already rationally or conceptually structured: that this 
rational structure is ‘a condition under which every intuition must stand in order to 
become an object for me’ (B138).103 Importantly, however, on Maimon’s reading at 
least, Kant does not hold that it is possible, even in principle, for a discursive intellect 
such as our own to account for intentional content in purely rational terms: the 
understanding operates by way of concepts, and synthetic knowledge is warranted 
extra-conceptually. Maimon, like Kant, argues, by way of a quaestio juris, that 
perceptual content must already be rationally structured if it is to constitute 
intentional content. Maimon takes himself to differ from Kant, however, in that he 
holds that the understanding is active in determining the supposedly extra-conceptual, 
that is, both the spatiotemporal form, and the matter, or sensible content, of 
intuition.104 Maimon therefore summarizes his own position as follows: 
                                                
102 See conclusion of this dissertation. 
103 By ‘intentional content’ here I mean to emphasize the fact of the content’s being for me, i.e. an 
object (in the broadest sense) of conscious thought for a subject.  
104 Maimon’s argument here therefore resembles recent debates in philosophy of perception concerning 
the role of so-called non-conceptual content. See, for example, McDowell, 1996. Maimon’s position 
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Kant maintains that the categories are conditions of experience, i.e., he asserts that 
without them we would have perceptions, but not experience (necessity of perception). 
By contrast … I maintain that logical forms, along with the conditions of their use (given 
relations of objects to one another), are conditions of perception itself. (VT, GW II, 214-
215, emphasis added) 
The question of whether this characterization of Kant’s account of the 
relationship between concepts and intentional content is correct is one that has 
generated a great deal of debate in recent philosophy of perception. A wide range of 
positions have been attributed to Kant, including conceptualism (e.g. McDowell, 
1994), non-conceptualism (e.g. Hanna, 2008), and various positions in between 
these.105 Some of these readings, and in particular that advanced by Waxman (2013), 
are much closer to Maimon’s own position than Maimon himself thought Kant to be. 
It is far beyond the scope of this dissertation to take any particular stand on this 
matter. My intention, then, is not to determine whether or not Maimon’s 
characterisation of the Kantian position is correct, but instead only to understand the 
nature of Maimon’s rationalism and the motivations for its adoption, with a view, 
ultimately, to understanding how this introduction of the infinite intellect might allow 
us to address the problem of the quaestio facti.  
Maimon’s position, then, is that rational explanation should, in principle, have 
universal legitimacy (although it remains to be seen whether there is a basis for 
distinguishing genuine, objective valid or productive, forms of rational determination 
from illegitimate or merely subjective forms of rational determination - I will 
consider this in chapter five). Let us call this thesis the ‘principle of complete rational 
                                                
differs significantly from that of McDowell, however, in that Maimon does think that objectively valid 
mathematical and perceptual judgments are warranted extra-conceptually. He is able to take this stance 
because rational determination is not, in his eyes, equivalent to conceptual determination, as will be 
seen. 
105 For a detailed discussion of this debate see Ginsborg, 2008.  
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determination’ (hereafter PCRD), and define it as follows: for any determination that 
is to constitute intentional content, it should be possible, in principle, to identify a 
rational ground. Maimon’s argument can thus be summarized, I propose, as follows:  
 
1) If sensible content is to become intentional content then it must warrant judgment 
2) All judgments, even mathematical and perceptual judgments, are rationally 
warranted 
Therefore: within the realm of the sensible intentional, rational explanation has 
universal scope 
 
In this chapter I aim to reconstruct Maimon’s quaestio juris and to make sense of the 
claim that its resolution requires that we adopt the PCRD. 106  
Before I do so, however, I would like to distinguish the reading I offer here 
from a number of other (dominant) lines of interpretation. My hope is that, as I 
present it here, Maimon’s quaestio juris is less vulnerable than these readings to some 
common lines of criticism. Maimon’s argument in support of the PCRD – that even 
mathematical or perceptual judgments are rationally warranted – is often 
characterized in the secondary literature (as I characterize it above) as a rejection of 
the discursivity thesis.107 Maimon does indeed explicitly reject discursivity. In the 
KA, for example, he claims to ‘reject merely discursive thought completely’(KA, X, 
GW VI, 10). There is however a danger in characterizing Maimon’s line of argument 
                                                
106 My interpretation is here at odds with that of Franks and Thielke, who hold that Maimon’s 
skepticism concerning the quaestio facti is a consequence of his ‘dogmatic rationalism’, or what 
Franks calls his commitment to infinite intelligibility. See Franks, 2003, and Thielke, 2014, p.84 
107 See in particular Thielke, 2001a. 
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in this way. In the contemporary context, to talk about Kantian discursivity is to talk 
about the distinct sources of knowledge – understanding and sensibility, or 
spontaneity and receptivity.108 This is to a large extent a product of the centrality that 
Allison places on the discursivity thesis, which he characterises in these terms.109 It is 
tempting here, then, as often happens in the secondary literature, to formulate 
Maimon’s skepticism in terms of this dualism of faculties – specifically, as 
concerning the possibility of interaction between them – or of the possibility of 
reconciling spontaneity with receptivity. The problem, so this reading goes, is that 
faculties that are as distinct as understanding and intuition are supposed to be, should 
not be able to interact in a way that would make experience possible. Thus Beiser 
writes, for example: 
The most striking problem posed by Kant’s dualism, Maimon argued, is that it seems 
impossible for such heterogeneous faculties as sensibility and understanding to 
interact with one another. The understanding is a purely intellectual faculty, which is 
active and beyond space and time; and sensibility is a strictly empirical faculty, 
which is passive and within space and time. But if these faculties are so unlike, then 
how do they interact? (2003, p.235) 
And Thielke: 
‘Behind the discussion of space and time’ he writes, ‘lies the more central issue of 
the heterogeneity of the faculties which […] forms the core of Maimon’s objections 
to Kant. At stake is the question of whether separate faculties can nevertheless 
interact so as to produce experience.’  (2001, p.90) 
On this reading the Maimonian solution is to deny that there is any real 
distinction between the faculties: there is no sensible given, because there is no 
                                                
108 See A15-16/B29-30: ‘there are two stems of human knowledge, namely, sensibility and 
understanding, which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root. Through the former, 
objects are given to us; through the latter, they are thought. Now in so far as sensibility may be found 
to contain a priori representations constituting the condition under which objects are given to us, it will 
belong to transcendental philosophy.’  
109 See Allison, 2004. 
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distinct faculty of receptivity and the understanding is in fact entirely productive of 
reality.110 Let us call this the ‘cognitive dualism’ reading.  
One problem with reading Maimon in this way is that we run the risk of 
attributing to him a form of ‘rational psychology’ of the kind that Schulze’s 
skepticism appears to presuppose, and against which Kant warns us in the 
Paralogisms.111 The ascription of concepts such as substance or causality to entities 
that are not extended in time is illegitimate, and it is therefore a mistake to think that 
an ‘interaction’ between distinct faculties must adhere to the usual metaphysical laws 
of physical interaction. More importantly, however, it appears to attribute a 
transcendent status to the faculties – one which Kant himself, as Franks argues 
(2003), is explicit in rejecting; he writes in the introduction to the KrV for example, 
that sensibility and understanding, may ‘perhaps spring from a common, but to us 
unknown, root’. (A15-16/B29-30). If Maimon’s quaestio juris is to pose a serious 
problem for Kant, it cannot therefore concern the distinct origins of the sensibility 
and understanding, but must instead reveal problems that are internal to Kant’s 
transcendental idealism; it must be made on the basis of what is available to us in 
experience and not on the basis of an inference to transcendent states of affairs. 
Fortunately, it is, I think, possible to read Maimon’s skepticism as internal to the 
Kantian framework in this way.112 Further, I think that Maimon’s own criticisms of 
                                                
110 Maimon’s treatment of the given is sometimes also thought to be a consequence of his treatment of 
the thing in itself. See, for example, Herrera, 2010. While Maimon is skeptical about the Kantian 
thing-in-itself, I think that his rejection of a determinate is a product of more than this skepticism, for 
the reasons discussed here.  
111 See A381-383 
112 It is interesting to note here that Maimon himself appears to allow for the possible of a given even 
in the case of an infinite understanding: ‘the given intuited by an infinite understanding is either an 
objectum reale, signifying something present in the infinite understanding, but not thought by it (this 
does not contradict its infinity because this consists only in the ability to think everything that is 
thinkable and the given is by its nature not thinkable); or the given is a mere idea of the relation of the 
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Schulze’s skepticism mean that we should.113 Maimon criticizes Schulze precisely 
because he attributes a transcendent status to the subject/object distinction, which 
suggests that Maimon himself was aware of the problems associated with these lines 
of argument.  
While Allison’s account constitutes one way of characterising Kant’s 
discursivity thesis, an examination of Kant’s use of the term allows of a subtly 
different reading. Kant’s refers to ‘discursivity’ relatively infrequently in the KrV. 
Where he does use the term, however, it is used not (or at least not directly) to 
designate knowledge that involves distinct faculties, or distinct sources of content, but 
instead to designate thought that happens by way of concepts. In the Metaphysical 
Deduction Kant writes, for example:  
[t]he knowledge yielded by understanding, or at least by the human understanding, 
must therefore be by means of concepts and so is not intuitive, but discursive. 
Whereas all intuitions, as sensible, rest on affections, concepts rest on functions. By 
‘function, I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one 
common representation. (A68/B93).  
The claim here is that the human understanding can itself act only insofar as it 
subsumes an already given perceptual manifold under concepts. This identification of 
discursivity with merely conceptual thought occurs again in the Postulates, where 
Kant writes that ‘other forms of intuition than space and time, other forms of 
understanding than the discursive forms of thought, or of knowledge through 
concepts, …’ (A230/B283), the implication again being that a discursive intellect is 
                                                
concept to something outside it, which in itself is merely a modification of the understanding.’ (VT, 
GW II, 251, emphasis added).  
113 See 1.3.1 of this dissertation.  
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one that merely subsumes under concepts;114 and, most importantly for the purposes 
of this chapter, in the Discipline of Pure Reason:  
‘in algebra by means of a symbolic construction, just as in geometry by means of an 
ostensive construction (the geometrical construction of the objects themselves), we 
succeed in arriving at results which discursive knowledge could never have reached 
by means of mere concepts’ (A717, B745, emphasis added).115  
‘in the above [just cited] example, we have endeavoured only to make clear the great 
difference which exists between the discursive employment of reason in accordance 
with concepts and its intuitive employment by means of the construction of concepts’ 
(A719/B747).  
It is at least possible, I suggest therefore, to conceive of a rejection of 
discursivity that does not involve any appeal to transcendent states of affairs, such as 
the claim that sensibility and intuition are ontologically, or as Franks puts it ‘really’ 
as opposed to merely ‘modally’, distinct (2003, p.209). When Maimon claims to 
‘reject merely discursive thought completely’, we should, I propose, conceive of this 
rejection of discursivity as a denial that the capacities of the human understanding are 
limited to the purely conceptual. Maimon rejects discursivity because he does not 
think that we are able to account for the possibility of mathematical and perceptual 
judgments if we suppose that the capacities of the understanding are merely 
conceptual; such judgments, if they are to be objectively valid, Maimon argues, are 
dependent upon the understanding’s having what I will term an ‘extra-conceptual’ 
capacity.116 Since Maimon thinks that we do make objectively valid mathematical 
                                                
114 See also A256/B311: ‘we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an 
understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a 
non-sensible intuition’ (emphasis added);  
115 See also A719/B747: ‘It would therefore be quite futile for me to philosophise upon the triangle, 
that is, to think about it discursively’  
116 In fact, as will be seen, concepts are, for Maimon, mere abstractions that do not have a legitimate 
application: it is only the relation between concepts that has objective validity.   
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and perceptual judgments, he therefore concludes that our intellect cannot be merely 
discursive.  
If I am to make the case for this reading, however, there is a particularly well-
known passage from the VT that I will need to make sense of. In chapter two, 
Maimon appears to equate the quaestio juris with the Cartesian mind-body problem: 
If we want to consider the matter more carefully, we will find that the question quid 
juris? is one and the same as the important question that has occupied all previous 
philosophy, namely the explanation of the community between soul and body. (VT, 
GW, II, 62) 
 As it is characterised here, it seems that the problem is primarily one of 
interaction between distinct substances. As Franks puts it, Maimon appears to 
‘misrepresent [Kant’s dualism] as a new version of the Cartesian real distinction, with 
all the attendant and perhaps insoluble problems about the possibility of interaction’ 
(2003, p.212). An examination of the remainder of the passage lends support, 
however, to an alternative reading. Just a few lines later, Maimon writes that: ‘the 
question of the explanation of the soul’s union with the body reduces to the following 
question: how is it conceivable that a priori forms should agree with things given a 
posteriori?’ (VT, GW II, 62-63). Here, the question is not how distinct faculties 
interact, but instead how a priori concepts can be instantiated in objects given a 
posteriori, or, alternatively, how the a posteriori can warrant judgment. Maimon’s 
argument is that it is only by reference to a non-discursive employment of the 
understanding that we are able to make sense of extra-conceptual warrant.  
What, then, is this extra-conceptual capacity of the understanding? And in 
what sense can it warrant judgments and thus determine intentional content? 
Maimon’s position, as I hope to show here, is that it is only be way of ‘ideas of the 
understanding’, which exceed what can be given or constructed in intuition, and what 
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can be arrived at by way of concepts, nevertheless serve to warrant mathematical, 
experiential and perceptual judgments, and thus play a constitutive role in 
determining intentional content. Maimon’s argument in favour of the constitutive role 
of ideas of the understanding is made on the basis of the insufficiency of sensible 
content itself in warranting perceptual judgment, and the insufficiency of 
mathematical construction in warranting mathematical judgment. 
 
4.1 If sensible content is to become intentional content then it must warrant 
judgment 
The first premise of Maimon’s argument - that sensible content must warrant 
judgment if it is to become intentional content - remains relatively implicit, and 
Maimon offers little in the way of support for it. It does, I think however, have its 
basis in the KrV. In the Transcendental Deduction, for example, Kant can be seen to 
employ precisely this line of argument; if perception is to be unified – if it is to be 
taken up in thought and to be thought as belonging to a singular subject (i.e. if it is to 
constitute intentional content) - then there must be an act of judgment by way of 
which it is taken up. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to offer a complete 
reconstruction of Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Deduction, but the following 
passages are, I think, sufficient to support my claim here. That synthetic unity is a 
condition on the possibility of (at least a certain kind of) intentional content is argued 
for in §17 of the Transcendental Deduction, where Kant writes: 
The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all 
knowledge. It is not merely a condition that I myself require in knowing an object, 
but is a condition under which every intuition must stand in order to become an 
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object for me. For otherwise, in the absence of this synthesis, the manifold would not 
be united in one consciousness. (B138, emphasis added) 
That this synthetic unity can only occur by way of judgment is then argued for in §20: 
The manifold given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the original 
synthetic unity of apperception, because in no other way is the unity of intuition 
possible (§17). But that act of understanding by which the manifold of given 
representations (be they intuitions or concepts) is brought under one apperception, is 
the logical function of judgment. (B143, emphasis added) 
The claim here is not only that judgment is a condition on the possibility of objective 
knowledge, but that consciousness of the manifold itself is dependent upon judgment; 
if perceptions are to become content for me, then I must judge with respect to them. It 
is, as discussed in chapter two, by means of this line of argument that the objective 
validity of the categories is supposed to be established; the categories correspond to 
the forms of judgment by means of which we judge with respect to the manifold, i.e., 
by means of which synthetic unity in the manifold is possible and, therefore, by 
means of which sensible content can stand as intentional content.117 These categories 
can therefore be applied legitimately to intentional intuitive content.118  
 The closest Maimon himself seems to get in the VT to an explicit commitment 
to judgment as a condition of intentional content is a passage in chapter two, where 
he writes that an object of thought: 
requires two parts: 1) Matter of thought … 2) Forms of thought, i.e., those universal 
rules or conditions themselves without which the given can still be an object (of 
intuition) but not an object of thought: for thought is judging (VT, GW II, 48, 
emphasis added) 
                                                
117 I have deliberately left open, here, the question of whether the matter of intuition is, for Kant, 
already spatiotemporally structured prior to this act of synthesis. See 3.1.2 of this dissertation. 
118 See Pippin, 1976, p.158-159: ‘A manifold, just as a manifold, is always “uninterpreted”, and 
becomes interpreted only when “thought”, only when the rule is applied’. 
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In the introduction to the VT, Maimon has already claimed that ‘all human activities 
are, as such, simply more or less thinking’ (VT, GW II, 1), and the claim in the above 
passage that ‘thought is judging’, and that in the absence of judgment ‘the given can 
still be an object (of intuition) but not an object of thought’ is, I think therefore, 
equivalent to the Kantian claim that judgment is a condition on an intuition being an 
object for me.119 If content (e.g. a ‘given’ content or an intuition) is to become 
intentional content - i.e. content for me, then I must judge with respect to it.120  
4.2. The Transcendental Schematism and experiential judgments 
It seems, then, that Maimon and Kant are in agreement that it is only by warranting 
judgment that perceptual or mathematical content can become intentional content (i.e. 
content for me). Maimon takes himself to differ from Kant, however, in that he holds 
that judgments can only be rationally warranted, and that intentional content must 
therefore, ultimately, be rationally grounded. Since synthetic judgments are warranted 
extra-conceptually, the determination of intentional content must therefore involve a 
non-discursive employment of the understanding.  
Maimon’s denial of discursivity takes its lead from an argument that Kant 
himself makes in the Schematism. If the aim of the Transcendental Deduction is to 
determine that the categories are objectively valid insofar as they are conditions on 
the possibility of objectivity itself, then the aim of the Analytic of Principles, of 
                                                
119 I do not offer a defence of this thesis here and am content, for the purposes of this project, if I am 
able to show only that the conditional holds, i.e. that if premise 1 holds, then the PCRD has universal 
scope within the realm of the intentional.  
120 This is, I think, further supported by Maimon’s later claim in the Logik, that: ‘Logic is the science 
of thought. Thinking is the activity of the subject, by way of which, under the presupposition of the 
identical unity of the subject in the consciousness of the manifoldness of the objects given to thought, 
an objective unity of this manifold is manifest’. (Logik, GW V, 70) 
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which the Schematism is a part, will be to determine exactly what should serve as a 
warrant for the application of the categories in experience, i.e. what should count as 
objective. This should have the advantage both of securing a domain of legitimate 
application for the categories, and of excluding the legitimacy of their application in 
other domains (in theology for example). Kant’s Schematism chapter in particular 
serves as an explanation of how it is that concepts which are to have a subjective 
origin can nevertheless apply, and apply a priori, to objects that are given in 
experience (i.e. given a posteriori). ‘[I]n all subsumptions of an object under a 
concept’, Kant writes, ‘the representation of the object must be homogeneous with the 
concept; in other words, the concept must contain something which is represented in 
the object that is to be subsumed under it’ (A137/B176). In order that there be an 
intuitable warrant for the application of the categories, it is necessary that they be 
schematized: that the imagination produce, by means of them, a spatiotemporal 
schema which is in some sense homogeneous with the representations themselves. 121 
Since the concept is a priori, it cannot entail any empirical content. its schema, and 
its application cannot therefore be warranted by (i.e. it cannot apply directly to) the 
matter of intuition. Kant is able to account for the possibility that a priori concepts 
are employed in empirical judgments, however, because he holds that the categories 
apply to temporal determinations and that, since time is an a priori form of objects, 
the schema is both constructible a priori and homogeneous with the a posteriori 
intuition. In this way, then, an a posteriori intuition can warrant the application of an 
                                                
121 It is sometimes claimed that the categories are already in some sense schemata. See, for example, 
De Boer, K., 2016. It is my view, however, that Kant’s claim in the introduction to the Analytic of 
Principles, that the categories are conditions of all conceivable experience, while alternative forms of 
intuition to those that we possess remains possible, suggests that the categories themselves must stand 
independently of the particular forms of intuition that we possess, and must therefore be independent 
of the particular schemata offered in the KrV.  
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a priori concept; the imagination is able to construct the relevant schema (i.e. the 
temporal form) in accordance with the concept, and the schema can then be compared 
to the empirical intuition.122 Because empirical intuitions are already spatiotemporally 
structured (as has been argued in the Transcendental Aesthetic), the schema and the 
empirical intuition are homogeneous and the judgment can be warranted on the basis 
of their (formal) identity. Maimon thus characterizes Kant’s quaestio juris as follows: 
for Kant … the meaning of the quaestio juris is this: we know from experience that 
we connect forms of thought determined a priori with objects determined a posteriori 
in a necessary way, but so long as we cannot discover anything a priori in the objects, 
this is impossible, and so this necessary connection a mere illusion. So what is this a 
priori that justifies us as treating it as real? (VT, GW II, 363).123  
And:  
this determination of the effect by the cause cannot be assumed materialiter (as when 
I say: a red thing is the cause of a green one, and the like) because then the question 
arises: quid juris? i.e. how is it conceivable that a priori concepts of the 
understanding like those of cause and effect can provide determinations of something 
a posteriori; these determinations must rather be assumed formaliter, i.e. with respect 
to the common form of these objects (time) and their particular determinations in this 
form (the one as preceding and the other as following) because then these concepts of 
cause and effect are determinations of something a priori, and hence determinations 
of the objects themselves (since objects cannot be thought without these concepts). 
(VT, GW II, 41) 
                                                
122 See A135-136/B175: ‘Transcendental philosophy has the peculiarity that besides the rule (or rather 
the universal condition of rules), which is given in the pure concept of understanding, it can also 
specify a priori the instance to which the rule is to be applied. The advantage which in this respect it 
possesses over all other didactical sciences, with the exception of mathematics, is due to the fact that it 
deals with concepts which have to relate to objects a priori, and the objective validity of which cannot 
therefore be demonstrated a posteriori, since that would mean the complete ignoring of their particular 
dignity. It must formulate by means of universal but sufficient marks the conditions under which 
objects can be given in harmony with these concepts. Otherwise the concepts would be void of all 
content, and therefore mere logical forms, not pure concepts of the understanding’.  
123 See also VT, GW II, 64: ‘According to the Kantian system it is inconceivable by what right we 
connect a concept of the understanding (of necessity) to determinations of an intuition (of temporal 
sequence). Kant certainly tries to get around this difficulty by assuming that space and time and their 
possible determinations are a priori representations in us, and therefore that we can legitimately 
ascribe the concept of necessity, which is a priori, to determined succession in time, which is also a 
priori.’ 
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Maimon’s position, however, is that the application of the categories to a 
posteriori intuitions remains problematic because the relevant schema entails more 
than can be given by means of the form of intuition alone. Thielke offers a helpful 
analysis of Maimon’s argument here. Thielke discusses Maimon’s skepticism with 
respect to the category of causality in particular. While he has an epistemic reading of 
the Analogies124, the argument that he advances is applicable to both forms. The 
problem arises because the criterion for the application of the category of causality is 
(supposed to be) the irreversibility of presentations. Kant discursivity thesis, however, 
leaves him unable to specify how irreversibility should be determined: ‘In what way, 
Maimon asks, can we account for the constraint upon which the irreversibility thesis 
depends? What exactly is it that constrains us to consider a succession as 
irreversible?’ (Thielke, 2001b, p.446). The application cannot depend upon the order 
of the presentations, since (on Thielke’s epistemic reading) the whole point of Kant’s 
argument in the Analogies is to show, against Hume, that objective order is ‘imposed 
upon the order of succession’ (Thielke, 2001b, p.443). This, however, leaves only 
two options: either the application of the category of causality is made on the basis of 
the matter of intuition, or the application of the concept is entirely arbitrary. Kant’s 
argument in the Schematism is that the matter of intuition cannot serve as a warrant 
for the application of the categories precisely because of the discursivity thesis – 
because it is merely given. The application of the category can only be, therefore, 
arbitrary. 
The ontological interpretation of the Analogies avoids the problem that 
Thielke identifies to some extent, but the problem, I suggest, resurfaces at another 
                                                
124 See 3.1 of this dissertation 
 106 
level.  On the ontological reading, the imagination must produce a spatiotemporal 
manifold on the basis of rules either that it prescribes for itself, or that are prescribed 
for it. If the imagination either prescribes rules for itself or has rules prescribed for it 
by the understanding, the application of the concept of causality must be merely 
arbitrary and completely independent of the matter of intuition. On the other hand, 
however, it is difficult to see how the rules for the application of the concept of 
causality could be given along with the matter of intuition. The matter is, after all, 
merely sensible and not intellectual – it should not be capable of giving rules for its 
own synthesis. Again, then, it seems that the application of the category of causality 
must happen either entirely arbitrarily, or according to rules that are completely 
independent of the matter of intuition, so that intuition adds nothing to the truth of 
causal judgments, but only to our conscious awareness of them; if I say, for example, 
that ‘fire causes heat’, this particular judgment is not arrived at by way of experience, 
but is in fact already a condition on the possibility of experience and only brought to 
consciousness through it. Maimon’s position, then, is that those judgments by way of 
which perception can become intentional content already involve some reference to 
the matter of intuition. It is not sufficient, therefore, if perceptual content is to become 
intentional content, that judgments are made with respect to temporal form; in order 
that perceptual content become intentional content it seems that we must first judge 
with respect to the matter of intuition.  
4.3 Perceptual judgment and empirical concept acquisition 
So far, the quaestio juris has arisen with respect to a particular subset of judgments - 
those that involve a priori concepts. The problem arises with respect to these 
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concepts in particular because, as discussed in chapter two, the concepts are 
heterogeneous with the intuition. The Schematism is required, then, in order to make 
sense of the possibility of warranting the application of these concepts experientially; 
spatiotemporal schemata are produced by way of the understanding and compared to 
the objects of experience which, too, are spatiotemporal. This is possible because 
space and time are a priori forms of intuition, and the production of spatiotemporal 
schemata is therefore possible.  Maimon’s position, however, is that a quaestio juris 
arises even in the case of empirical concepts. How, then, should we make sense of 
this claim?  
On first glance, it does not appear that there is any problem of heterogeneity 
in the case of empirical concepts; because the concept is derived from experience it 
already contains the relevant empirical determinations. I arrive at the concept of 
snow, for example, by way of repeated exposure to a coincidence of a number of 
intuitable properties: coldness, whiteness, etc. My concept of snow just is a 
coincidence of these properties, then, and there is no problem of heterogeneity when I 
come to apply the concept in the future. The quaestio juris that Maimon has in mind 
in the case of empirical concepts, however, pertains not to our application of them, 
but instead to their acquisition. In order that I am able to acquire the concept ‘snow’, 
the particular determinations that make up the concept (coldness, whiteness, etc.) 
must first form part of the intentional content of my experience. Maimon’s position, 
however, is that in order that these empirical determinations form part of the 
intentional content of my experience, it is first necessary that I judge with respect to 
them. I must be in a position to distinguish cold from hot, for example. As will be 
seen, Maimon’s argument is that a non-discursive employment of the understanding 
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(in the form of ideas of the understanding) is a condition on the possibility of judging 
with respect to particular sensible determinations.  
On at least some readings, Kant thinks that empirical difference is something 
which can be given sensibly; my experience of red is distinct from my experience of 
green because the sensible experience is different – I do not have to form a concept of 
this difference in order to perceive the different sensible qualities, but am able to 
perceive the qualities themselves directly. In fact, the concept of difference, for Kant, 
is a concept of reflection – a concept which we arrive at only by way of comparison 
of already acquired concepts, and intuitions that already constitute intentional content 
(A260/B316). Maimon does not think, however, that the Kantian account can explain 
how it is that particular empirical determinations become intentional content. It is for 
this reason that he argues that the concepts of reflection, which play a relatively 
minor role in the KrV, have logical priority with respect to the categories: that they 
are ‘the highest (most universal) forms of thought’ (VT, GW II, 130). Maimon’s 
argument depends, in part, upon the claim that my ability to form a concept of a 
particular empirical determination is dependent upon my ability to compare that 
determination to other, similar, determinations, and in doing so to recognise the ways 
in which it differs. In order that ‘redness’ itself stand as intentional content such that I 
can form an empirical concept of it, in other words, I first need some frame of 
reference; I can form of concept of ‘red’ only if I am also presented, or at least have 
been presented, with a not-red: 
When a perception, for example red, is given to me, I do not yet have any 
consciousness of it; when another, for example green, is given to me, I do not yet 
have any consciousness of it in itself either. But if I relate them to one another (by 
means of the unity of difference), then I notice that red is different from green, and so 
I attain consciousness of each of the perceptions in itself. If I constantly had the 
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representation red, for example, without having any other representation, then I could 
never attain consciousness of it. (VT, GW II, 131-132) 
So far this is not necessarily incompatible with Kant’s own position: perhaps it is true 
that we are unable to acquire an empirical concept of a particular sensible 
determination unless we have also been presented in intuition with its negation, but 
this does not in itself mean that a rational ground must underlie the sensible 
difference. Perhaps, in other words, it is sufficient, in order that I acquire an empirical 
concept of red, that I am presented in intuition with red and with green.  
It is at this point, however, that Maimon’s raises his quaestio juris: ‘if I say 
that red is different from green,’ he writes, ‘then the pure concept of the 
understanding of the difference is not treated as a relation between the sensible 
qualities (for then the Kantian question quid juris? remains unanswered)’ (VT, GW 
II, 32, emphasis added). Maimon’s position, then, is that the difference between two 
empirical determinations, e.g. red and green, that is itself a condition on our being 
able to acquire concepts of them, cannot be sensibly given.125 This claim is central to 
Maimon’s rejection of discursivity. The difference cannot be arrived at in reflection, 
by way of the comparison of the relevant concepts in the way Kant describes in the 
Amphiboly, because the difference is itself supposed to be a condition on our ability 
to acquire the relevant concepts in the first place. This being the case, however, if the 
difference cannot be given sensibly either, then it seems that Kant’s discursive model 
of the intellect is ill-equipped to account for the possibility of perceptual judgment 
and thus perceptual intentional content. Maimon supports the claim that difference 
cannot be given sensibly as follows: 
                                                
125 Maimon’s arguments here bear similarities with the arguments Hegel later makes in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (See Hegel, 1807, pp.58-66).  
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if I judge: red is different from green, then I imagine first red in intuition and then 
green; afterwards I compare the two with each other, and from this the judgment 
arises. But how are we to make this comparison comprehensible? It cannot happen of 
its own accord during the representation of red and the representation of green; it 
does not help if someone says the imagination reproduces the first representation 
along with the second because they cannot flow together into one representation; and 
even if this were possible there would still be no comparison and for the very same 
reason. (VT, GW II, 44-45) 
If I am presented in intuition with red and green I am not yet, merely by way of this 
successive presentation, presented with the difference between them. I am not yet, 
then, in a position to experience them as different. In order to do so, I must somehow 
compare them: I must hold them together in thought simultaneously in order to 
become conscious of the difference. In order for this to happen sensibly as opposed to 
conceptually, however, the different sensible qualities would have to be presented to 
me simultaneously and in the same space. We cannot, however, represent the sensible 
qualities in this way.126 The sensible content cannot itself, therefore, warrant a 
judgment of difference; there must instead be an act of thought by way of which 
comparison of the sensible qualities is possible.  
Maimon’s position, then, is that the means by which red and green (or any 
other perceivable differences) are differentiated must be formal as opposed to 
material. There are two possibilities, therefore. Either judgments of difference with 
respect to empirical content are warranted intuitively, in which case sensible 
difference is determined by formal, as opposed to material, intuitive determinations, 
or such judgments are warranted rationally, i.e., by determinations of the 
                                                
126 In fact, Maimon thinks that this is the case with respect not only to sensible content, but also to 
sensible form: ‘it is even more striking with disjunctive judgments: for example, a triangle is either 
right-angled or oblique-angled; if we suppose that this judgment becomes possible in the first place by 
means of intuition, then we must first bring a right-angled and then an oblique-angled triangle into 
intuition. But how can this judgment be comprehended, for these predicates are mutually exclusive and 
yet it is supposed to be possible to think both at the same time in the same subject?’ (VT, GW II, 45) 
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understanding.127 I will consider the former possibility shortly. I want first here 
though to, briefly consider the implications of the latter. Since, on Maimon’s account 
at least, empirical judgments of difference are a condition on the possibility of 
empirical concept acquisition, the relevant warrant in the case of judgments with 
respect to empirical content cannot itself be conceptual. If the understanding is to 
warrant judgments with respect to empirical content, (and unless we are to hold that 
empirical judgments can be warranted on the basis of a priori concepts alone) a non-
discursive employment of the understanding must therefore be possible.  
4.4 All mathematical judgments are rationally warranted 
Since Kant’s discursivity thesis precludes, at least in the case of the human intellect, a 
non-discursive employment of the understanding, let us suppose, then, that the former 
of these two possibilities most closely resembles the Kantian position: that judgments 
pertaining to the sensible content of intuition are warranted by the a priori form of 
intuition. In fact, as the following passage reveals, Maimon himself takes this to be 
the Kantian position:  
‘if I say that red is different from green, then the pure concepts of the understanding 
of the difference is not treated as a relation between the sensibilities … but rather … 
(according to the Kantian theory) as the relation of their spaces as a priori forms’ 
(Maimon, VT, GW II, 32, emphasis added). 
Formal, as opposed to sensible, intuitiable properties may serve as a warrant in the 
case of perceptual judgment in the same way that they do in the case of experiential 
                                                
127 See VT, GW II, 112-113: ‘in themselves (abstracted from their a priori forms, time and space), 
intuitions can no more be described as identical than as different (here the Kantian question: quid 
juris? is totally unanswerable), unless it is with respect to their differential elements, as I have shown 
above. We can apply these concepts only to the form of intuitions, or on my account, to their 
differentials, and by this means to the intuitions themselves. So only a priori concepts or ideas can be 
judged identical or different, and intuitions can be judged only by means of their forms, namely in 
terms of whether they are in one and the same time and space or not’. 
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judgments (i.e. judgments involving the categories). Space and time, although a 
priori, are supposed on the Kantian account to warrant judgments that could not be 
warranted on the basis of the understanding alone. Moreover, since space and time 
are a priori in the sense of being introduced by the subject, it is possible for the 
subject to construct a schema which is identical in form to the object to which the 
particular concept is to be applied.  
That space and time play this role (i.e. that they introduce empirical 
determinations) can be seen most clearly in the arguments of the Amphiboly, where 
Kant draws upon the role of the pure forms of intuition in warranting judgment as a 
means of rejecting the Leibnizian principle of the identity of indiscernibles. 
According to this Leibnizian principle, ‘it is not true that two substances can resemble 
each other completely and differ only in number’ (1686, §9).128 The Leibnizian claim, 
then, is that two conceptually identical entities cannot constitute two numerically 
distinct entities. Kant’s strategy, in keeping with the strategy of the Amphiboly more 
generally, is to show that the Leibnizian position depends upon a ‘confusion of the 
empirical with the transcendental employment of understanding’ (A260/B316). The 
claim is that the same concept of reflection (in this case the concept of identity) can 
be applicable to two objects considered as objects of thought, while at the same time 
being inapplicable to those same objects considered as objects of intuition: 
If an object is presented to us on several occasions but always with the same inner 
determinations (qualitas et quantitas), then if it is to be taken as object of pure 
understanding, it is always one and the same, only one thing (numerica identitas) not 
many. But if it is appearance, we are not concerned to compare concepts; even if 
                                                
128 Kant also makes a similar claim in the Analogies. See A263/B319: ‘But if it is appearance, we are 
not concerned to compare concepts; even if there is no difference whatsoever as regards the concepts, 
difference of spatial position at one and the same time is still an adequate ground for the numerical 
difference of the object, that is, of the object of the senses’.  
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there is no difference whatever as regards the concepts, difference of spatial position 
at one and the same time is still an adequate ground for the numerical difference of 
the object, that is, of the objects of the senses. (A263/B319) 
As a consequence, Kant claims, Leibniz’s ‘principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles (principium identitas indiscernabilium) certainly could not be 
disputed’ (A264/B320), but only with respect to objects of pure thought, and not with 
respect to appearances. Importantly, this ambiguity is shown to arise because of the 
role of the pure forms of intuition in warranting judgment:129  
since they are objects of sensibility, in relation to which the employment of the 
understanding is not pure but only empirical, plurality and numerical difference are 
already given us by space itself, the condition of outer appearances. For one part of 
space, although completely similar and equal to another part, is still outside the other, 
and for this very reason is a different part. (A264/B320). 
Kant’s response to Leibniz here is concerned with numerical difference, i.e. 
difference in place, and the claim is that two conceptually identical entities (which 
should already, therefore, be identical with respect to their a posteriori sensible 
determinations) can nevertheless constitute two numerically distinct entities. It 
remains conceivable, however, that the same argument could be made with respect to 
the supposedly a posteriori sensible qualities: formal difference may also underlie 
sensible differences such as that between red and green, and so warrant empirical 
judgments of difference and allow for the possibility of empirical concept 
acquisition.130 
                                                
129 For a detailed discussion of Kant’s argument here, see Beiser, 1987, and Warren, 2008. 
130 It is sometimes thought that intensive magnitude, which Kant introduces in the Anticipations of 
Perception may be a candidate for this form of warrant (See Beiser, 1987, p.296). 
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4.4.1 Maimon’s philosophy of mathematics 
Kant is able to maintain that empirical concept acquisition is compatible with the 
discursivity thesis, then, because he maintains that non-rational a priori determination 
is possible, i.e., that the pure forms of intuition warrant judgments that cannot be 
warranted on the basis of the activity of the understanding alone. As it stands 
therefore Maimon’s quaestio juris is not yet sufficient to require that we abandon 
Kantian discursivity: an appeal to a non-conceptual employment of the understanding 
is not yet necessary. It follows that if we are to conceive of Maimon’s quaestio juris, 
as often happens, as primarily a problem of receptivity, then it need not pose serious 
problems for Kant.131 My position here, however, is that Maimon’s quaestio juris is 
not, primarily, concerned with the question of the given, or the compatibility of 
spontaneity and receptivity. Instead, Maimon’s claim is that even in the case of 
mathematical judgments a quaestio juris arises, and that a non-discursive 
employment of the understanding must be presupposed if we are to make sense of the 
possibility even of these judgments. My reading is, I think, supported by the 
following passage from Maimon’s April 1789 letter: 
The importance of this question [quid juris] makes it worthy of a Kant; and if it is 
given the scope that you yourself give it, it demands: how can something a priori 
apply with certainty to something a posteriori? In this case the answer or deduction 
that you give is completely satisfying, as [only] the answer of a Kant can be. But if 
the scope of the question is enlarged, it demands: How can an a priori concept apply 
to an intuition even to an a priori intuition? (GW VI, 424, emphasis added).132 
                                                
131 Indeed, it has often been argued, and in particular in contemporary philosophy of perception, that 
Kant should be considered a ‘conceptualist’ in just the way described above – the sensible content of 
intuition is thought to be already somehow conceptually determined. For a discussion of this see 
Ginsborg, 2008. 
132 See also VT, GW II, 362: ‘For Kant … the meaning of the question quid juris? is this: we know 
from experience that we connect forms of thought determined a priori with objects determined a 
posteriori in a necessary way, but so long as we cannot discover anything a priori in the objects, this is 
impossible, and so this necessary connection a mere illusion. So what is this a priori that justifies us in 
treating it as real? As for me, I also take a fact as ground, but not a fact relating to a posteriori objects 
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Here, Maimon appears satisfied with Kant’s response to the quaestio juris insofar as 
a priori concepts apply to a priori formal determinations in the object, but holds that 
the quaestio juris arises again, this time within the realm of the a priori. The problem 
is that of how a priori concepts can be related even to a priori forms of intuition.  
In order to make sense of Maimon’s argument, I turn now to an examination 
of his philosophy of mathematics. While there has been some discussion of Maimon’s 
philosophy of mathematics (Freudenthal’s 2006 analysis is especially helpful), its role 
in Maimon’s quaestio juris has tended to be neglected, with Mier Buzaglo’s (2002) 
analysis standing as notable exception.133 Maimon’s ‘grasp of mathematics’, Buzaglo 
claims ‘places him on a par with the leading mathematicians of his generation.’ 
(2002, p.37), and his criticisms of Kant therefore reflect his familiarity with the 
central mathematical debates and developments of the time. In particular, Maimon 
was concerned with the development of the differential calculus, and with the 
                                                
(because I doubt the latter) but a fact relating to a priori objects (of pure mathematics) where we 
connect forms (relations) with intuitions; and because this undoubted fact refers to a priori objects, it is 
certainly possible, and at the same time actual. But my question is: how is it comprehensible?’.  
133 Thielke, for example, characterizes Maimon’s quaestio juris purely in terms of the given. See 
Thielke, 2014, p.229: ‘The problem, Maimon argues, is that even if the forms of intuition – space and 
time – are taken to be a priori features of sensibility, the content of intuition is merely brutely given: it 
is something we simply encounter in our dealings with the world. But this means, Maimon claims, that 
we cannot give any account of how a priori forms of the understanding can be applied to the sensible 
content, since the two elements are so heterogeneous’. While Thielke does acknowledge Maimon’s 
criticism of Kant’s formal dualism (see, for example, Thielke, 2003), he does not link this to Maimon’s 
quaestio juris. There are other exceptions: in particular Simon Duffy (see Duffy, 2014) and Richard 
Fincham (See Fincham, 2015). While Duffy’s account is helpful in understanding Maimon’s theory of 
mathematics in relation to Kant’s, however, he does not provide an account of why Maimon thinks that 
we need an alternative to Kantian dualism beyond the claim that ‘as long as sensibility is regarded as 
an independent source of cognition to the understanding, the possibility of applying concepts to 
sensible intuition cannot be comprehended. The connection between the two can only be explained by 
demonstrating that they both derive from the same cognitive source.’ (Duffy, 2014, p.229). Fincham 
provides a more detailed analysis of Maimon’s quaestio juris with respect to mathematics. While he 
claims that Maimon rejects ‘Kant’s account of space and time as a priori forms of intuition which 
specifically precede material content’ (2015, p.1038) however, he again does not give an account of 
why this should be the case. Instead, Fincham argues that Maimon’s quaestio juris sets out from the 
presupposition of a priori mathematical knowledge and argues that such knowledge is possible only if 
it is, ultimately, analytic as opposed to synthetic.  
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possibility of non-Euclidean geometries: as Buzaglo argues, Maimon ‘innovatively 
advanced the possibility of mathematically fertile non-Euclidean geometries well 
before Gauss’ (2002, p.37). 
Maimon’s position is that while spatiotemporal representations can aid us in 
our comprehension of mathematical propositions, they do not themselves warrant 
those propositions; they do not, in other words, determine their validity.134 This is, of 
course, at odds with the Kantian account, according to which mathematical judgments 
are synthetic precisely because they are intuitively warranted; an a priori construction 
in intuition corresponds to the relevant mathematical concept and warrants 
mathematical judgment. There are, as John Callanan has argued (2014), two ways of 
understanding the Kantian position here. On many accounts, the mathematical 
concept is somehow supposed to precede its construction in space and time. The 
imagination, guided by the understanding, produces a spatiotemporal schema on the 
basis of the mathematical concept, and the schema then serves to warrant 
mathematical judgments that could not have been warranted on the basis of the 
concept alone (let’s call this the ‘concept construction’ interpretation). In the case of 
                                                
134 Mier Buzaglo provides a helpful analogy here. See Buzaglo, 2002, p.42-43: ‘When we fit a Venn 
diagram to an Aristotelian syllogism and determine the validity of the argument form by inspecting the 
diagram, an intuition that is not empirical and is not connected with the color of the circles or even 
their size, we are connecting logic with intuition. However this connection does not raise the quid juris 
question. What we see in the diagrams reflects the situation with respect to the validity of the 
syllogistic form tested, but the validity of the forms is not essentially based on the diagrams’. 
Aristotelian logic is not supposed to be warranted by its expression in the Venn diagram, but only 
made more easily comprehensible through it. The truths that we arrive at by way of the Venn diagram 
are independent of this construction. On the Kantian conception, mathematical judgments are unlike 
the expression of Aristotelian logical by way of a Venn diagram in that they are supposed to be 
warranted by way of intuition; they are synthetic because they necessarily involve space and time, 
which are themselves irreducible to the merely conceptual. As will be seen, however, Maimon’s 
ultimate position is that the construction of mathematical objects in intuition does not itself serve as a 
warrant in the case of mathematical judgments, but instead serves merely to make truths which are 
already entailed by pure mathematics, comprehensible to us, in the same way that the Venn diagram 
can help to make Aristotelian logic comprehensible. 
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the concept of the triangle, for example, the mathematical concept (‘an enclosed 
three-sided figure’) does not itself warrant any judgment about the sum of its angles. 
Once the concept of the triangle has been constructed in intuition, however, it 
becomes apparent that the sum of its interior angles is 180°. Thus Freudenthal claims, 
for example, that for Kant, ‘construction … mediated between the concept of the 
understanding and intuition’ (2006, p.5), and Lachterman that: 
A “constructed” concept is a corresponding structure made present by imagination in 
temporal intuition (i.e., arithmetical number) or in spatial intuition (i.e., geometrical 
figure). Salient here is the alterity of intuition vis-à-vie understanding. (Lachterman, 
1992, 501, emphasis added) 
As Callanan argues, however, it is also possible to interpret the method of 
geometrical construction as a process of concept acquisition (2014, p.580).135 In this 
case, the mathematical concept (which already includes all the relevant mathematical 
determinations) is only arrived at by way of a mathematical construction, i.e., the 
production of the mathematical object by way of the imagination: ‘we must represent 
an empirical or mental image of a triangle in order to acquire the concept of a 
triangle’ (Callanan, 2014, p.582). In the case of the triangle, then, the concept already 
entails that the sum of the internal angles is 180° because we only arrive at the 
concept by way of the construction (let’s call this the ‘concept acquisition’ 
interpretation). Maimon’s argument applies, I think, to both of these readings: on the 
                                                
135 Kant’s claim (discussed in chapter two) that a form of transcendental deduction has already taken 
place with respect to the concepts of space and time, lends support, I think, to Callanan’s reading. As I 
argue in chapter two, the aim of the transcendental deduction that occurs in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic is to establish the possibility of a particular form of synthetic a priori judgment (the 
mathematical judgment), and the method of transcendental deduction in general takes the form of a 
tracing of the origin of an a priori concept. In the case of mathematical judgments, the a priori status is 
already presupposed, and the purpose of the transcendental deduction should therefore be to establish 
that the concept is not ‘pure’, that is does not arise purely on the basis of the activity of the 
understanding, and that the mathematical judgment is, therefore, synthetic.   
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concept construction interpretation, the claim will be that a construction in intuition 
made on the basis of the concept is insufficient to explain the possibility of legitimate 
mathematical judgments. On the concept acquisition interpretation, the claim will be 
that the construction in intuition is not sufficient to account for our possession of the 
fully determined concept of the mathematical object.   
4.4.2 Mathematical judgment and geometrical construction 
Maimon’s quaestio juris with respect to mathematics is thus concerned with our 
ability to warrant mathematical judgments intuitively, or by way of construction in 
intuition. In Maimon’s view, Kant presupposes that the mere fact of the apriority of 
space and time is enough to account for our ability to account for the objective 
validity of mathematical judgments. ‘Even if they are a priori,’ Maimon argues 
however, ‘intuitions are still heterogeneous with the concepts of the understanding, 
and so this assumption does not get us much further’ (Maimon, VT, GW II, 64). In 
order to understand the exact nature of Maimon’s argument, it is useful to consider 
the role of schemata in mathematical judgment. As discussed, schemata facilitate 
synthetic judgment in general by acting as a mediator between concepts (especially 
where those concepts are a priori) and intuitions. In the case of experiential 
judgments, the temporal schema can be matched to intuition because it, too is 
temporal, and judgments can therefore be made about the objects of intuition. In the 
case of mathematical concepts, the application of the concept to objects of experience 
happens, too, by way of schemata. If I judge that a clock is circular, for example, this 
happens because I am able to produce the image of a circle by way of the schema of 
the concept ‘circle’, and, because this schema is homogenous in a relevant way with 
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the object of experience, I am able to legitimately apply the concept to the intuition. 
Mathematical judgments, however, are made independently of the empirical object to 
which the mathematical concept is to applied. When we talk of a mathematical object, 
then, we do not refer to the object of experience to which the mathematical schema is 
applied (e.g. the clock), but to the schema itself (the circle as an abstract construct). 
Mathematical judgments are thus warranted by schemata, and will be objectively 
valid if the schema proves sufficient to warrant them. Even if, in other words, I am 
never presented with a triangle in experience, I will nevertheless be able to make 
legitimate mathematical judgments about it.  
If objectively valid mathematical judgment is to be possible within the 
Kantian framework, it therefore seems that all mathematical concepts must be 
amenable to spatiotemporal schematization (on the concept construction 
interpretation), or that the construction in intuition should be sufficient to account for 
the acquisition of the concept (on the concept acquisition interpretation). It is for this 
reason that Kant is often said to be a constructivist with respect to mathematics: 
mathematical judgments must be intuitively warranted, and mathematical concepts 
have objective validity, therefore, only if they can be constructed in intuition.136 This 
is true whether we take the construction to be a source of geometrical concepts, or 
whether we take geometrical construction to be guided by the understanding. The 
claim that construction in intuition warrants mathematical judgment is also key to 
Kant’s characterisation of mathematical judgments as synthetic a priori; 
mathematical judgments are a priori because they are warranted by objects that are 
independent of experience, (the schema of the circle as opposed to the circular clock 
                                                
136 For a discussion of this see, for example, Engelhard and Mittelstaedt, 2008 and Posy, 1984. 
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or the circle drawn on paper) and they are synthetic because the mathematical object 
is nevertheless in some sense extra-rational - it cannot be constructed by the 
understanding alone.  
Maimon’s central argument is that not all mathematical concepts are 
amenable to schematization in Euclidean space, and that, since we nevertheless 
employ those concepts in objectively valid mathematical judgments, the Kantian 
framework must be amended. Neither conceptual nor intuitive warrant is, in other 
words, sufficient to account for the possible of certain key geometrical judgments, 
and a non-discursive employment of the understanding must be supposed if we are to 
make sense of our mathematical knowledge. An argument of this kind has been made 
more recently with respect to non-Euclidean geometry – the claim is that Kant is not 
able to account for the objective validity of non-Euclidean mathematical judgments 
because the objective validity of these judgments is dependent upon the relevant 
mathematical objects being amenable to construction within the particular space-time 
that we experience (i.e. within Euclidean space-time), and because we are not in a 
position to construct these objects in Euclidean space. Non-Euclidean mathematical 
judgments are nevertheless thought to have objective validity, and it thus seems that 
the Kantian framework requires modification.137 As discussed, Maimon does have 
something to say about the possibility of non-Euclidean geometry, and he goes so far 
as to suggest that legitimate judgments can be made about non-Euclidean 
mathematical objects.138 What makes Maimon’s argument particularly interesting in 
                                                
137 The degree to which non-Euclidean geometry poses a problem for Kant is a much debated issue, 
and one with which it is beyond the scope of this chapter for me to engage. For a helpful discussion of 
the issue see Hagar, 2008.  
138 See, for example, VT, GW II, 148: ‘If Euclid had assumed false axioms instead of his 
metaphysically true ones, then I am sure that he would not, because of this, have bequeathed a lesser or 
worse work to the world than the one that we now possess. For example, if I assume that the outer 
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light of this debate, however, is that he thinks that construction in intuition cannot 
warrant mathematical judgments even within Euclidean geometry. It is with this latter 
claim that I am interested in this chapter. Maimon discusses a number of, what he 
takes to be, unconstructible schemata. These include the geometrical (in particular the 
asymptotes of a curved line), and what is sometimes termed the ‘pure mathematical’ 
(e.g. √2).139 The majority of his efforts, however, are devoted to the issue of the 
constructability of the circle, which is a significant point of contention between Kant 
and Maimon.140 A full analysis and defence of Maimon’s position requires a more 
detailed engagement with the history of geometry than can be accomplished within 
the context of this chapter, and an analysis of this kind has already been provided by, 
among others, Freudenthal (2006). My aim here, however, is to show the way in 
which Maimon’s arguments, if successful, serve to undermine Kant’s discursivity 
thesis, and to provide an outline of the basis for Maimon’s claims.  
In the VT, Maimon talks of two kinds of mathematical concepts, with one 
describing the ‘essentia nominalis’ (nominal essence) of the mathematical object, and 
the other describing its essentia realis’ (real essence) (VT, GW II, 38-39). In ‘any 
arbitrarily assumed concept’, Maimon writes, ‘the determination of its essentia 
nominalis leaves its essentia realis still doubtful until it has been presented in 
intuition’ (ibid.). If we have the real concept, or definition, of a mathematical object 
                                                
angle of a triangle is not the sum of the two opposite inner angles, but is equal to the sum plus half of 
it, the it would necessarily follow that the angle at the centre of a circle would not be twice (as it 
actually is) but three times as big as the angle at the circumference, and so on’. Buzaglo has a helpful 
analysis of this (see Buzaglo, 2002, p.52-53).  
139 See Buzaglo, 2002, who characterizes the problem of the quaestio juris in mathematics as one of a 
duality of ‘pure mathematics’ and geometry.  
140 There is some uncertainty surrounding the exact chronology of the debate. Freudenthal argues, for 
example, that Maimon altered his position in the published version of the VT in response to the 
criticisms that Kant raised in his Letter to Herz (Ak. XI, 51-52). See Freudenthal, 2006. 
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the possibility of its construction in intuition is already supposed to be bound up with 
that concept or definition. On the concept-acquisition reading, then, we might say that 
the real concept or definition already contains all the relevant determinations in a 
way that a merely nominal concept or definition does not. On the concept-
construction reading, the real concept will not itself contain the relevant mathematical 
determinations, but the concept should be such that any construction made in 
accordance with it will yield the relevant determinations. In cases where we have a 
merely nominal concept, or definition, the reality of the mathematical object will 
remain, in Maimon’s terms, merely problematic because the concept remains, in an 
important way, underdetermined. On the concept-acquisition reading, the concept 
does not give us a mathematical object but merely combines some properties of an as-
yet undefined mathematical object. On the concept-construction reading, a 
mathematical construction is not possible because the concept is underdetermined, i.e. 
it encompasses too great a range of possible mathematical objects. Maimon’s claim is 
that the concept or definition that we possess in the case of the circle is merely 
nominal – that it is not sufficiently determined so as to describe an object that is 
distinct from a number of other mathematical objects. Moreover, because the 
definition tells us nothing about the construction of the object in intuition, we have no 
way of determining whether any mathematical object does in fact correspond to the 
nominal definition: 
the understanding thinks the arbitrarily assumed concept of a circle according to a 
rule that it is a figure delimited by a line of such a kind that all the lines that can be 
drawn from a given point inside the figure are equal to one another; this is the 
essentia nominalis of a circle. However, it is still doubtful whether these conditions 
are also possible until it is presented in intuition by means of the movement of a line 
around one of its endpoints; thereupon the circle becomes an essentia realis (VT, 
GW II, 39) 
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we know the meaning of the rule or condition of the circle, but we still lack a real 
definition, i.e. we do not know whether this rule or condition can be fulfilled or not. 
Should it be incapable of fulfilment, then the concept here expressed in words would 
have no objective reality. (VT, GW II, 50) 
The circle cannot be constructed merely on the basis that ‘all the lines drawn from a 
given point are equal to one another’ in the same way that a triangle can be 
constructed purely on the basis of the concept of an enclosed three sided figure. This 
is because the circle is not composed of individual points - the ends of imaginary radii 
- but, instead, of one continuous line - a circumference, and yet the definition tells us 
nothing about how to produce this circumference.141 As Freudenthal argues, on 
Kant’s definition all that can be constructed are polygons of an ever increasing 
number of sides.142 As a consequence, as Freudenthal puts it, ‘a polygon is not 
conceptually distinguished from a circle’ (Freudenthal, 2006, p.68). For the same 
reasons, neither, if we accept the concept-acquisition reading, does the concept we 
possess fully capture the circle as a distinct mathematical object. Nevertheless, we do 
make objectively valid mathematical judgments about circles, and in doing so we 
recognize the circle as a distinct mathematical object: it warrants its own set of 
mathematical judgments that are distinct from those warranted by the Polygon. How, 
then, are we to make sense of our ability to judge with respect to the circle? Maimon 
                                                
141 ‘by this method only a few points in the circle are constructed … and not the circle itself as a 
continuous magnitude’ (Antwort, p.63).  
142 See Freudenthal, 2006, p.65: ‘Suppose we use this definition of the circle as a rule of construction. 
The procedure is as follows: To take a “distance” (the Greeks had no word for “radius”) and to mark a 
number of equidistant points from the center. These points will all be on the circumference of the 
circle, but they do not yet form the “line” required. They have to be connected to form a line. It is, 
however, a straight line which is uniquely determined between any two points. (Postulates 1 and 2 in 
Elements book I which guarantee the possibility of drawing a straight line and also imply that it is 
unique.) If all points equidistant from the center are thus connected, and if, to choose the simplest rule 
of construction, they are also equidistant from each other, we obtain a rectilinear figure, e.g. a regular 
polygon but not a circle. However, at all the points assigned (which are the vertices of the polygon) it 
indeed satisfies the definition of a circle.’ 
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holds that the Kantian framework must be amended – we must possess an idea of the 
circle that extends beyond both our concept of it, and our construction of it in 
intuition. Our understanding must therefore have a non-intuitive yet extra-conceptual 
capacity if we are to make sense of our ability to make objectively valid mathematical 
judgments about circles. We must possess ideas of mathematical objects: ‘concepts of 
objects which cannot be presented in intuition because they involve infinity [in the 
case of the circle, infinite radii of equal magnitude] and yet can be infinitely 
approximated’ (Freudenthal, 2006, p.63).143  
In his Letter to Herz Kant attempts to respond to Maimon’s claim. The 
definition of the circle is not merely nominal, Kant argues, but instead real:144  
prior to the practical proposition: ‘to describe a circle by moving a straight line 
around a fixed point’, the possibility of a circle is not merely problematic; rather the 
possibility is given in the definition of the circle; this is because it is constructed by 
means of the definition itself, i.e. presented in intuition … For I can always draw a 
circle freehand with chalk on the board and put a point in it, and I can just as well 
demonstrate all the properties of the circle in this circle … I assume that the points of 
the circumference are at an equal distance from the centre. (Ak XI, 53) 
Kant’s claim, then, is that we are able to construct a circle in intuition on the 
basis of the concept alone, even without rotating a straight line around its endpoint. If 
I draw a circle freehand, I understand that it is a circle insofar as the radii are 
supposed to be equal, even if this is not in fact achieved in the physical construction. 
Maimon remains unconvinced by the Kantian response, however. Later, in the 
                                                
143 It is important to note that Freudenthal’s claim here is not that the object itself (e.g. the circle) 
cannot be presented in intuition, but that the object as a mathematical object cannot be presented, or 
constructed, in intuition. 
144 See Ak XI, 52-53: ‘it is not necessary with Mr Maimon to admit ideas of the understanding. In the 
concept of a circular line, nothing more is thought than that all straight lines drawn from it to a single 
point (the centre) are equal: this is a merely logical function of the universality of judgment in which 
the concept of a line constitutes the subject and refers merely to each of the lines, not to the totality of 
the lines that can be described on a plane to a given point’.  
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Antwort, rather than distinguishing between two kinds of concept, Maimon instead 
distinguishes between two kinds of construction: ‘object-construction’ and ‘schema-
construction’, which he further identifies with ‘mechanical’ and ‘geometrical’ 
methods of construction respectively.145 The geometrical / mechanical distinction 
does not have its origins in Maimon’s work, but instead in that of the ancient 
mathematicians, and receives attention in Descartes’ Geometry (1637, p.40), to which 
Maimon briefly refers (Antwort, p.69-70).  In a geometrical construction, the 
mathematical object is produced a priori in its entirety and in accordance with its 
concept. In a mechanical construction, the mathematical object is constructed by 
means other than its concept. Put differently, we might say that we can produce a 
mathematical object mechanically without any understanding of it as a mathematical 
object. The geometrical construction, however, always involves an understanding of 
the object as already mathematical, and the construction merely represents 
mathematical properties that are already implicitly understood. Thielke provides the 
following helpful example (see Figure 1 for a diagrammatic representation of the 
mathematical bisection): 
we can bisect line AB “mathematically” [i.e. geometrically] by constructing two 
circles with centres at A and B and with radii equal to AB, and then drawing a line 
between the two points where the circles intersect. When we carry this out on paper, 
we consider the actually drawn figure according to the pure rules of construction, and 
as a result treat the figure as a pure [a priori] intuition. But we can also bisect line 
AB “mechanically,” and make use of exactly the same actual figure, if we use a 
compass to determine specific magnitudes: employing this method, we would start by 
estimating a likely candidate for a midpoint, and then using the compass to make a 
cut on AB with A as the endpoint; we would then use the same compass opening to 
make a similar cut using B as the endpoint; if the cuts do not line up, we repeat the 
process, honing in on the midpoint. (Thielke, 2014, p.231) 
                                                
145 See Maimon, Antwort, pp.62-71. 
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Figure 1: Mathematical  
bisection of the straight line 
 
It is possible to bisect the line AB mechanically in a number of ways without 
having any mathematical knowledge. In doing so, we must make reference to a 
particular straight line. In the mathematical bisection, however, we find a general 
means of bisecting any straight line, and we do so on the basis of our mathematical 
understanding. Put differently, we might say that we able to make the bisection on the 
basis of the idea of the line, or in Kantian terms, on the basis of its schema, where in 
the case of mechanical bisection we determine something only about whatever 
particular empirical line we happen to be presented with. Similarly, then, in the case 
of the mathematical (or geometrical) construction, we make use of our insight into the 
concept of the mathematical object, and its relation to the concept of other 
mathematical objects, in order to produce the mathematical object. In the case of the 
mechanical construction, we do not. The mathematical or geometrical construction is 
thus a schema-construction because it allows us to apply the mathematical concept of 
the object and so to make objectively valid mathematical judgments. The mechanical 
construction on the other hand does not serve as a schema for the mathematical object 
(although it may perhaps serve as a schema for a particular kind of empirical object) 
and it cannot in itself, therefore, account for our ability to make objectively valid 
A B 
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mathematical judgments. If mathematical judgments are to have objective validity, 
therefore (and Maimon believes that they do), then all mathematical objects should be 
capable, in principle, of being geometrically as opposed to merely mechanically 
constructed. If we do not possess, however implicitly, the schema (the method of 
geometrical construction) for a particular mathematical object, then we may be able 
to produce it mechanically, but we will never be able to recognize it, i.e. we will 
never be in a position to judge it as a mathematical object. The object that is 
produced by way of this procedure is not in itself mathematical, but only becomes so 
when we compare it with the schema of the mathematical object and find it to be 
identical. Maimon’s position, then, is that the Kantian account of the construction of 
the circle in intuition is a mere object-construction and not a schema-construction: it 
does not ‘make the concept of the circle possible in the first place, but merely shows 
the it is possible’ (VT, GW II, 43). It remains insufficient, therefore, to account for 
the possibility that we make objectively valid mathematical judgments about circles. 
4.5 Ideas of the understanding, concepts of the understanding, ideas of reason, 
and fictions of the imagination 
Having considered the grounds on which Maimon proposes a rejection of the 
discursivity thesis, I turn now to Maimon’s positive account of the role of the non-
discursive employment of the understanding in warranting judgment and thus in 
determining intentional content. Maimon’s positive account of the non-discursive role 
of the understanding and its relation to discursive knowledge is both complex and 
obscure, and I am therefore able to provide only a brief sketch of it here. In essence, 
Maimon’s response is to propose a form of mathematical Platonism in place of Kant’s 
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mathematical constructivism.146 I have already hinted, in the above, at the form this 
Platonism takes: ideas of the understanding exceed what can be conceptualised or 
intuited. Maimon’s further claim is that ideas of the understanding express logical 
relations themselves, where discursive thought can express these relations only 
mediately by way of a fictitious non-relational.147 The circumference of the circle 
must be composed of a number of lines, as opposed to a number of points, if it is to 
be constructed in intuition (i.e. it must be a ‘continuous quantity’ (Anwort, 69)). A 
line, Maimon argues however, ‘must be in some way measurable’ (Antwort, 70), i.e. 
it must have some determinate magnitude. Construction in intuition is not possible in 
the case of the circle, therefore, because each point on the circumference must have 
no magnitude if the mathematical object is to be a circle as opposed to a polygon. The 
circle can be thought as idea, however, insofar as it can be thought in terms of pure 
relation, and independently of the magnitude that must be introduced as soon as we 
attempt to construct the circle in intuition. Ideas of the understanding, then, express 
logical relations themselves where intuitions and concepts can do so only mediately, 
by way of an introduction of a fictitious non-relational such as determinate space or 
determinate time. In construction, imagination, by way of the introduction of a 
fictitious determinate magnitude or quantity, makes what are merely relational 
qualities comprehensible. In Bergman’s terms, ideas of the understanding are thus 
mathematical truths expressed in merely qualitative as opposed to quantitative terms 
                                                
146 Maimon is thus often said to pre-empt a number of more recent developments in the philosophy of 
mathematics, and in particular those of Russel, Hilbert, Cassirer and Frege (see Buzaglo, 2002, 50-58) 
147 Maimon’s ideas of the understanding are thus reflected in Deleuze’s ‘virtual’. See Voss, 2011 and 
Smith, D 2009 and 2010. 
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(1967, p.62).148 We can form neither a concept nor an intuition of these merely 
qualitative mathematical relations because our concepts already involve some 
introduction of the fictitious – i.e., the introduction of some determinate magnitude. 
Mathematical ideas can therefore be approximated ever more closely in intuition (and 
thus ever more closely conceptualised) by determining the relation between the 
(infinitely divisible) parts of the mathematical object ever more closely, but at the 
limits of this construction or conceptualisation, the mathematical object ceases to be 
spatiotemporal.149 ‘An idea of the understanding’, Maimon writes therefore, ‘is the 
material completeness of a concept, insofar as this completeness cannot be given in 
intuition.’ (VT, GW II, 75). As has been seen, in the case of geometry the 
introduction of determinate spatial magnitude precludes the complete construction of 
the mathematical object in accordance with its idea. Maimon makes a similar claim, 
however, with respect to arithmetic. On the Kantian account, arithmetic constitutes a 
body of synthetic a priori knowledge because the number series must be constructed 
in time.150 On Maimon’s view, however, ‘The concepts of the natural numbers are 
merely relations and do not presuppose real objects because these relations are the 
objects themselves’ (VT, GW II, 190). The real mathematical object – the 
mathematical object as an idea of the understanding – is the mathematical relation. 
The reduction of this relation to the natural number is, like the reduction of 
                                                
148 Note that this coincides with Maimon’s claim, discussed in chapter three, that judgments of quantity 
are not basic but derivative, and that only qualitative forms of judgment are genuine (See 3.2 of this 
dissertation). 
149 It is worth noting that it is this claim, that geometrical judgments are warranted independently of the 
construction of the mathematical object in Euclidean space, that opens up, for Maimon, the possibility 
of non-Euclidean geometry. As Bergman puts it, for Maimon ‘extension in space is accidental to the 
laws of geometry’ (1967, p.60).  
150 See Engelhard and Mittelstaedt (2008, pp.256-257) for a detailed discussion of Kant’s claim here. 
 130 
geometrical relation to determine spatial magnitude, fictitious – a product of the 
imagination: 
For example, the number 2 expresses a ratio of 2:1 at the same time as it expresses 
the object of this relation; and if the latter is necessary for consciousness, it is 
certainly not necessary for its reality. All mathematical truths have their reality prior 
to our consciousness of them.’ (VT, GW II, 190).  
Maimon therefore suggests a reformulation of the Kantian discursive model. 
He contrasts the ‘subjective order of all the operations of the mind’, which coincides 
with the Kantian model, with the ‘objective order considered in itself’ (VT, GW II, 
81-82). It appears to us (subjectively), Maimon argues, that what I have termed 
intentional content first arises by way of the synthesis of a merely given sensible 
matter in intuition, at which point the content becomes intentional insofar as it is 
thought. This is because it is by way of this spatiotemporal representation that 
discursive thought and, therefore, knowledge, becomes possible. Reason, insofar as it 
seeks unified knowledge, attempts to unite these concepts in a totality, which, on the 
Kantian account, results in the antinomies. In fact, Maimon argues however, 
intentional content must be determined, ultimately, by ideas of the understanding, 
which are only partially amenable to conceptualisation.151 Thus Maimon argues that: 
The objective order considered in itself is … the following: 
1. Ideas of the understanding, that is to say the infinitely small of every sensible 
intuition and its forms, which provides the matter to explain the way that objects 
arise. 
2. Concepts of the understanding, and  
3. Ideas of reason  
     (VT, GW II, 81-82) 
                                                
151 ‘Accordingly, I view the understanding as merely a capacity for thought, that is, for producing pure 
concepts by means of judging. No real objects are given to it as material for it to work on. Its objects 
are merely logical and they only become real objects in the first place by means of thought. It is an 
error to believe that things (real objects) must be prior to their relations.’ (VT, GW II, 190) 
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Ideas of the understanding warrant judgment, but judgment is itself always 
discursive; it occurs, that is, by way of concepts. In its attempt to fully conceptualise 
experience, reason attempts to produce a totality of concepts, with ideas of reason, 
and the resulting antinomies, being the outcome.152 Ideas of reason are therefore 
products of an attempt to represent discursively what can only be represented as idea. 
Ideas of reason, then, have no objective validity. Ideas of the understanding, however, 
do have objective validity insofar as they are not illegitimate extensions of concepts 
but themselves warrant judgment and so are constitutive of intuitive content.  
4.5.1 Maimon’s rejection of pure space and time 
I have not yet said anything about an important line of Kantian argument. Maimon’s 
claim that the ‘material completeness’ of the mathematical concept does not involve 
spatial or temporal magnitude is at odds with Kant’s claim, in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic, that space and time in themselves and independently of either content or 
conceptualisation, constitute pure manifolds. On the Maimonian account, spatial and 
temporal magnitude is a ‘fiction’ (Wörterbuch, GW III, 44).153 that is introduced to 
                                                
152 See VT, GW II, 81-82: ‘The subjective order (with respect to our consciousness) of all the 
operations of the mind is the following: 
1. Sensibility (which certainly does not provide consciousness itself, but rather the matter for 
consciousness) 
2. Intuition. The ordering of homogeneous sensible representations under their a priori forms (time 
and space); from this consciousness arises, although certainly no thought. 
3. Concepts of the understanding (categories); from this a thought arises, i.e. the representation of a 
unity in the manifold. 
4. Ideas of reason. Totality of the concepts of the understanding. 
 
The objective order considered in itself is, on the other hand, the following: 
1. Ideas of the understanding, that is to say the infinitely small of every sensible intuition and its forms, 
which provides the matter to explain the way that objects arise. 
2. Concepts of the understanding, and  
3. Ideas of reason, whose use has already been explained’ 
153 Maimon thus refers to the imagination as the ‘faculty of fictions’. See Wörterbuch, GW III, 36): 
‘Fiction is the most general meaning of an operation of the imagination, by way of which a non-
objective necessary unity of the manifold in an object is manifest’ 
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represent conceptual difference, and the idea of an ‘empty’ space and time, or a 
spatiotemporal manifold devoid of any sensible content, is thus a mere abstraction - 
‘a transcendent representation without any reality’ (VT, GW II, 179).154 If this is to be 
the Maimonian position, however, then Maimon must address the arguments that 
Kant makes in the Transcendental Aesthetic: he must provide us with reasons to 
doubt Kant’s claim that space and time are independent of their contents.  
In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant argues that ‘we can never represent to 
ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects’ 
and that space ‘must therefore be regarded as the condition on the possibility of 
appearances, and not as a determination dependent on them’ (A24/B38-39). The 
claim here is that our ability to produce a pure spatiotemporal manifold by way of the 
imagination, taken together with our inability to imagine a non-spatiotemporal object, 
reveals the transcendental priority of space and time: objects can only appear to us 
insofar as they appear in space and time, and space and time therefore precede, and 
are independent of, their contents. Maimon is skeptical about Kant’s claim here for 
two reasons. The first is that Maimon does not think that we are able to deduce 
anything about the necessary form of objects on the basis of our experience of them 
as spatiotemporal. Maimon argues by way of the following analogy (VT, GW II, 340-
342): we are conscious of the fact that a bottle gives its liquid contents their form 
because we experience those contents independently of the bottle and observe that 
under these different circumstances those same contents have a different form. 
                                                
154 See Wörterbuch, GW III, 69: ‘The location of a body is its relation to other bodies, just as the point 
in time of an incident is the relation of itself to the preceding and succeeding instants. Indeed, we have 
no concept of absolute location and point in time; and yet one thinks each body as in an absolute 
location, and each instant at an absolute point in time, that is, the imagination transforms the relative 
concepts of space and time into absolute concepts’. 
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Suppose, however, that we had never experienced wine without a bottle nor a bottle 
that did not contain wine. We would have no means of determining that the bottle 
itself was the source of the form, and would be equally justified in thinking that the 
wine itself determined its own form, or that it determined the form of the bottle. 
Maimon argues that this is the position in which we find ourselves with respect to the 
relation of space and time to their contents. We never experience space and time 
independently of their contents, nor the contents independently of space and time, and 
we are not, therefore, in any position to determine that the form is imposed upon the 
matter of intuition by the subject as opposed to dependent on the matter itself. ‘We 
recognize merely that up to now we have had no intuition without time and space, 
but not that we cannot have any intuition without them’ (VT, GW II, 342). 
A further argument is made on phenomenological grounds. Kant is wrong, 
Maimon argues, in thinking that the production of a pure manifold in imagination is 
possible. The representation of space and time as given manifolds already requires, he 
claims, diversity amongst the sensible matter of intuition, and this in turn already 
requires that there is a sensible matter: ‘[i]f there were only a uniform intuition’ 
Maimon argues, ‘then we would not have any concept of space, and hence no 
intuition of space either’ (VT, GW II, 18). Suppose, for example, that we were 
presented in intuition with a homogeneous block of red. Maimon’s claim is that our 
intuition could not, under these circumstances, be considered spatial – we would not 
have any concept of left or right, for example, and any attempt to ascribe spatial 
properties under these circumstances would require reference to some external 
markers of spatiality (i.e. some further intuitable difference). It cannot be the case, 
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Maimon argues therefore, that space and time are pure manifolds that are independent 
of their contents.  
Thielke (2003, p.95) highlights a number of potential problems with 
Maimon’s argument here. Firstly, Kant’s division of outer and inner sense seems 
capable of accommodating the Maimonian thought experiment. Kant need only argue 
that, while a homogenous sensible intuition would indeed lack spatial qualities, it 
would therefore be an example of inner, as opposed to outer, sense, perhaps not even 
an intuition at all.  More importantly, Thielke argues, Kant’s claim is only that ‘space 
is a necessary condition for the possibility of outer intuitions, and [he] could readily 
allow that diversity plays a role in constituting empirical intuitions’ (ibid.). While I 
agree with Thielke that, as a skepticism about the a priori status of space and time 
Maimon’s argument fails, I disagree with the conclusion that Thielke draws – that 
Maimon’s argument is therefore unsuccessful – insofar as I do not agree that Maimon 
intends his thought experiment to serve as an argument in favour of this kind of 
skepticism. Maimon can concede that the representation of objects in space and time 
is a condition of intuition, without having to concede that space and time as pure 
forms themselves introduce diversity. As I have argued above, Maimon need only 
establish that space and time cannot themselves introduce the required diversity. If 
this is indeed Maimon’s aim, however, then the Kantian lines of response that Thielke 
identifies already make enough of the necessary concessions to vindicate the 
Maimonian position: if ‘diversity also plays a role in constituting empirical intuitions’ 
(Thielke, 2003, p.95) as Thielke claims, then doubts can be raised about the role of 
the manifold of space and time in differentiating between otherwise identical sensible 
content, and the Kantian response to Leibniz is weakened. Similarly, if an intuition 
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that is homogeneous in terms of its contents thereby ceases to be spatial and becomes 
only an inner intuition, then Maimon’s point has been made for him: spatiality itself 
adds nothing in the way of diversity: diversity is instead a condition on spatiality, and 
Maimon’s claim that ideas of the understanding (i.e. ideas of pure relation) underlie 
spatiotemporal representation, remains coherent. Ultimately, however, while 
Maimon’s argument here serves as an interesting alternative to the Kantian 
viewpoint, it seems far too speculative to serve as a decisive proof of the PCRD (in 
the same way that Kant’s own psychological argument is far too speculative to serve 
as decisive proof of the ideality of space and time): it is impossible to determine the 
possibility of empty spatiotemporal intuition or the spatiality or otherwise of a 
homogeneous manifold in this way because we simply cannot know to what degree 
we have unknowingly introduced some empirical content into the supposedly pure or 
homogeneous products of our imagination.  
These does not appear to be among the most convincing of the Maimonian 
lines of argument, then, but it is worth noting that they do not necessarily need to be. 
Maimon’s denial that space and time themselves constitute a pure manifold is 
sometimes presented as though it were key to Maimon’s argument in favour of 
rationalism.155 As I hope to have shown in this chapter, however, it is Maimon’s 
arguments concerning the possibility of geometrical construction and of perceptual 
judgment that are supposed to do the bulk of the work in convincing us of the non-
spatiotemporality of mathematical objects, and not his arguments concerning the 
possibility of pure intuition. It is enough, then, that Maimon is able to identify 
vulnerabilities in the Kantian account and to present viable alternatives, and in doing 
                                                
155 In addition to Thielke, 2003, see also Voss, 2011 
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so to pre-empt some possible lines of Kantian response. To this extent, Maimon’s 
arguments here can, I think, be considered successful.  
4.6 Conclusion 
Against some contemporary readings I have argued that when Maimon claims to 
reject Kant’s discursivity thesis, this is primarily a claim about the role of the 
understanding in human cognition, and not about the interaction between concepts 
and intuitions. While Kant holds that understanding is merely discursive, operating 
solely by means of concepts, Maimon’s position is that the non-discursive 
employment of the understanding is a condition on the possibility of objectively valid 
synthetic judgment, whether experiential, perceptual or mathematical. Further, I have 
argued, against those accounts that characterise Maimon’s quaestio juris as a problem 
of applying concepts to a posteriori content, that Maimon’s philosophy of 
mathematics, which concerns the application of concepts even to a priori forms of 
intuition, is key to Maimon’s quaestio juris line of argument. What Maimon terms 
‘ideas of the understanding’, which exceed what can be fully intuited or fully 
conceptualised, serve as conditions on the possibility of synthetic judgment and are 
therefore constitutive of intentional content.  
In this way, the PCRD which is the outcome of the Maimonian quaestio juris, 
mitigates some of the more pressing problems which arise as a result of the quaestio 
facti: while we are not yet in a position to establish which formal explanations are 
valid and which are not, we are at least justified in seeking a complete formal 
explanation. In order to understand how this might be the case, it is helpful to re-
examine the skeptical problem that is posed by Hume, and which Maimon 
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reformulates from within the Kantian framework. In chapter two I argued that 
Humean skepticism arises because there is no empirical warrant for the application of 
concepts such as that of causality: these concepts appear to be defined by 
determinations that cannot themselves be given in experience. As Kant’s treatment of 
Hume reveals, however, an implicit premise of Humean skepticism is that the formal 
conditions of objectivity can be given: that is, that they can be materially 
determined.156 Kant is therefore able to respond to the Humean skeptic by rejecting 
this premise; our experience of objectivity requires that objects are formally, as 
opposed to materially, determined. Objectivity is not, in other words, given, but must 
instead be constructed. We are able to establish the validity of judgments which 
employ the categories, therefore, because although they are not warranted materially, 
by some determination that is given in intuition, they can nevertheless be warranted 
formally, insofar as experience of objects already presupposes formal 
determination.157 This happens in the case of the category of causality by way of the 
arguments of the analogies: experience of a temporally extended realm of objects is 
dependent upon the application of the categories of relation, so that the ground of 
objective temporal relation is not material but formal. We are therefore warranted in 
applying the category of causality to temporally extended objects because it is only 
by way of causal judgments that such objects are first possible. Maimon, too, 
                                                
156 I have used ‘non-rational determination’, as opposed to ‘material determination’ throughout. This 
encompasses material determination (i.e. determinations that are not introduced by the subject), but 
also formal but non-rational determinations (i.e. the Kantian forms of intuition).   
157 See, for example A94/B127: ‘David Hume recognised that, in order to be able to [‘obtain 
knowledge which far transcends all limits of experience’], it was necessary that these concepts should 
have an a priori origin. But since he could not explain how it can be possible that the understanding 
must think concepts, which are not in themselves connected in the understanding, as being necessarily 
connected in the object, and since it never occurred to him that the understanding might itself, perhaps, 
through these concepts, be the author of experience in which its objects are found, he was constrained 
to derive them from experience, namely, from a subjective necessity’. 
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addresses a quaestio juris by showing that rational determination is already a 
condition on the possibility of experience; ideas of the understanding are conditions 
on the possibility of intentional content. On the Maimonian account, however, this 
rational determination is not only a condition on the thought of a particular kind of 
objectivity, but is instead a condition on the possibility of sensible intentional content 
in general: 
Kant maintains that the categories are conditions of experience, i.e., he asserts that 
without them we would have perceptions, but not experience (necessity of perception). 
By contrast … I maintain that logical forms, along with the conditions of their use (given 
relations of objects to one another), are conditions of perception itself. (VT, GW II, 214-
215, emphasis added) 
We are therefore at least entitled to seek the rational grounds of intuition, even 
if we cannot yet determine what those rational grounds might be, and Maimon’s 
rationalism thus provides at least the materials for a response to the quaestio facti. In 
the next chapter, I will turn to Maimon’s ‘dogmatic rationalism’ and, in particular, to 
the ‘principle of determinability’ which Maimon introduces as a means of 
distinguishing valid from invalid judgments, and legitimate from illegitimate 
concepts, and so builds upon the conclusions of the present chapter.  
Before I do so, however, I would like here to note some qualifications with 
respect to the above conclusions. Firstly, Maimon’s conclusions hold only insofar as 
we accept the initial premise that it is only by way of judgment that sensible content 
can become intentional content. As discussed, this premise has its origins in the KrV, 
and Maimon does not devote any significant efforts to defending it. It is conceivable, 
then, that judgment is not the sole, or even the primary, means by which sensible 
content can become intentional content.  
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A further qualification concerns the meaning of the PCRD, which should, I 
propose, be distinguished from what Paul Franks calls a ‘commitment to infinite 
intelligibility’ (2003, p.202), and from the ‘principle of sufficient reason’. Franks first 
introduces the thesis of infinite intelligibility in relation not to Maimon but to Kant, 
and defines it as follows: 
things are intelligible without any limit whatsoever. For every thing, there is a 
sufficient reason, and the series of reasons neither goes on forever, nor turns in a 
circle, nor terminates arbitrarily; instead the series of reasons ends with an absolute 
reason that is self-explanatory, or wholly beyond the need for explanation (ibid.) 
Kant is committed, Franks claims, both to the thesis of finite intelligibility and to the 
thesis of infinite intelligibility: ‘The world as it is known by God, and the world as 
viewed from the standpoint of morality, is infinitely intelligible ... But the world as 
theoretically known by us is finitely intelligible.’ (2003, p.204). Kant’s claim, 
according to Franks, is that the particular forms of finite, human, knowledge, such as 
spatiality and temporality, are merely contingent, and do not themselves adhere to the 
principle of sufficient reason: ‘[i]t is conceivable that another species of finite rational 
beings could have quite different forms of sensibility, and there can ultimately be no 
explanation why our sensibility has just the forms it has’ (Franks, 2003, p.204). The 
world perceived from the point of view of the infinite intellect, however, is entirely 
necessary: the infinite intellect can account for the complete determination of reality 
entirely on the basis of a first principle. As will be seen in chapter five, Maimon is, 
ultimately, committed to the thesis of infinite intelligibility insofar as he thinks that 
objectivity has a singular, universal and necessary structure, and that the particular 
rational structure of our experience is therefore determined according to this 
necessary structure of objectivity. A commitment to the PCRD, however, need not in 
itself mean a commitment to infinite intelligibility insofar as it entails that ‘for every 
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thing there is a sufficient reason’ (or sufficient reasons), but not that ‘the series of 
reasons ends with an absolute reason that is self-explanatory, or wholly beyond the 
need for explanation’. We might, for example, think that the spatiotemporal 
properties of objects are completely rationally determined (so that full cognisance of 
these rational determinations should be sufficient to warrant all possible knowledge 
about them), without holding that there must be a sufficient reason for 
spatiotemporality itself, or the particular determinations thereof. In other words, the 
thesis of absolute formal determination does not entail that rational determinations 
themselves adhere to the principle of sufficient reason, and it therefore remains 
compatible with finite intelligibility as Franks characterises it here. 
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Chapter Five: ‘dogmatic rationalism’ 
At this point, it is useful to take stock. Maimon has argued along two distinct lines. 
On the one hand, he has rejected the possibility of non-rational determination, and has 
therefore adopted the thesis of complete formal determination: mathematical and 
perceptual judgments are warranted by ideas of the understanding - products of a 
productive, non-discursive (i.e. extra-conceptual) activity on the part of the 
understanding. The validity of pure formal, or rational, explanation has therefore been 
established. On the other hand, however, Maimon has argued that Kant’s attempts to 
ground pure formal explanation in functions of the understanding that are accessible 
to thought (thereby allowing concepts which relate to genuine kinds of formal 
determination to be distinguished from those concepts which do not) fails insofar as 
the table of judgments turns out to itself depend upon abstraction from experience. 
Maimon’s quaestio juris has revealed formal explanation to be valid, then, but his 
quaestio facti means that we have no means of determining which forms of 
explanation are correct and which are not: we should be equally entitled to attribute 
temporal succession to fate or fortune as we are to attribute it to causality.  
Maimon’s ‘dogmatic rationalism’ is intended to respond to this problem. His 
aim is to develop a first principle by which legitimate judgments are to be 
distinguished from illegitimate judgments. Moreover, this principle should be 
transcendental, as opposed to pure: it should capable of accounting not just for what 
he calls ‘symbolic knowledge’ but also for ‘real thought’; it should be capable, in 
other words, of accounting for metaphysical and not merely logical possibility. 
Maimon finds such a principle in the ‘principle of determinability’. The aim in this 
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chapter is to provide an account of the principle of determinability, to situate it within 
the Maimonian system, and to consider how it helps to address the problems that 
Maimon identifies in the KrV.  
5.1 Real thought and symbolic cognition 
Before I turn to the details of Maimon’s argument, I want here to consider an 
important Maimonian distinction. In chapter four, I argued that, by way of the 
quaestio juris, Maimon establishes that the understanding must play a role not only in 
subsuming an already determinate sensible content under concepts, but in 
determining the sensible content itself, insofar as perceptual judgment is to be 
rationally warranted. It seems self-evidently true, however, that not all thought is 
determinative. I can make claims that are false (either deliberately or mistakenly), or I 
can make claims that are true but which correspond to an object that cannot itself be 
given in intuition: I can draw conclusions, for example, about the nature of atoms, 
about the chemical composition of a star, or about prehistoric forms of life. On the 
Kantian account, the distinction between judgments and the objects to which they 
refer can be easily accounted for by way of cognitive dualism: concepts alone are not 
sufficient to determine objects, intuitions are also required, and thought about objects 
can therefore be contrasted with the real objects of experience. If thought is to be 
entirely determinative of its content (as the PCRD demands), however, then an 
alternative to this Kantian distinction is required: it must be possible to account for 
the fact that not all thought is determinative of real objects – that some thought is 
merely about objects.  
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The distinction between real thought and symbolic cognition plays this role 
for Maimon: ‘[i]t is by means of symbolic cognition’ he writes, ‘that we attain 
abstract concepts and compose concepts in different ways out of these so that we are 
able to discover new truths from those we already know; i.e. to use our reason at all’ 
(VT, GW II, 263).158  The distinction first appears in the VT, where an appendix (‘on 
symbolic cognition and philosophical language’) is dedicated to it. Maimon contrasts 
symbolic cognition with what he calls ‘intuitive knowledge’:159 the production, or 
direct determination, of objects of experience in intuition. ‘As long as one remains 
with intuitive cognition’, Maimon writes, ‘the discovery of truth takes place by means 
of a direct exchange, i.e., a direct substitution of thoughts for one another’ (VT, GW 
II, 411): one can only have a thought of an object by way of an intuition of it 
(whether by way of perception, or by way of the imagination). Symbolic cognition, 
on the other hand, involves the production of concepts, or symbols, which correspond 
to an object of knowledge but do not themselves determine it: ‘an object of symbolic 
cognition is: a form, or way, of thinking an object of intuition, that is itself treated as 
an object (but not of intuition)’ (VT, GW II, 272). We assign symbols to particular 
intuitive determinations, Maimon argues, in the same way that we assign a particular 
monetary value to coins. The production of further concepts is then made possible by 
way of the synthesis of these symbols and, importantly, because the concepts merely 
represent the objects of intuition but do not themselves produce or determine them, 
the production of concepts which relate to objects that cannot themselves be objects 
                                                
158 Surprisingly little has been written about Maimon’s account of symbolic knowledge. David 
Lachterman does provide an examination of the role of symbolic knowledge in Maimon’s theory of 
mathematics. See Lachterman, 1992. 
159 See VT, GW II, 411 
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of intuition is possible. ‘In this way we are in a position to discover the most hidden 
truth without much effort and, as it were, mechanically’ (VT, GW II, 412); we can 
attain a symbolic knowledge of 100,000 for example, without having to actually 
experience the number in intuition; we have intuitive, or real, knowledge of 10 
because we have been presented with this number in intuition, and can add the 
symbolic concept to itself until we have what will be a symbolic cognition of 
100,000.160 It is by way of symbolic cognition, then, that reason is able to extend 
beyond the boundaries of what can, practically speaking, be experienced – that it can, 
in other words, form ideas. In this way, as will be seen in chapter six, symbolic 
cognition allows for a resolution of the antinomies in that it allows the understanding 
to gain an idea (though not an intuition) of the infinite. It is by way of symbolic 
cognition, Maimon argues, that the differential calculus is possible: the understanding 
has insight into the production of the polygon, and the differential calculus exploits 
this insight in order to gain a discursive understanding of the production of the circle: 
the circle is thought as composed of an infinite number of infinitely small straight 
lines, with each expressing a determinate relation of the ratio of y to x, and the 
addition of the symbolic concepts to infinity allows for symbolic cognition of the 
circle.161  
A consequence, however, is that we can sometimes produce concepts by way 
of symbolic cognition that do not correspond to objects of possible experience. While 
these conceptual ‘fictions’, like those of determinate space and time, can sometimes 
help to make ideas of the understanding discursively available, they can at other times 
                                                
160 This is a version of an example that Maimon himself gives (See VT, GW II, 273) 
161 For a more detailed account of symbolic cognition in mathematics, see Lachterman, 1992. 
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lead us astray.162 In this case, we produce what Maimon calls ‘arbitrary’ syntheses. 
(VT, GW II, 103). I can say, for example, ‘a round sadness’, even though I cannot 
ever intuit it. It is, to use another of Maimon’s distinctions, logically possible insofar 
as the concepts are not contradictory, but it is not metaphysically possible – it is not 
something that can be constructed in intuition.163 Maimon often uses the example of a 
regular decahedron here; the regular decahedron is an object of symbolic cognition 
because we can create the concept through the combination of existing concepts (by 
extension, for example, of the concept of the cube as a regular six-faced solid object) 
which do not themselves contradict one another, but the regular decahedron is not a 
possible object of intuition, or at least not within the Euclidean space in which 
material objects are represented for us.164 Arbitrary synthesis can also occur when 
repetition in experience encourages us to combine two concepts of intuitive 
knowledge in a further concept or judgment. As has been seen, Maimon thinks that 
the Kantian concept of cause is of this kind: we produce a synthesis of two concepts 
by way of the imagination (for example, fire and heat). By way of abstraction from 
various syntheses of this kind we arrive at the concept of causality. The synthesis is 
merely arbitrary, Maimon holds however, since nothing is thereby determined in 
intuition.  
 ‘[I]f it is to be of any use’, Maimon argues therefore, ‘symbolic knowledge 
must be grounded in intuitive knowledge; without this it would be a mere form 
                                                
162 For examples of useful conceptual fictions see Maimon, VT, GW II, 412: ‘we occasionally arrive at 
symbolic combinations or formulae that have no reality, i.e. that do not correspond to any real objects, 
for example the imaginary numbers, the tangent and cosine of a right angle and similar things in 
mathematics’ (VT, GW II, 412) 
163 See, for example, Logik, GW V, 76. 
164 See, for example, Logik, GW V 76. Maimon also gives the example of ‘the tangent and cosine of a 
right angle’ (VT, GW II, 412) 
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without objective reality’ (VT, GW II, 263). Symbolic knowledge must, in other 
words, correspond to determinations that are constitutive of intuition. Maimon thus 
excludes the possibility of legitimate regulative forms of judgment, so that the 
categories that Kant designates dynamical, i.e. those that are supposed to have a 
merely regulative employment or mere discursive certainty, can no longer be 
considered objectively valid. We must therefore have a means of determining when 
symbolic knowledge corresponds to a real, productive, objective synthesis (i.e. when 
it approximates ideas of the understanding, or where it is warranted by them) and 
when it corresponds to a merely subjective synthesis. In other words, we require a 
means for distinguishing between real, metaphysical possibility, and mere logical 
possibility. The former Maimon designates ‘real thought’, the latter ‘arbitrary 
thought’.165  The goal of transcendental philosophy should therefore be to determine 
the objective reality of certain kinds of symbolic cognition: to determine whether they 
constitute ‘real thought’, i.e. represent really possible determinations of objects, or 
whether they are ‘mere’ symbolic knowledge. Maimon identifies a principle that he 
thinks should allow us to make this distinction: the principle of determinability 
(PoD). Real thought, Maimon argues, adheres to the PoD. Arbitrary synthesis, or 
mere symbolic cognition, on the other hand, does not.  
5.2 The principle of determinability  
The origin of Maimon’s principle of determinability is unclear. As has often been 
pointed out, Kant himself develops a ‘principle of determination’, but this bears little 
                                                
165 Maimon introduces a new form of judgment – the zero (0) judgment, to designate arbitrary 
judgments, i.e. judgments that are only logically and not metaphysically possible, such as that of the 
round sadness. See Logik, GW V, 126 
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resemblance to Maimon’s own principle, having to do with the application of 
contradictory predicates to the same subject.166 It is generally concluded, then, that 
the PoD is a solely Maimonian innovation.167 I suggest, however, that Maimon’s PoD 
does have its origins in the KrV. In a paragraph at the end of the introduction to the 
Transcendental Deduction, Kant writes: 
I shall introduce a word of explanation in regard to the categories. They are concepts 
of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as 
determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgment. Thus the function 
of the categorical judgment is that of the relation of subject to predicate; for example, 
‘All bodies are divisible’. But as regards the merely logical employment of the 
understanding, it remains undetermined to which of the two concepts the function of 
subject, and to which the function of predicate, is to be assigned. For we can also say 
‘something divisible is a body’. But when the concept of body is brought under the 
category of substance, it is thereby determined that its empirical intuition in 
experience must always be considered as subject and never as mere predicate. 
Similarly with all the other categories. (B128-129) 
 Kant does not elaborate any further on this, but the claim appears to be that while in 
general logic one can say that ‘something divisible is a body’ or that ‘a body is 
divisible’, the same is not true with respect to the object of experience. My 
experience is only ever of a divisible body, where ‘body’ is the substance, and 
‘divisibility’ the property, and not of a body divisibility, where divisibility is the 
substance and body the property. Transcendental logic can be distinguished from 
general logic, then, insofar as it relates to the content of judgments, and not to their 
mere form: in the case of the category of substance and accident, transcendental logic 
determines which of the terms should be considered substance and which property. It 
is difficult to know exactly what Kant intended here – while the claim makes some 
sense with respect to the category of substance, and of causality, it is more difficult to 
                                                
166 See A571/B599: ‘of every two contradictory opposed predicates only one can belong to a concept. 
This principle is based on the law of contradiction, and is therefore a purely logical principle’ 
(A571/B599).  
167 See, for example, Breazeale, 2013, p.44. 
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make sense of it with respect to some of the other categories; how would we apply 
this rule, for example, with respect to the category of totality? It is clear, however, 
that if we are to accept Kant’s claim that transcendental logic determines both the 
form and the content of judgments, so that in a judgment of real thought it should be 
determined which is the subject and which the predicate, this can serve as a principle 
for distinguishing real judgments (which have their origins in transcendental logic) 
from merely arbitrary judgments (which conform only to what Maimon refers to as 
the merely negative form of the principle of non-contradiction). In this way, then, the 
principle of determinability may serve as a means of responding to the quaestio 
facti.168  
Maimon first introduces his version of the principle of determinability in 
chapter four of the VT, where he appears to repeat Kant’s own claims concerning the 
relation between general and transcendental logic: 
In general logic, the forms of thought are viewed in relation to an object in general (a 
priori or a posteriori); but in transcendental logic, they are viewed in relation to 
objects determined a priori. As a result, subject is not distinguished from predicate 
through any condition in general logic; whereas in transcendental logic they are 
distinguished by means of an a priori condition. (VT, GW II, 85) 
On the basis of this distinction between general and transcendental logic, Maimon is 
able to develop the following general principle of real, or determinative, thought: ‘[i]f 
one of the constituent parts of a synthesis can be thought without reference to the 
other, i.e. either in itself or in another synthesis, but the other cannot be thought 
without reference to the first, then the first is termed the subject of the synthesis and 
                                                
168 Maimon claims, therefore, that the aim of the Logik is to provide a ‘general criterion of real thought 
in what I have called the “principle of determinability” (KA, GW VI, 10) 
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the latter the predicate’ (VT, GW II, 84).169 According to the principle of 
determinability there must be a one-sided dependence of the predicate on the subject 
if the judgment is to be real as opposed to merely formal or arbitrary: ‘if, on the other 
hand, [the subject and predicate are] interchangeable, a merely formal, but not a real 
thought, and therefore no thought object, can take place.’ (Logik, GW V, 83). On this 
definition, then, it is clear exactly why Maimon does not think that causality 
constitutes an objective synthesis: the predicate and subject in the causal judgment 
can be thought independently of one another, and their synthesis might therefore 
occur only after our intuition of them. Mathematical judgments do, however, at least 
appear to conform to the principle of determinability: I cannot think of the concept of 
a square without thereby also thinking of a four-sided figure, but I can think of a four-
sided figure without thinking of a square. Similarly, I cannot think of the property of 
being four-sided without thereby also thinking the concept figure, but I can think of 
the concept figure without thereby also thinking of four-sidedness.  
There is a further implication of the PoD: each determination should be 
applicable to only one determinable, i.e., the same predicate cannot legitimately be 
applied to two different subjects. In support of this claim, Maimon provides the 
following line of argument: 
different grounds cannot have the same consequences. The reason is this: if the 
grounds are completely different, i.e., if to posit one is to eliminate the other, then the 
following is certain: if A is a ground (condition) of something, then non A, or the 
elimination of the ground, cannot at the same time be the ground of the same 
something. On the other hand, suppose they are only partially but not completely 
different, and so in part the same: in this case, if A is the ground of something, then B 
can be the ground of the same something at the same time only to the extent that it is 
                                                
169 By synthesis here, Maimon intends both judgments and concepts – he does not distinguish between 
these. For a detailed explanation of why this is the case, see Yakira, 2003, pp.63-73. 
 150 
identical with A. Then the ground of this something is neither A nor B, but is instead 
merely what they have in common. (VT, GW II, 90) 
Maimon’s argument here appears complex, but this principle in fact follows, I think, 
fairly straightforwardly from the PoD. If a particular subject (A) is a condition on the 
possibility of the thought of a particular predicate (C), then it follows that it cannot be 
legitimately - or really - thought with respect to another subject (B) unless that 
subject (B) is already identical with A. This is because AC is only a real synthesis if 
C cannot be thought without A, and BC is a real synthesis only if C cannot be thought 
without B. It follows, then, that in any predication C, both A and B must be thought, 
i.e., there can be no synthesis of AC nor of BC unless A and B are in fact identical. If 
I reply, for example, that perhaps B includes A along with some further 
determinations, then I thereby render the synthesis of BC merely symbolic, since it is 
possible to think of C independently of B insofar as I can think of it merely by way of 
A.  
This is particularly counter-intuitive. It seems evident that the same predicate 
does apply to multiple subjects – the sky is blue, for example, but so are peacocks, 
and sapphire. Maimon’s position, however, is that the fact of this multiple application 
of the concept is evidence of the subjective nature of the respective syntheses: blue is 
not a predicate of these individual objects, but instead of what is shared by them (e.g. 
space or figure etc.). In fact, the objects themselves are products of the imagination, 
i.e. of imaginative and therefore subjective synthesis, insofar as they involve a 
synthesis of several sensible properties which can be thought in themselves.170 The 
                                                
170 See, for example, VT, GW II, 102-103: ‘gold is a perceived synthesis of yellow colour, distinctive 
weight, hardness, etc. It is not a synthesis of the understanding because these characteristics can be 
thought without one another and hence are not in the relation of subject and predicate (the 
determinable and its determination); instead they are combined only because they accompany each 
other in time and space. I freely admit that the synthesis of the imagination must have an inner ground, 
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basis for the synthesis is simply that these properties occupy a singular 
spatiotemporal location. A hypothetical infinite understanding, however, - i.e., one 
which had cognisance of the complete production of the objects of intuition - would 
not think in terms of these kinds of objects at all: 
For example, take the objection that the predicate ‘figure’ belongs to every body as 
subject, or that a determined colour, for example red, can belong to different bodies, 
etc. We have only to consider these examples more closely to discover that in the 
first example figure is not predicated directly of body, but of its form, namely of 
space; and that in the second colour is as little a predicate (determination) of body in 
general as it is of any particular body; for what could it be a determination of? – 
extension, impenetrability, weight, hardness, etc.? Only those who have no insight 
into the nature of a determination and treat things of the imagination as things of the 
understanding could believe this. The gathering together of these qualities is merely a 
synthesis of the imagination, based on their simultaneous coexistence in time and 
space … but not a synthesis of the understanding: we can think a red body as little as 
we can think a sweet line. (VT, GW II, 92-93) 
But what exactly is it that we are doing when we work backwards like this 
from determination to determinable? A consequence of Maimon’s commitment to the 
PCRD is that the matter/form distinction becomes relativized. In any particular 
synthesis, the predicate is what is doing the determining (i.e. it is the form) and the 
subject is what is being determined (i.e. it is the matter). In itself, however, the 
subject is not straightforwardly matter, since it is already a product of a prior formal 
synthesis:  
The determinable in an object is the matter, and the determinable [in the object] the 
form. (Logik, GW V, 256) 
The reason must be the one that I give, namely this: the subject comprises that part of 
a synthesis that also constitutes a synthesis in itself; as a result it can also be thought 
in itself as an object without relation to the other part, the one that does not constitute 
a synthesis in itself; as a result it can be thought only as a constituent part of a 
synthesis, not in itself as an object. (VT, GW II, 377) 
                                                
i.e., an understanding that is acquainted with the inner essence of gold has to construct its concept of 
gold so that these properties must necessarily follow from the essence; nevertheless, for us this 
synthesis will always remain a mere synthesis of the imagination.’  
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To produce these chains of predication is therefore to carry out a kind of reverse 
engineering of experience by moving backwards through the determinations by way 
of which intentional content is produced.171 It is to reveal, in other words, the 
judgments that are made with respect to intuitable content in order that it become 
intentional content.   
5.2.1 The influence of the principle of determinability 
Breazeale has argued that Fichte’s ‘principle of reciprocal determination’ is an 
amended version of Maimon’s principle of determinability.172 If we think, as I have 
argued above that we should, that the PoD serves as a method by which to access the 
process of determination by way of which a given becomes an intentional content, 
then Maimon’s aims bear a strong resemblance to the aims of §1 of Fichte’s 
Grundlage, which describe the process of reciprocal determination by way of which 
an Anstoß or limitation on the activity of the I comes to be an intentional content.173 
Similarly, Oded Schechter argues that the principle of determinability was highly 
influential in the development of Hegel’s Aufhebung (2003, pp.51-52). According to 
Schechter, Maimon ‘formulated the “blueprint” which German Idealism adopted, but 
without his [skeptical] caveats’ (2003, p.51); while Maimon remains skeptical about 
the possibility of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate forms of judgment 
insofar as the finite intellect is dependent on a matter that is merely given, Hegel, in 
                                                
171 Breazeale argues that this Maimonian method was a precursor to Fichte’s ‘pragmatic history of the 
human mind’. See Breazeale, 2013, chapter 4.  
172 See Breazeale, 2013, chapter 3. 
173 In addition to Breazeale, 2013, see Martin, 1997 for an example of how Fichte might be interpreted 
along these Maimonian lines.  
 153 
that he rejects the material given, transforms Maimon’s principle of determinability 
into a principle of speculative metaphysics.   
5.3 Dogmatic rationalism, empirical skepticism 
A much debated issue in the scholarship is the question of what Maimon means when 
he calls his a ‘coalition system’: a combination of ‘dogmatic rationalism’ and 
‘empirical skepticism’.174 If Maimon’s position is ultimately rationalist, and if he 
adopts the PCRD of necessity and in order to account for the possibility of 
experience, then in what sense does he remain a skeptic? Some commentators have 
argued that Maimon remains a skeptic insofar as he shows only that a rejection of 
Kantian discursivity provides a means of responding to the quaestio juris, but not that 
we should abandon discursivity. As discussed above, this requires that we conceive of 
the quaestio juris in a particular way – as concerning the validity of concepts or 
judgments, as opposed to as establishing conditions of the possibility of perception. 
More recently, it has been argued that Maimon’s skepticism is a product of his 
dogmatic rationalism. In particular, Thielke (2014) and Franks (2003) have advanced 
this reading. Others have argued, as I have, that Maimon moves from skepticism to 
rationalism: that the Maimonian skepticism about the Kantian explanation of the 
possibility of perception ultimately leads to a speculative rationalism. In this case, 
however, how can we make sense of Maimon’s characterization of his project as a 
coalition system? 
I suggest that Maimon’s coalition system is best summarized in a passage I 
referred to earlier from the KA: 
                                                
174 See VT, GW II, 436 
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‘I reject merely discursive thought completely, as an empty fiction that has no real 
ground; limit my theory of thought to just real thought, and place the object of 
experience in doubt’ (KA, x, GW VI, 10) 
Maimon is a dogmatic rationalist is so far as he holds that it should be possible in 
principle to account for the objects of experience purely in terms of rational 
determination. He remains an empirical skeptic, however, insofar as this rationalism 
provides only a partial response to the quaestio facti. While Maimon, by way of the 
quaestio juris, establishes that the understanding is active in warranting perceptual 
judgment and so in determining intuitive content, Maimon does not think, as Kant 
does, that we have immediate access to the a priori forms that govern real (i.e. non-
arbitrary) thought. While the PoD can help us in identifying arbitrary syntheses, and 
can, therefore, take us part way to an understanding of the process of determination 
by which sensible intentional content is produced, our inability to construct sensible 
objects in discursive, or symbolic, cognition, means that we remain unable to provide 
a complete account of the a priori conditions governing intuitive thought. We must 
therefore presuppose that there are objective grounds for our subjective syntheses: 
that there is a reason for example that heat and light are conjoined, but we have no 
means of determining what these are because we are merely finite, symbolic, 
cognisors and do not therefore have access to the grounds of objective synthesis. We 
can make use of certain subjective concepts, such as that of causality, in order to 
formulate an account, but this can only ever have subjective, and not objective, 
validity.175  
                                                
175 In fact, Maimon argues, different forms of explanation (which employ merely subjective syntheses) 
will appeal according to the use that we want to make of them: ‘Theologians, for example (when they 
also want to be philosophers), naturally find more subjective interest in the Wollfian system than in 
other systems. A system that holds the objects of their profession to be a mere idea (in the sense in 
which Kant and I define this word) will not please them’ (VT, GW II, 439) and ‘Physicians find 
themselves in a desperate situation in this regard. Their subjective interest requires them to endorse the 
 155 
5.4 Conclusion 
Maimon’s quaestio juris serves as a partial response to his quaestio facti, then, 
insofar as is establishes that rational explanation has, in principle, universal 
applicability. Further, Maimon’s PoD allows us to identify certain illegitimate forms 
of judgment. A more robust system of transcendental philosophy such as Kant 
attempts to formulate in the KrV remains, however, beyond our reach as finite, 
discursive, cognisors, and a full response to the quaestio facti is not, therefore, 
possible. Finite, human, knowledge takes place by way of symbolic cognition, 
meaning that we are able to attain an understanding of objects that we are not in a 
position to intuit. A consequence of this, however, is that illegitimate syntheses are 
possible. Such syntheses produce symbolic objects that cannot in principle be objects 
of possible intuition. The PoD serves as a means of distinguishing real, objectively 
grounded, synthesis from mere symbolic, or arbitrary, synthesis. As a consequence, 
syntheses such as that of causality, which are based upon the relation of material 
content in space and time have a merely subjective as opposed to objective validity: 
they can stand in for the understanding and allow us to approximate real knowledge, 
but they do not themselves correspond to real objective determination. Beyond the 
science of mathematics, then, we have limited insight into the production of 
experience by way of determination, and remain unable, therefore, to establish a 
system of transcendental metaphysics.  
  
                                                
system of the materialists because with materialism they gain a wonderful opportunity to detail their 
anatomical and physiological knowledge in explaining all vital functions by mere physical 
mechanisms … On the other hand, they also find the very same interest in the opposite system (that of 
the spiritualists), namely in the assumption of an infinite wisdom and goodness that they likewise 
support with their anatomical and physiological knowledge’ (VT, GW II, 440-441) 
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Chapter Six:  Cognitive dualism and antinomy: Kant’s 
challenge to Maimon 
In the preceding, I have set out the skeptical challenges to which Maimon intended 
that his ‘coalition system’ should respond, and I have outlined the foundations of 
Maimon’s own attempt to respond to these. As discussed, this distinctive set of 
Maimonian problems, and the Maimonian framework by which they are to be 
resolved (what I have called the ‘Maimonian response’), had a significant influence 
on the early development of post-Kantian philosophy. In the remainder of the 
dissertation, however, I aim to reveal what I will argue is a key shortcoming in the 
Maimonian response, and to suggest that modifications of the Maimonian position are 
therefore required. The shortcomings of the Maimonian system are most acutely 
revealed in a challenge that Kant himself sets to Maimon in his 1789 letter to Herz. 
Here, after praising Maimon for the acuity of his insights, Kant sets a challenge for 
Maimon: he should ‘[deliver] a whole system. This would clearly show not only the 
way he thinks of the principles of a priori knowledge, but also the implications of his 
system for the solution of the problems of pure reason’. Kant’s position is that 
Maimon will find himself unable to resolve the antinomies as a result of his rejection 
of discursivity:  
the antinomies of pure reason can provide a good touchstone, and may convince him 
of the following: that human understanding is not of the same species as divine 
understanding so that it can be taken to differ from it only by limitation, i.e. in degree 
– that unlike divine understanding, human understanding must be treated as a faculty 
of thinking, not of intuiting, and must always have a completely different faculty (or 
receptivity) of intuition at its side, or better as its matter, in order to produce 
cognition; and that, because intuition merely provides us with appearances and the 
thing itself is a mere concept of reason, the antinomies, arising entirely from the 
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confusion of the two, can never be resolved unless the possibility of synthetic a 
priori propositions is deduced according to my principles (Ak. XI, 53-54) 
The aim of the present chapter is to examine Kant’s claim. I first consider the role of 
discursivity in Kant’s own resolution of the antinomies – both those of the KrV and 
the antinomy of teleological reason that is to be found in the KU. I then turn to 
Maimon’s treatment of antinomy. Finally, I argue that while Maimon is able to 
provide an account of antinomy, this account comes at the expense of a coherent 
account of the subject.  
6.1 Discursivity and things in themselves 
Before turning to these questions, it is first necessary to draw a distinction between 
two components of Kant’s claim in his letter to Herz. As it is formulated there, Kant’s 
claim is that Maimon will not be in a position to resolve the antinomies because his 
rejection of discursivity means that the dualism of things in themselves and 
appearances required in order that the antinomies be resolved is not possible within 
his system. Contemporary discussions of Kant’s resolution of the antinomies have 
tended to focus upon his claim that transcendental idealism, or the denial that 
spatiotemporal objects are things in themselves, is key to resolving the antinomies. 
As discussed in chapter four, however, the important Maimonian development is not 
a rejection of things in themselves, but instead a rejection of discursivity. Here, then, 
I argue that Kant’s resolution of the antinomies is not a direct result of the distinction 
he makes between appearances and things in themselves, but instead of his 
discursivity thesis, and that it is therefore Maimon’s rejection of discursivity that 
leaves Maimon susceptible (at least in Kant’s eyes) to the problem of antinomy.  
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6.2 Kant’s resolution of the antinomies 
The antinomies are four sets of two opposing, yet equally convincing, ‘cosmological’ 
proofs. Each of the antinomies corresponds to one category from each of the four sets 
of categories (quantity, quality, relation and modality) described in the Metaphysical 
Deduction. The first antinomy, for example, is concerned with the category of 
totality; the thesis states that ‘[t]he world has a beginning in time, and is also limited 
as regards space’, while the antithesis states that ‘[t]he world has no beginning, and 
no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both time and space’ (A427 / B455). Kant’s 
argument is that in each antinomy we have no means of determining that either of the 
two arguments (i.e. that in favour of the thesis and that in favour of the antithesis), is 
preferable to the other. Moreover, to abandon either the thesis or the antithesis 
appears to lead reason into contradiction. In the first antinomy, for example, the thesis 
leads to contradictions insofar as it requires a time before time, but the antithesis also 
leads to contradictions insofar as it requires that we conceptualise what is 
fundamentally unconceptualisable, namely an infinite regress in time. Kant’s 
argument in the Antinomies chapter is that these conflicts of reason arise as a result of 
the natural tendency of reason to try to establish a singular and coherent system:  
‘Human reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, it regards all knowledge as 
belonging to a possible system, and therefore allows only such principles as do not at 
any rate make it impossible for any knowledge that we may attain to combine into a 
system with other knowledge’ (A474 / B502).  
In the case of the cosmological concepts, this leads to a belief that a complete and 
exhaustive explanation of sensible experience should be possible; that it is possible, at 
least in theory, to determine a priori the finitude or infinitude of the world, and the 
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finite or infinite divisibility of its constituent parts. This demand for totality is then 
satisfied in different ways according to the thesis and the antithesis. 
The general structure of antinomy can be seen most clearly in the first and 
second antinomies, where the conflict arises as a result of an expectation, on the part 
of reason, that it is possible to account for the sensible content of experience, the 
presence of which it should be outside the domain of reason to explain. Consider, for 
example, the first antinomy, which concerns the magnitude of the world considered 
as a totality. In the case of the thesis: ‘The world has a beginning in time, and is also 
limited as regards space’ (A426/B454),  the demand for totality is met in the pure 
application of the categories; it is argued that the empirical series of spatiotemporal 
objects should be subsumed under the idea of the world as totality: ‘When the 
transcendental ideas are postulated and employed in the manner prescribed by the 
thesis, the entire chain of conditions and the derivation of the conditioned can be 
grasped completely a priori’ (A466 / B494). In practice, however, the argument of 
the thesis is problematic. The dependence of experience upon a sensible component 
means that the empirical application of the categories can never reach the level of the 
transcendental idea. In order that the empirical regress be brought into unity with the 
idea of totality, it is therefore necessary to introduce an arbitrary limit on the 
empirical regress; a non-temporal is thought as providing a limit to the temporal. This 
is, of course, problematic because it supposes that the non-temporal can stand to the 
temporal in a relation of time.  It is also dogmatic, however, in that it introduces into 
the series of sensible objects of experience, an object which is not itself an object of 
possible experience, but which is instead merely intelligible, and it does not posit this 
 160 
object as an object of thought, but as an object which exists independently of the 
thought of it: 
The assertions of the thesis […] presuppose, in addition to the empirical mode of 
explanation employed within the series of appearances, intelligible beginnings;  and 
to this extent its maxim is complex. But as its essential and distinguishing 
characteristic is the presupposition of intelligible beginnings, I shall entitle it the 
dogmatism of pure reason. (A466/B494) 
In the case of the antithesis, on the other hand, the argument proceeds only on the 
basis of what is to be met with in experience, only allowing regress to those objects 
which conform to the rules of possible experience. In experience, however, the 
regress can only occur within space and time, and can therefore only proceed to 
further spatiotemporal objects. As a consequence, the regress continues indefinitely, 
and it is concluded that the world does not have a finite but instead an infinite 
magnitude. It should be noted here that while it is generally accepted that the 
assertion of the thesis is inherently problematic, the issue of whether or not the 
assertion of the antithesis is inherently problematic is more contentious. Kant claims 
that the antithesis is problematic because ‘the propositions of the antithesis are of 
such a kind that they render the completion of the edifice of knowledge quite 
impossible’ (A474/B502). In the case of the first antinomy, ‘the infinity of a series 
consists in the fact that it can never be completed through successive synthesis. It thus 
follows that it is impossible for an infinite world-series to have passed away’ (A427 / 
B455). The argument is that the antithesis is problematic because it demands a 
completion of the series (in that it supposes that the actuality of a particular 
spatiotemporal object entails the actuality of the entire series of conditions), while at 
the same time denying that this totality is possible.  
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The solution to these conflicts, Kant argues in the KrV, lies, at least in part, in 
the rejection of transcendental realism, that is, a rejection of the presupposition that 
things in themselves are spatiotemporal. If not only appearances, but also things in 
themselves are spatiotemporal, then the grounds of appearances can themselves in 
turn be only spatiotemporal. Given a particular spatiotemporal object in experience, 
then, a search for the ultimate origin of that object takes the form of a regress in time 
or space. Both the thesis and the antithesis of the mathematical antinomies 
presuppose transcendental realism in that they attempt to reach the ultimate ground 
(the condition which is not itself conditioned) by way of a regress through the 
conditions in time and space. In the case of the first antinomy, the origin of 
spatiotemporal objects is sought through a regression in time. When the position of 
the thesis is adopted, an unconditioned, and therefore non-spatiotemporal, is posited 
as standing in a relation of time to the temporal sequence. When the position of the 
antithesis is adopted, it is argued that no such origin can be found in the temporal 
regress, and it is concluded that there can therefore be no non-temporal origin and 
time must therefore be infinite. Similarly, the spatial extension of the world is thought 
as standing in a relation of space to the non-spatiotemporal in the case of the thesis, 
while in the antithesis the impossibility of a regression in thought to the limits of 
space, leads to the conclusion that there can be no non-spatial entity and space must 
therefore be infinite. In the case of the second antinomy, the ultimate ground of the 
spatial extension is sought in its constituent parts. When the position of the thesis is 
adopted, the regress from the spatial extension to its constituent parts is terminated 
arbitrarily and a non-spatial entity is posited as the ultimate ground of spatiality. 
When the position of the antithesis is adopted, the regress in thought from spatial 
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extension to its constituent parts continues indefinitely and it is therefore concluded 
that there can be no non-spatial ground of spatial extension.  
The mathematical antinomies arise, then, because we extend the conditions on 
the possibility of experience so that they apply to all entities, not just those of 
possible experience.176 As a consequence, we conclude that any ground of experience 
must itself be subject to the conditions of experience, so that we are incapable of 
regressing to anything other than a further conditioned. ‘The whole antinomy of pure 
reason,’ Kant claims therefore ‘rests upon the following dialectical argument: If the 
conditioned [spatiotemporal] is given, the entire series of all its conditions is likewise 
given; objects of the senses are given as conditioned; therefore, etc.’ (A497 / B525).  
In order that the antinomies be resolved, Kant argues therefore, transcendental 
realism must be rejected: ‘The objects of experience, then, are never given in 
themselves, but only in experience, and have no existence outside it’ (A492 / B521). 
‘Space and time,’ Kant argues, ‘and with them all appearances, are not in themselves 
things; they are nothing but representations, and cannot exist outside our mind’ 
(A492/B520).  If spatiotemporality is limited to objects of possible experience, then it 
does not follow from an ‘indefinite regress’ in experience that an infinite regress must 
be possible independently of experience (A468/B496).  
                                                
176 See A528/B556: ‘In representing the antinomy of pure reason through all the transcendental ideas, 
in tabular form, and in showing that the ground of this conflict and the only means of resolving it is by 
declaring both the opposed assertions to be false, we have represented the conditions as, in all cases, 
standing to the conditioned in relations of space and time. This is the assumption ordinarily made by 
the common understanding, and to it the conflict is exclusively due’. 
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6.2.2 The antinomy of teleological judgment 
While the antinomies of the KrV are concerned with the metaphysical, a priori, 
structure of the world or nature, the antinomy of the KU is instead concerned with the 
totality of empirical natural laws. As such, while the antinomy can still be said to 
stem from the supposition of transcendental realism, the essential distinction is not 
between things in themselves and appearances, but instead between appearances 
considered as products of the kind of mechanistic natural causality which results from 
the transcendental application of the categories of the understanding, and, in 
reflection upon experience, as products of an additional, non-mechanistic causality of 
final causes. The antinomy is presented as follows. The thesis states that ‘[a]ll 
production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible in terms 
of merely mechanistic laws’ (Ak. V 387). The antithesis, on the other hand, states that 
‘[s]ome products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible in terms of 
merely mechanical laws. (Judging them requires a quite different causal law – viz., 
that of final causes)’ (ibid). The thesis appears to contradict the antithesis because 
taken together they appear to entail that mechanistic causality is at the same time both 
sufficient and insufficient to account for the empirical laws of nature.   
As with the antinomies of the KrV, Kant’s solution is to dissolve the 
opposition between the thesis and the antithesis. His argument here is that the thesis 
and antithesis are only contradictory if they are taken to apply to things in themselves 
or, in other words, where the role of judgement is taken to be constitutive as opposed 
to regulative. In this case, Kant argues, the antinomy can be presented as follows: 
‘Thesis: All production of material things is possible in terms of merely mechanical 
laws. […] Antithesis: Some production of material things is not possible in terms of 
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merely mechanical laws.’ (Ak. V, 387).  It is clear that the above propositions are 
contradictory since both refer to the actual constitution of objects of experience, and 
cannot both, therefore, be true: ‘In this latter form, as objective principles for 
determinative judgement, the two principles would contradict one another, so that one 
of them would have to be false; and so an antinomy would result’ (Ak.V, 387). The 
thesis and antithesis are not contradictory in the antinomy as it is originally presented, 
however, because they are not concerned with the existence of objects, but instead 
merely with the rules which govern empirical reflection upon an already constituted 
experience:   
But if we consider instead the two maxims of a power of a judgement that reflects, 
the first of these two maxims does in fact not contradict [the second] at all. For if I 
say that I must judge all events in material nature, and hence also all the forms that 
are its products, in terms of merely mechanical laws as to [how] they are possible, 
then I am not saying that they are possible in terms of mechanical laws alone (i.e., 
even if no other kind of causality comes in). (Ak V, 387-8).  
The argument is that in determinative judgement, the maxim concerns how an already 
given manifold is to be subsumed in such a way as to produce experience. In this 
case, then, the synthesis can take place only according to mechanistic natural laws. In 
the case of reflective judgement, however, the matter to be judged already includes 
the given manifold, and the mechanistic laws are not in themselves, therefore, 
sufficient to account for the totality of empirical synthesis:  
‘we have no insight into the first inner basis [responsible] for the endless diversity of 
the particular natural laws, because they are contingent for us since we cognize them 
only empirically; and so we cannot possibly reach the inner and completely sufficient 
principle of the possibility of nature (this principle lies in the supersensible)’ (Ak. V 
388).  
In §76 of the Critique of Teleological Judgement, Kant provides an explanation for 
the role of discursivity in allowing for a resolution of antinomies of judgement. His 
argument is that the antinomy arises because, for the human intellect, there is a 
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distinction between what is possible and what is actual, or what is possible in thought 
and what is materially possible. In the case of a hypothetical non-discursive intellect, 
there could be no possibility of a non-natural causality because it should be possible 
to account for everything which appeared in nature purely in terms of the activity of 
the understanding. The distinction between actuality and possibility is itself, Kant 
claims, a product of the discursivity of the finite human intellect, and the antinomy is 
resolved by showing that the argument of the thesis and the antithesis of the antinomy 
in its contradictory form, wrongly presupposes the identity of possibility and actuality 
and, therefore, that finite experience is non-discursive. My argument in the following 
is that in the same way in which the mathematical antinomies are often said to 
provide an indirect proof of transcendental idealism, the antinomy of teleological 
judgement can be said to provide an indirect proof of discursivity.  
How is it, then, that an identity of possibility and actuality underlies the 
arguments of the thesis and the antithesis in the contradictory formulation of the 
antinomy of teleological judgement? And in what way is the distinction between 
possibility and actuality dependent upon discursivity? As discussed, the contradictory 
formulation of the antinomy mistakes the regulative principles which determine 
reflection upon, or conceptual thought about, an object, for constitutive principles 
which are sufficient to bring about the existence of that object. In other words, it 
presupposes that it should be possible, at least in principle, to account for the totality 
of material actuality purely in terms of conceptual principles. Kant describes this as a 
belief that it should be possible to proceed from the universal to the particular; the 
belief, resulting from the confusion of regulative with constitutive understanding, is 
that it should be possible for the human understanding to proceed from the purely 
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conceptual to the material.  It is a mistake to believe that this is possible in the case of 
the human intellect, because here the role of the understanding is always to subsume 
an already given particular under general, or universal, laws.  
In turn, this distinction between possibility and actuality is possible only on 
the presupposition of a discursive intellect, because it is only for a discursive intellect 
that there can be a distinction between a purely conceptual thought and a thought 
corresponding to a material actuality. In order to reveal the dependence of the 
distinction between possibility and actuality on the discursivity of the intellect, Kant 
considers a hypothetical non-discursive intellect: 
For if the exercise of these [cognitive] powers did not require two quite 
heterogeneous components, understanding to provide concepts and sensible intuition 
to provide objects corresponding to these, then there would be no such distinction 
(between the possible and the actual). If our understanding were intuitive rather than 
discursive i.e., conceptual] it would have no objects except actual [ones]. [For] we 
would then be without concepts (and these deal with the mere possibility of an 
object) and also be without sensible intuitions (which do give us something [actual], 
yet without allowing us to cognize it as an object). But our entire distinction between 
the merely possible and the actual rests on this: in saying that a thing is possible we 
are positing only the presentation of it with respect to our concept and to our thinking 
ability in general; but in saying that a thing is actual we are positing the thing itself 
[an sich selbst] (apart from that concept). Hence the distinction between possible and 
actual things holds merely subjectively, for human understanding. (Ak. V, 401-2) 
A resolution of the antinomy can therefore proceed in the same way in which the 
resolution of the first antinomy proceeded. Both the thesis and the antithesis are 
shown to share a false premise (in this case that there is no distinction in experience 
between possibility and actuality, or that the human intellect is non-discursive, so that 
it should be possible, at least in theory, to provide a complete explanation for the 
existence of particular natural objects).  The confusion is shown to stem from 
reason’s demand for a complete and exhaustive account of the existence of natural 
objects, a demand which can never be met as a result of the discursive nature of the 
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human understanding: ‘It is indispensable [and] necessary for human understanding 
to distinguish between the possibility and the actuality of things, and this fact has its 
basis in the subject and in the nature of his cognitive powers.’ (Ak 401-2).  The 
shared premise is therefore rejected, and the thesis and antithesis no longer contradict 
one another. As in the mathematical antinomies, the thesis and antithesis (as they are 
presented in the contradictory form) are shown to presuppose a transcendent 
application of the understanding:  
‘What makes it so difficult for our understanding with its concepts to match reason 
here is merely this: that there is something which for it, as human understanding, is 
transcendent (i.e., impossible in view of the subjective conditions of its cognition), 
but which reason nevertheless treats as belonging to the object and turns into a 
principle.’ (Ak V, 403).  
As is the case with the antinomies of the KrV, then, discursivity serves to 
allow for a resolution of antinomy by revealing that a conflict which would otherwise 
be located in the object itself is instead located in the cognitive processes of the 
subject. In the case of the mathematical antinomies, this means that a conflict which 
is thought as arising within a spatiotemporal world in itself, is instead shown to arise 
as a result of conflicts between distinct cognitive faculties. The demand of reason for 
a complete account of nature is in conflict with the capabilities of the understanding, 
which can only bring an already given intuition under a priori concepts, and which 
can therefore only account for spatiotemporal entities in terms of further 
spatiotemporal entities. In the case of the antinomy of teleological judgement, a 
conflict which is thought as arising within a nature given in itself, is again shown to 
result instead from a conflict within the cognitive faculties of the subject. While 
reason demands a complete and exhaustive conceptual explanation of the empirical 
laws of nature, the human understanding is limited to merely mechanistic accounts; 
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reason demands an account of the actuality of natural entities in terms of their mere 
possibility, while, for the human understanding, possibility and actuality must always 
remain distinct: 
Hence the two propositions, that things can be possible without being actual, and that 
consequently one cannot at all infer actuality from mere possibility, do indeed hold 
for human reason. And yet this does not prove that the distinction lies in things in 
themselves [selbst]; there clearly is no such implication (Ak V, 402) 
It seems, then, that discursivity plays an essential role in the resolution of the 
antinomy of judgement described in the KU. I will now turn to the question of the 
role which it plays in the resolution of the antinomies described in the KrV. As 
discussed, the resolution of the mathematical antinomies depends upon the rejection 
of a premise which Kant argues amounts to transcendental realism, and which is 
shared by both the thesis and the antithesis. ‘The whole of the antinomy of pure 
reason’ Kant argues, ‘rests upon the dialectical argument: If the conditioned is given, 
the entire series of all its conditions is likewise given; objects of the senses are given 
as conditioned; therefore, etc’ (A497/B525). According to the above argument, the 
experience of the spatiotemporal object (i.e., its being ‘given’ to consciousness) must 
also require that the entire series of conditions entailed by that object is not only 
given to consciousness, but given to it as conditioned, that is, as spatiotemporal. To 
uphold the major premise constitutes transcendental realism because it entails that 
spatiotemporal objects can be thought of as existing independently of either our 
thought or our intuition of them, and, as discussed previously, leads to antinomy 
because this existence must be of two contradictory natures depending upon whether 
it is thought as pure idea or as sensible reality. A resolution of the antinomy is 
possible, therefore, if the major premise is rejected. The denial that the experience of 
a particular conditioned spatiotemporal object entails that the series of its conditions 
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is also given immediately to consciousness as similarly spatiotemporal or 
conditioned, dissolves the opposition between the thesis and the antithesis, revealing 
them to be merely ‘dialectically contradictory’ (A504/B532). 
In order properly to determine the meaning of this rule of pure reason, we must 
observe, first, that it cannot tell us what the object is, but only how the empirical 
regress is to be carried out so as to arrive at the complete concept of the object. If it 
attempted the former task, it would be a constitutive principle, such as pure reason 
can never supply. (A510/B538) 
How, then, does discursivity allow for a rejection of the premise described above? As 
discussed previously, according to Kant, the discursive intellect differs from the non-
discursive intellect in that the understanding cannot itself bring about the actuality of 
objects of experience, but can only determine the possibility that a particular object 
might appear. In the case of a non-discursive intellect there could be no distinction 
between possibility and actuality. This would mean that reason had a constitutive 
role, so that the mere positing of possible objects would also entail the actuality of 
those objects. As a consequence, any contradiction entailed by the idea of those 
objects could not be merely a contradiction in thought, but would also be a 
contradiction within the object itself. The contradiction involved in the thought of the 
object as possible (the thought of the object through the pure categories of the 
understanding) and the thought of it as actual (that is, as subject to the conditions of 
possible experience) would be inherent to objects in themselves.  
On the assumption of a discursive intellect, however, the arguments of the 
thesis can be shown to depend upon an invalid inference from the possible thought of 
an object (a possibility determined through the merely regulative application of 
reason to the categories of the understanding) to the possibility of its actuality (or its 
appearance in human experience). In the case of the first antinomy, it is assumed that 
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the thought of the world as a spatiotemporal totality can be met with in actuality, 
which demands that not only the thought but also the intuition is possible. In the case 
of the second antinomy, this means that the possibility of the thought that constituent 
parts of spatiotemporal extension are not themselves spatial (in the sense of being 
divisible) is taken to entail the possibility that this thought is actual (that it is possible 
to encounter the non-spatial constituent parts of spatial extension in intuition). In the 
case of the antithesis in the first and second antinomy, on the other hand, 
impossibility in general (i.e. for a hypothetical intuitive intellect) is inferred from the 
impossibility of actuality (the impossibility that an object be intuited in space and 
time). In the first antinomy, this means that the impossibility of a non-spatiotemporal 
in general is inferred from the impossibility of its actuality. In the second antinomy, it 
means that the impossibility of a non-spatial ground of spatiality is inferred from the 
impossibility of its actuality. Discursivity allows for a resolution of the antinomies, 
then, because it provides an explanation for the distinction between the conditions on 
the possibility of objects in general, and the condition on the possibility of objects of 
actuality. I hope to show later that Kant’s resolution of the antinomies must entail not 
only that the condition on the possibility of the thought of objects is distinct from the 
possibility of their actuality, but also that the condition on the possibility of the latter 
cannot ultimately be derived from the condition on the possibility of the former.  
6.2.3 The resolution of the dynamical antinomies 
So far, I have considered only the first and second (mathematical) of the four 
antinomies of the KrV. The solution differs, however, in the case of the third and 
fourth antinomies, which Kant calls the dynamical antinomies. This difference is a 
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result of a distinction which Kant makes between the nature of the application of the 
first and second sets of categories, to which the mathematical antinomies correspond, 
and of the third and fourth sets of categories, to which the dynamical antinomies 
correspond. I discussed this distinction briefly earlier in this dissertation (see 1.2), but 
it is worth considering in more detail here. Kant introduces this distinction in the B 
edition of the Transcendental Logic. ‘While it contains four classes of the concepts of 
understanding,’ Kant claims, the table of categories:  
may, in the first instance, be divided into two groups; those in the first group being 
concerned with objects of intuition, pure as well as empirical, those in the second 
group with the existence of these objects, in their relation to either to each other or to 
the understanding. The categories in the first group I would entitle the mathematical, 
those in the second group the dynamical. (B110).  
The mathematical categories are distinguished from the dynamical categories 
as a result of a difference in the matter to which they apply, and, as a consequence, in 
the nature of their application. Because they are concerned with magnitude, the 
mathematical categories are said to be ‘constitutive’ of the objective and, as a result 
exhibit ‘intuitive certainty’ (A161/B201): the matter to which the mathematical 
categories are applies is always homogeneous. This is not the case, however, with the 
dynamical categories, the application of which is merely regulative and which ‘allow 
of only discursive certainty’ (A162/B201). The matter to which the dynamical 
categories are applied may be heterogeneous: 
In the application of pure concepts of understanding to possible experience, the 
employment of their synthesis is either mathematical or dynamical; for it is 
concerned partly with the mere intuition of an appearance in general, partly with its 
existence. The a priori conditions of intuition are absolutely necessary conditions of 
any possible experience, those of the existence of the objects of a possible intuition 
are in themselves only accidental (A160/B199-200) 
As a consequence, the certainty of the principles which determine the employment of 
the mathematical antinomies can be established in intuition because they are a 
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condition of intuition. On the other hand, the principles which determine the 
application of the dynamical principles cannot be established in intuition, because 
their application is not a condition of intuition in itself, but instead only of the thought 
of an object as existing, which corresponds to that given intuition.  
The principles of mathematical employment will therefore be unconditionally 
necessary, that is, apodeictic. Those of dynamical employment will also indeed 
possess the character of a priori necessity, but only under the condition of empirical 
thought in some experience, therefore, only mediately and indirectly. 
Notwithstanding their undoubted certainty throughout experience, they will not 
contain that immediate evidence which is peculiar to the former. (A160 / B199-200) 
In the case of the first set of categories, those of quantity, for example, Kant writes:  
‘every appearance is as intuition an extensive magnitude; only through the successive 
synthesis of part to part in [the process of] its apprehension can it come to be known. 
All appearances are consequently intuited as aggregates, as complexes of previously 
given parts. This is not the case with magnitudes of every kind, but only with those 
magnitudes which are represented and apprehended by us in this extensive fashion’ 
(A163 / B204).  
In order that spatiotemporal appearances are possible, it is not enough that we are 
presented merely with an intuition – this intuition can only appear to us as an 
appearance of some determinate magnitude, and this is only possible on the condition 
of the synthesis of the manifold through the category of quantity. The mathematical 
principles, Kant claims therefore, allow of intuitive certainty. Their validity can be 
determined from the mere fact of the appearance of an intuition to consciousness.  
In the case of the third and fourth categories (those of relation and modality), 
however, the principles are not a condition on the possibility of appearance itself, but 
only on determining the existence of objects through the synthesis of the manifold 
given in intuition. It is not the case therefore that the mere presence of an intuition to 
consciousness is sufficient to determine their validity, or, as Kant puts it, the 
principles are not intuitively certain. In that the intuition does not in itself yield 
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experience of an object, however, and given that this is only possible on the condition 
that the dynamical principles determine the synthesis of presentations in intuition, 
Kant argues that the dynamical categories allow of a discursive certainty: the 
presence of objects, as opposed to mere intuitions, to consciousness, entails the 
application of the categories of relation and modality.  
A further consequence of this distinction is that, while the mathematical 
principles are constitutive, the dynamical principles are merely regulative. Kant says 
in the Analogies, for example, of the categories of relation: 
These principles have this peculiarity, that they are not concerned with appearances 
and the synthesis of their empirical intuition, but only with the existence of such 
appearances and their relation to one another in respect of their existence. The 
manner in which something is apprehended in appearance can be so determined a 
priori that the rule of its synthesis can at once give, that is to say, can bring into 
being, this [element of] a priori intuition in every example that comes before us 
empirically. The existence of appearances cannot, however, be thus known a priori; 
and even granting that we could in any such manner contrive to infer that something 
exists, we could not know it determinately, could not, that is, anticipate the features 
through which its empirical intuition is distinguished from other intuitions. 
(A178/B220-1) 
In other words, the principles of the mathematical synthesis are, by themselves, 
sufficient to produce their object (in this case an extended spatiotemporal intuition). 
They are, Kant claims, ‘constructive’: ‘I can determine a priori, that is, can construct, 
the degree of sensations of sunlight by combining some 200,000 illuminations of the 
moon.’ (A179/B229). In the case of the dynamical principles, however, the 
principles, because they concern the existence of objects, as opposed to merely the 
form of their appearance, cannot construct an object, but can only provide us with a 
means for determining where we can expect to find a related object in experience. 
The dynamical principles cannot therefore determine the sensible properties of the 
object which is to appear, but can instead provide only ‘a rule for seeking the fourth 
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member in experience, and a mark whereby it can be detected. It does not tell us how 
mere perception or empirical intuition itself comes about. It is not a principle 
constitutive of the objects, that is, of the appearances, but only regulative’ (A140 / 
B222).  
This distinction allows for an alternative means of resolving the dynamical 
antinomies. This is because the application of the mathematical principles, since they 
determine what can appear in intuition, must always apply to a homogeneous 
(spatiotemporal) matter. In the case of the dynamical principles, however, since they 
determine the thought of the object which accompanies the intuition, the matter for 
synthesis can be heterogeneous. This allows that a purely intelligible (non-sensible 
and non-spatiotemporal) object can serve as an explanation for the sensible objects of 
experience: 
All combination (conjunctio) is either composition (compositio) or connection 
(nexus). The former is the synthesis of the manifold where its constituents do not 
necessarily belong to one another. For example, the two triangles into which a square 
is divided by its diagonal do not necessarily belong to one another. Such also is the 
synthesis of the homogeneous in everything which can be mathematically treated. 
This synthesis can itself be divided into that of aggregation and that of coalition, the 
former applying to extensive and the latter to intensive quantities. The second mode 
of combination (nexus) is the synthesis of the manifold so far as its constituents 
necessarily belong to one another, as, for example, the accident to some substance, 
or the effect to the cause. It is therefore synthesis of that which, though 
heterogeneous, is yet represented as combined a priori. This combination, as not 
being arbitrary and as concerning the connection of the existence of the manifold, I 
entitle dynamical. (B201-202) 
In the case of the first and second antinomies, the regress from the conditioned to the 
conditions can only ever take the form of a regress to further spatiotemporal objects, 
so that the unconditioned (non-spatiotemporal) cannot be found within the series: ‘in 
the mathematical connection of the series of appearances no other than a sensible 
condition is admissible, that is to say, none that is not itself a part of the series’ 
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(530/B558). The thesis is therefore incompatible with experience because it demands 
that an unconditioned (non-spatiotemporal) object be presented in intuition. In the 
case of the third and fourth antinomies, however, the regress is in discursive thought, 
as opposed to intuition, and can therefore take the form of a regression to a non-
spatiotemporal object: 
Understanding does not admit among appearances any condition which can itself be 
empirically unconditioned. But if for some conditioned in the [field of] appearance 
we can conceive an intelligible condition, not belonging to the series of appearances 
as one of its members, and can do so without in the least interrupting the series of 
empirical conditions, such a condition may be accepted as empirically unconditioned, 
without prejudice to the continuity of the empirical regress. (A531/B559) 
 In the case of the third antinomy, for example, a non-spatiotemporal (unconditioned) 
cause can be thought as ground of the spatiotemporal intuition. In this case, the thesis 
and antithesis need not contradict one another, since the introduction of a non-
spatiotemporal (non-natural) causality need not contradict the principle of the 
antithesis – that ‘everything in the world [i.e., the realm of spatiotemporal objects] 
takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature’ (A445/B473). In this case, then, 
both the thesis and the antithesis may be true: 
In as much as the dynamical ideas allow of a condition of appearances outside the 
series of the appearances, that is, a condition which is not itself appearance, we arrive 
at a conclusion altogether different from any that was possible in the case of the 
mathematical antinomy. In it we were obliged to denounce both the opposed 
dialectical assertions as false. In the dynamical series, on the other hand, the 
completely conditioned, which is inseparable from the series considered as 
appearances, is bound up with a condition which, while indeed empirically 
unconditioned, is also non-sensible. We are thus able to obtain satisfaction for 
understanding in the one hand and reason on the other. (A531/B559) 
It seems, then, that Kant offers two means of resolving antinomy. The first method 
resolves the antinomy by showing that both thesis and antithesis rest upon a false 
premise. Kant calls this form of opposition, where the thesis and antithesis, while 
opposed, are not contradictory, dialectical: ‘I beg permission to entitle this kind of 
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opposition dialectial, and that of contradictories analytical. Thus of two dialectically 
opposed judgements both may be false; for the one is not a mere contradictory of the 
other, but says something more than is required for a simple contradiction’ 
(A504/B532), and I will therefore refer to the method by which Kant resolves 
antinomy by showing the opposition to be dialectical, as the dialectical method.  In 
the case of the mathematical antinomies, both thesis and antithesis are shown to share 
the false premise that spatiotemporal objects are things in themselves and that the 
unconditioned can therefore be found in the series of conditions. An alternative 
method is available in the case of the dynamical antinomies, however, because it can 
be argued that the thesis and antithesis apply to distinct entities – nature considered as 
a totality of sensible and intelligible (in the case of the thesis) or merely as sensible 
(in the case of the antithesis). I will refer to this as the metaphysical solution. The 
metaphysical solution resolves the antinomy by showing that the thesis and the 
antithesis are compatible if the thesis is taken to apply to objects of sensible intuition, 
and the antithesis to the merely intelligible. It is clear that the resolution of the 
mathematical antinomies can only proceed via the dialectical method, since the 
constitutive nature of the application of the categories which underlie the antinomy 
means that both the thesis and antithesis can only refer to the spatiotemporal. As 
discussed, however, the dynamical antinomies can allow of a metaphysical resolution 
because the thesis and antithesis can be taken to refer either to sensible or to 
intelligible objects. 
If this is the case, however, then the dynamical antinomies pose an additional 
threat to Maimon’s system. Not only is Maimon, as a result of his rejection of 
discursivity, unable to account for the distinction between conceptual and material 
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possibility which would make a resolution of the mathematical antinomies possible, 
but it appears that his rejection of the thing in itself as a transcendent entity precludes 
a resolution of the third and fourth antinomies. Maimon’s claim that, in the case of 
the infinite intellect, the appearance and the thing in itself coincide, together with his 
claim that the finite, human intellect is merely a limited form of this infinite intellect, 
seems to entail that antinomy must remain a feature of things in themselves. This 
would mean that any resolution of the antinomies would demand not only a 
commitment to some form of discursivity (or some alternative capable of accounting 
for the distinction between conceptual and material possibility), but also some 
metaphysical or epistemological commitment to an absolute distinction between 
appearances and things in themselves, a commitment which Maimon is not in a 
position to make without rejecting the fundamental premises of his system.  
It is not immediately clear, however, whether the dynamical antinomies might 
not also allow of a dialectical resolution. It is often argued that Kant’s method of 
resolving the first and second antinomies cannot be applied in the case of the third 
and fourth antinomies. Allison, for example, writes: 
Thus we now learn that the solution sketched above, which asserts that the antinomy 
is resolved because thesis and antithesis are both seen to be false, holds only for the 
antinomies arising from the first two or mathematical ideas and that in the case of the 
last two, or dynamical ideas, the conflict is resolved in a radically different manner, 
indeed, one which establishes the compatibility, rather than the falsity of thesis and 
antithesis (2012, p.17). 
There are also reasons for thinking that Kant himself saw the metaphysical solution as 
the sole means of resolving the dynamical antinomies. In the following passage, for 
example, Kant appears to claim that these antinomies can only be resolved by 
positing an intelligible object (or thing in itself) and attributing the claims of the 
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thesis to it, while maintaining that only the antithesis refers to the spatiotemporal 
series of conditions: 
to think an intelligible ground of the appearances, that is, of the sensible world, and 
to think of it as free from the contingency of appearances, does not conflict either 
with the unlimited empirical regress in the series of appearances nor with their 
thoroughgoing contingency. That, indeed, is all that we had to do in order to remove 
the apparent antinomy; and it can be done in this way only. (A563-4 / B591-2, 
emphasis added) 
It is clear that the dialectical method is more problematic in the case of the dynamical 
antinomies. In the case of the mathematical antinomies, the shared premise (that 
spatiotemporal objects are things in themselves) can be fairly easily rejected once 
these objects are considered as appearances, and opposed to things in themselves. In 
the case of the dynamical antinomies, however, the denial that spatiotemporal objects 
are things in themselves is not in itself sufficient to resolve the antinomy, since the 
categories with which it is concerned can apply both to the spatiotemporal and to the 
non-spatiotemporal. While the antithesis, since it presupposes that the series of the 
spatiotemporal contains its own condition within itself, takes transcendental realism 
as its premise, the thesis, since it presupposes only that the unconditioned is to be 
found somewhere in the totality of the sensible and intelligible conditions, does 
not.177 It may seem, then, that the only method available for resolving the dynamical 
antinomies is to refer the antithesis to objects as they appear in space and time, and 
the thesis to the sensible and intelligible considered as a totality. There are problems 
with taking this view, however. Elsewhere in his chapter on the Antinomies, Kant 
                                                
177 It is for this reason that the mathematical antinomies are often said to provide a proof of 
transcendental idealism, while the dynamical antinomies are not. In the case of the mathematical 
antinomies, the rejection of transcendental realism is a condition of a possible resolution of the 
antinomies. In the case of the dynamical antinomies, however, the resolution does not depend upon the 
rejection of transcendental realism, because a non-spatiotemporal entity can consistently be thought as 
the condition of a spatiotemporal entity due to the possibility of the application of the dynamical 
categories to a heterogeneous matter.  
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makes clear that he does not intend his solution to the dynamical antinomies to serve 
as proof of the existence of non-natural causality, or for the existence of a necessary 
being: 
in what has been said our intention has not been to establish the reality of freedom as 
one of the faculties which contain the cause of the appearances of our sensible world. 
For that enquiry, as it does not deal with concepts alone, would not have 
transcendental… What we have alone been able to show, and what we have alone 
been concerned to show, is that this antinomy rests on a sheer illusion, and that 
causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature (A558/B586) 
In these remarks we have no intention of proving the unconditionally necessary 
existence of such a being, or even of establishing the possibility of a purely 
intelligible condition of the existence of appearances in the sensible world. (A562 / 
B590) 
This would seem to suggest that the resolution of the dynamical antinomies does not 
necessarily entail that there is a purely intelligible component to the sensible world. 
This becomes problematic, however, if we consider the metaphysical method to be 
the only means of resolving the dynamical antinomies. As they stand, the antinomies 
cannot be resolved simply by rejecting either the thesis or the antithesis. Similarly, if 
the thesis and the antithesis are no longer to be opposed then the solution cannot 
proceed by rejecting both on the grounds that they entail a false premise. The only 
method available, then, is to show that each refers to a different conception of the 
world.  If we consider the world merely as a spatiotemporal totality, for example, we 
conclude that ‘everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with the laws 
of nature’ (A445 / B473). If we consider it as a totality of sensible and intelligible, 
however, we conclude that ‘causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the 
only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived’ 
(A445 / B473). Kant’s claim that he is not concerned ‘even [with] establishing the 
possibility of a purely intelligible condition of the existence of appearances in the 
 180 
sensible world’ suggests that he must remain open to the possibility that there is no 
purely intelligible component to the sensible world. It seems, however, that a 
rejection of this purely intelligible component must result in a recurrence of 
antinomy. If the existence of the purely intelligible is rejected, then there is no 
difference between the ‘world’ as it is understood in the thesis and as it is understood 
in the antithesis. Since both must refer to the same entity, the opposition between the 
two reoccurs, and the metaphysical solution ceases to be a means of resolving the 
antinomy. In order to leave open the possibility that there is no intelligible ground of 
appearances, such as a noumenal causality or a necessary being, it would therefore 
seem that Kant must leave open the possibility of a dialectical resolution of the 
dynamical antinomies. 
What form, then, would a dialectical resolution of the dynamical antinomies 
take? In his discussion of the antinomy of teleological judgement, Kant gives a clue 
as to how such a resolution might be possible. Here, he claims that the antinomy of 
reason, produced when the antinomy (which should be an antinomy only of 
judgement) is taken to concern the constitution of natural objects, arises because the 
understanding is limited in terms of the kinds of causality that are intelligible for it: 
Hence our reason, whose concept of causality is greatly restricted if reason has to 
specify it a priori , cannot possibly tell us whether nature’s productive ability, which 
is quite adequate for whatever seems to require merely that nature be like a machine, 
is not just adequate for [things] that we judge to be formed or combined in terms of 
the idea of purposes, or whether things [considered] to be actual natural purposes 
(which is what we necessarily judge them to be) are in fact based on a wholly 
different kind of original causality, namely, an architectonic understanding, which 
cannot at all lie in material nature, nor in its intelligible substrate. (Ak. V, 389). 
The argument, according to the metaphysical resolution of the dynamical antinomies, 
is that the totality of sensible conditions does not contain within itself the ground of 
the series, but that such a ground can be sought in the purely intelligible. The 
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suggestion in the above passage, however, is that even the totality of sensible and 
intelligible may be insufficient to account for the temporal series, or that even the 
totality of the sensible and the intelligible series may not contain the grounds of the 
series within itself. This suggests that a dialectical resolution of the third and fourth 
antinomies is possible. Both the thesis and the antithesis may rest upon a false 
premise – in this case that the series of sensible and intelligible conditions exists as a 
thing in itself. In the case of the antithesis, there is also an additional assumption that 
there is no distinction between the series of sensible, and the series of intelligible, 
conditions. Although this solution would avoid the need for a thing in itself, it would 
still presuppose a discursive intellect, since it would require that there be a distinction 
between what is intelligible (what is possible according to mere concepts) and what is 
materially possible. It requires that the conceptual is insufficient to account for 
appearances, and that the discursive intellect must always, therefore, receive its 
matter from without.  
6.3 Maimon’s treatment of antinomy 
So far, I have argued that Kant’s resolution of the antinomies is dependent upon a 
distinction between formal and material possibility that arises as a result of the 
discursivity thesis. As discussed in chapter four, however, Maimon’s position is that 
an answer to the quaestio juris is not possible on the assumption of a merely 
discursive intellect. Maimon’s solution to this problem, therefore, is to reject Kant’s 
discursivity thesis. He proposes that a non-conceptual (i.e. non-discursive) 
employment of the understanding serves to warrant mathematical and perceptual 
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judgments, so that the sensible component of experience can be accounted for, at least 
in principle, in purely rational terms:  
‘[w]e assume an infinite understanding (at least as idea), for which the forms are at 
the same time objects of thought, or that produces out of itself all possible kinds of 
connections and relations of things (the ideas). Our understanding is just the same, 
only in a limited way’ (VT, GW II, 63)  
Kant’s challenge to Maimon, then, is to provide an account of how antinomy might 
be resolved without recourse to discursivity, and it is clear that Kant does not think 
that such a resolution will be possible. I turn now to Maimon’s own attempt to 
account for, and resolve, antinomy. While I hope to provide a partial defence of the 
Maimonian position, insofar as I think that Maimon does have a compelling response 
to the problem of antinomy, and that, despite his rejection of the discursivity thesis, 
this resolution can take place along Kantian lines, my position will be that Maimon’s 
treatment of antinomy reveals a deeper problem. Maimon’s resolution of antinomy is, 
like Kant’s, I argue, dependent on his claim that the understanding is finite: that 
human knowledge is merely discursive. On the Kantian account, this means that the 
warrant in the case of synthetic judgments is non-rational. On the Maimonian 
account, however, it means that, while a complete understanding of the world as a 
mathematical or dynamical whole is, in principle, possible, human knowledge can 
only every approximate but never fully attain such an understanding. There is in 
principle, then, for Maimon, no distinction between what is rationally possible and 
what is materially actual: Maimonian antinomy is resolved, in other words, only by 
creating a problematic division within the understanding itself.    
 It is important to note that not all of the antinomies will prove problematic for 
Maimon. Because he denies the reality of Kant’s mechanistic conception of causality, 
for example, Maimon can dissolve the third antinomy without recourse to 
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discursivity. Maimon does, however, dedicate a portion of the VT to a discussion of 
mathematical antinomy. In fact, Maimon claims to ‘extend the sphere of the ideas [of 
reason] (as well as the sphere of the antinomies arising from these ideas) much 
further because I maintain that they are to be found not only in metaphysics but also 
in physics, and even in the most self-evident of all sciences, mathematics’ (VT, GW 
II, 227). Antinomies occur, Maimon holds, wherever the concept of infinity is 
employed in mathematics or in dynamics. Maimon does not have recourse to Kant’s 
cognitive dualism in order to resolve these antinomies, but his means of resolving 
them does involve an appeal to sensibility.178 As discussed, it is Maimon’s position 
that the truths that are revealed through the representation of objects in space and 
time are independent of that representation. The representation in space and time is, 
nevertheless, a means of making cognisable to oneself what cannot be immediately 
cognised by the understanding as a result of its finitude. It is this dependence on 
space and time, then, that results in antinomy: a complete understanding of the object 
requires that we are able to cognise it as an idea of the understanding. Our 
dependence on discursive cognition, however, means that we can only ever cognise it 
as an idea of reason: in terms, that is, of a totality of concepts. Ideas of the 
understanding are non-finite not in the sense that they have an infinite magnitude, but 
in the sense that they have no determinate magnitude. Ideas of reason, however, are 
infinite in the more traditional sense of the word, i.e. in so far as their production 
                                                
178 It is interesting to note that Maimon himself recognised the role that a division between 
understanding and sensibility played in Kant’s resolution of the antinomies. See VT, GW II, 226-227: 
‘For Kant, ideas are principles of reason that by their nature demand the unconditioned for every 
conditioned. Since there are three kinds of syllogism (namely categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive) 
there are also necessarily three kinds of idea, and these are none other than the three complete 
categories (ultimate subject, cause, world-whole) that ground the antinomies (conflict of reason with 
itself, which can be resolved only by his system of sensibility and its forms’ (emphasis added). 
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must occur as an infinite progression in time or space. The discursive intellect 
experiences the non-finite as an infinite magnitude because of the requirement, 
discussed in chapter four, that it introduce a fictitious magnitude into the 
representation of the object. The means of resolving the antinomy, then, is to 
recognise, as discussed in chapter four, that space and time do not themselves ground 
the truths of mathematics but merely make them cognisable to us, and to seek to 
approach ideas of the understanding ever more closely by way of ideas of reason.179  
The natural number series is, Maimon holds, one form of mathematical 
antinomy. Discursive reason both sets itself a task insofar as it demands that the 
number series be produced in its entirety, and is unable to complete this task insofar 
as its completion requires an infinite amount of time.180 From the standpoint of an 
infinite (non-discursive) intellect, however, the infinite number series does not 
depend upon infinite succession, but can be thought immediately: 
The solution to this antinomy is the following. Since our perception is tied to the 
form of time, we can only produce an infinite number by means of an infinite 
succession in time (and so we can never think of it as complete). But an absolute 
understanding thinks the concept of an infinite number all at once, without temporal 
sequence. So, what is treated as a mere idea by the understanding considered as a 
limited understanding, is a real object for the understanding considered as existing 
absolutely. (VT, GW II, 228) 
Something similar is at work in the case of infinitely small numerical 
determinations. A non-discursive understanding can think such determinations 
immediately. The discursive understanding, however, must already introduce a 
                                                
179 See VT, GW II, 443: ‘Finite reason approaches ever closer to infinite reason to infinity. The idea of 
its complete attainment is the idea of their union’  
180 See VT, GW II, 227-228: ‘the complete series of all the natural numbers cannot be an object given 
in any intuition; it can only be an idea by means of which the successive progress to infinity is treated 
as an object. Here reason comes into conflict with itself because it treats as an object something that 
according to its conditions can never be given as an object’. 
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determinate non-relational magnitude into pure mathematics in the form of the natural 
numbers.181 As an idea of reason, then, the irrational number (e.g. √2) is conceptually 
unattainable since its conceptualisation requires an infinite approximation: 
We can approach [irrational roots] ever more closely by means of infinite series 
(according to the binomial theorem, or with the help of a series recurrens), and yet 
we are convinced a priori that we will never find their exact value because they 
cannot be either whole numbers or fractional numbers, and hence cannot be numbers 
at all. In this case reason falls into an antinomy because it prescribes a rule according 
to which this number must definitely be found, and at the same time proves the 
impossibility of accomplishing this. (VT, GW II, 229) 
In physics, the antinomies again arise as a result of the necessity that objects be 
represented in space and time. In this case, however, the antinomies pertain to 
dynamics as opposed to pure mathematics. Maimon introduces three such antinomies. 
The first concerns the possibility of absolute movement. If we are to judge that a 
body (a) moves, we must compare it to another body (b) that does not move. If the 
position of a changes with respect to b, then we judge that a has moved. In order, 
however, to determine that it is in fact a that moved and not b, we will have to 
determine the position of both to a third body (c) …  
But just as a has altered its relation to c, so has c altered its own relation to a, and 
therefore we have no ground for thinking this motion as actually in a rather than in c, 
and hence we must assume yet another body, for example d, and so on to infinity. In 
this case we have an antinomy because we can never think the motion as actually in 
a, and yet see ourselves forced to suppose for the sake of experience that this is true; 
in other words reason commands us to assume an absolute motion, but we cannot do 
so because the concept of motion can only be thought as relative. (VT, GW II, 230) 
The second concerns the movement of a wheel. Suppose that I draw a line from the 
centre of a rotating wheel to its circumference and that I then pick a point along this 
line (for the purposes of this thought experiment, we will have to imagine that the 
wheel is rotating freely as opposed to around an axle). The closer the point is to the 
                                                
181 See 4.5.2 of this dissertation. 
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circumference, the greater the speed at which it travels will be. At the centre of the 
circle, the speed will be equal to zero, and yet I cannot think that there is a point 
within the circle that does not move at all: ‘We have another antinomy in this case 
because an infinitely small movement is thought as an object and at the same time not 
as an object of experience’ (VT, GW II, 231).  
 While Maimon does not address the Kantian antinomies directly, then, we can 
nevertheless formulate a response on his behalf: the mathematical antinomies that 
Kant formulates are a product of the introduction of a fictitious temporal or spatial 
magnitude with respect to the ideas of the understanding, as a condition on the 
possibility of discursive cognition of them. Maimon’s resolution of these antinomies 
can therefore proceed along Kantian lines. The grounds of experience are not 
themselves subject to the conditions of experience; space and time are not properties 
of ideas of the understanding, and infinite space and time are fictions. The infinite, 
then, is a condition on the possibility of perception, and yet we cannot make it into an 
object of perception but can only approach it ever more closely by way of extension 
of our concepts into infinity in symbolic cognition.182 ‘All of this makes clear’ 
Maimon argues, ‘that for us the infinite (the ability to produce it) is indeed a mere 
idea; but that it nonetheless can be and is in a determinate way actual so that the 
antinomies this gives rise to can only be resolved in my way’ (VT, GW II, 238). 
Maimon therefore defines his resolution of antinomy as follows:183 
For me the solution [of the antinomies] rests on this: that the understanding can and 
must be considered in two opposed ways. 1) As an absolute understanding (unlimited 
                                                
182 The resolution of the antinomy therefore requires, Maimon claims, that we ‘make our thought 
always more complete, so that the matter ever approaches the form into eternity, and this is the 
resolution of the antinomy’ (Wörterbuch, GW III, 187) 
183 According to Atlas, Maimon was influenced, in his response to antinomy, by Maimonides. See 
Atlas, 1948. 
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by sensibility and its laws). 2) As our understanding, in accordance with its 
limitation. So the understanding can and must think its objects according to two 
opposed laws. (VT, GW II, 227) 
Elsewhere, Maimon resolves these antinomies into one singular ‘antinomy of 
thought’ (Wörterbuch, GW III, 186-187): in order that the understanding be cognisant 
of its own rational processes, it must apply them to a matter that is taken as merely 
given and which, therefore, is always represented in space and time. Yet in order that 
it have full cognisance of its rational activities, the understanding must think the 
object as entirely produced, i.e., not as materially given. Antinomies arise, then, as a 
result of these competing demands:184 
Thinking in general consists in the relation of form (a rule of the understanding) to a 
matter (the given that is to be subsumed by it). Without matter one cannot achieve 
consciousness of the form, so that matter is a necessary condition of thought, that is, 
for real thought of a form or rule of the understanding, a matter, to which it relates, 
must be given; on the other hand, however, the completeness of the thought of an 
object requires that nothing be given, but everything thought. (Wörterbuch, GW II, 
186) 185  
 
6.4 Weaknesses of the Maimonian response to antinomy: the problem of the 
subject 
How successful is Maimon, then, in overcoming the problem of antinomy? While 
Maimon is able to resolve what he calls the ‘antinomies of the understanding’, it 
                                                
184 Bransen argues (1989, pp.94-98) that Maimon’s antinomy of thought can be expressed in terms of 
the quaestio facti / quaestio juris distinction; in order that we have knowledge, it is necessary that it is 
in some sense given as fact, on the other hand, however, in order to resolve the quaestio juris, it is 
necessary that there is no given, and that the object is a product entirely of thought. Thus the quaestio 
juris and quaestio facti are in tension and cannot both be satisfied within the same act of knowing.  
185 There is some debate about the degree to which Maimon’s ‘antinomy of thought’ can be seen to 
have influenced, and to bear resemblance to, the notions of ‘infinite striving’ in Hegel and Fichte. See, 
for example, Bransen (1989, p.179), who argues that there are important differences between these 
doctrines, and Bergmann (1967, chapter XII: Maimon and Fichte). 
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seems that this resolution comes at the expense of the coherence of his system and, in 
particular, the coherence of his account of the subject. Kant’s resolution of the 
antinomies is complete insofar as he is able to dissolve the opposition between thesis 
and antithesis by rejecting what turns out to be a shared premise, namely 
transcendental realism. Maimon does not dissolve the antinomies, however, but 
instead makes antinomy internal to the understanding. Knowledge, even if it is 
warranted extra-conceptually, nevertheless takes the form of a relation of concepts, 
which are, in turn, acquired by reflection upon a spatiotemporal manifold. The 
spatiotemporal representation itself already presupposes, however, that the idea of the 
understanding is not thought in its entirety.  The antinomy is ‘resolved’, therefore, to 
the extent that the thesis and the antithesis are merely two ways of thinking about 
experience: as idea of the understanding and as idea of reason. It is sometimes 
thought that the infinite intellect is merely as a product of the imagination: an idea 
that we project onto our experiences and towards which we can strive.186 In 
particular, these commentators have pointed to the following passage from the VT: 
We assume an infinite understanding (at least as idea), for which the forms are at the 
same time objects of thought, or that produces out of itself all possible kinds of 
connections and relations of things (the ideas). Our understanding is just the same, 
only in a limited way. (VT, GW II, 64-65, emphasis added)187 
As I hope I have shown by way of the arguments of chapter four, however, the 
infinite intellect cannot be merely an idea insofar as it is a condition on the possibility 
of perception in general. It is, as Paul Franks puts it, a ‘transcendentally necessary 
                                                
186 For a more detailed discussion of the Maimonian infinite intellect, and in particular its possible 
origins in Spinozism, see Socher, 2006, chapter three. For a discussion of the constitutive vs regulative 
status of the infinite understanding in Maimon’s thought, see Beiser, 1987, 294-295 
187 See also VT, GW II, 237: ‘for us the infinite (the ability to produce it) is merely an idea; but … it 
nonetheless can be and is in a determinate way actual so that the antinomies that it gives rise to can 
only be resolved in my way’. 
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condition for a satisfactory solution to Kant’s problems’ (2003, p.205).188 It is not 
enough, then, merely to set it as a goal for the finite understanding.189  
The status of the infinite understanding therefore remains ambiguous. On the 
one hand, infinite intelligibility is set as a task for the finite understanding: we can 
approach complete formal determination ever more closely, but we can never attain it 
because our thought is discursive – i.e., it is conceptual and always therefore requires 
a ‘given’ matter that is organised in spatial and temporal relations. On the other hand, 
however, infinite intelligibility is a condition on the possibility of perception, and, 
therefore, of discursive knowledge.190 Our intellect must therefore be both finite and 
infinite: both discursive and non-discursive. We might formulate the problem 
alternatively, in the following way. The outcome of Maimon’s quaestio juris, is that it 
should not be possible for a determination that does not have a rational ground to 
constitute intentional content: complete rational determination is a condition on the 
possibility of intentionality. Nevertheless, it seems that the (non-rational) activities of 
the imagination are constitutive of intentional content insofar as we are in a position 
to experience our conceptualisations or intuitions as incomplete.  
 
                                                
188 Beiser makes a similar claim. See for example, Besier, 1987, p.286: ‘it is necessary to postulate 
Leibniz’s and Malebranche’s idea of an infinite understanding that is present within our finite 
understanding and that creates not only the form but also the content of experience. Only such an idea 
resolves the problem of the deduction, Maimon argues, because it alone surmounts Kant’s problematic 
dualism’. 
189 See VT, GW II, 248: ‘The possibility of each and every thing presupposes the possibility of both a 
more general and a more particular thing; as a result, in the series of subordinated things to which the 
given belongs, both a progress and a regress to infinite pertain to the complete possibility of a thing: 
this makes the idea of an infinite understanding a necessary one’. 
190 Although Kant himself considers the possibility of a distinct, non-discursive, form of intellect in the 
KU, Maimon’s account differs in that, while for Kant the infinite intellect remains a merely 
hypothetical entity, for Maimon it is a condition of human experience.  
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It seems, then, that the problem remains: Maimon’s account rests upon a 
contradictory account of the subject. Maimon is forced to reintroduce the form / 
matter distinction, or the distinction between formal and material possibility, into his 
rationalist system, since it is only by way of this distinction that a resolution of 
antinomy is possible. In doing so, however, Maimon creates a division within the 
subject, between its real (infinite), and ideal (finite) aspects. This is, I think, the 
essence of Hegel’s criticism of Fichte in the Differenzschrift. My concern here is not 
to determine whether or not Hegel’s assessment of Fichte is accurate, nor whether his 
criticisms are fair, but Hegel’s criticisms do apply, I think, at least to the Maimonian 
system. Hegel writes: 
the end of the system is untrue to its beginning, the result is untrue to its principle. 
The principle was Ego=Ego; the result is Ego not = Ego. The former identity is an 
ideal-real one; form and matter are one. The latter is merely ideal, form and matter 
are divided; the identity is a merely formal synthesis (Differenzschrift p.138) 
The above passage could just as well have been written about Maimon; Maimon’s 
resolution of antinomy requires the non-identity of the finite with the infinite 
understanding, yet the very possibility of there being an antinomy at all depends upon 
their identity. Infinite intelligibility is not merely to be set as a goal: we must already 
presuppose infinite intelligibility if we are to make any sense of the system that 
Maimon presents. Complete rational determination is never in fact achieved within 
his system, however: we have only finite determination and an infinite striving 
towards an infinite conceptualisation that can never be attained.  
6.5 Conclusion 
It seems, then, that while Maimon is partially successful in his attempt to further the 
Kantian project by way of a quaestio juris, the infinite or non-discursive 
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understanding that he introduces in order to account for the possibility of perceptual 
and mathematical knowledge leaves him results in a problematic dualism within the 
faculty of the understanding itself. Sensible representation in space and time (and 
discursive knowledge, therefore) is supposed, on the Maimonian account, to be a 
product of finite conceptualisation. Yet, as argued in chapter four, a non-discursive 
understanding is already supposed to be a condition on the possibility of perceptual or 
mathematical judgment. Maimon must hold that the understanding is both finite and 
infinite: it must be finite in order that the objects are given to it as opposed to merely 
thought by it, and it must be infinite insofar as it represents conceptual differences in 
space and time.  
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Conclusion: Critical Rationalism? 
My aim, in the course of this dissertation, has been to provide a detailed account of 
Maimon’s skepticism and to argue that it constitutes a compelling form of post-
Kantian skepticism. My claim that Maimon’s skepticism is post-Kantian, argued for 
in chapter one, is made on the grounds that it does not presuppose transcendental 
realism, and is not therefore susceptible to a number of anti-skeptical lines of 
argument that are afforded Kant as a result of his transcendental idealism, and which 
he is often thought to develop in the KrV. My claim that Maimon’s skepticism is 
compelling is supported by the arguments of chapter three. Maimon’s skepticism as it 
is often construed constitutes a form of what I have termed ‘empirical’ as opposed to 
‘critical’ skepticism: it pertains, in other words, to the degree of confidence with 
which we can make assertions about empirical states of affairs. I argue that such 
accounts fail to capture the full force of Maimon’s skepticism. I instead present 
Maimon’s as a form of critical skepticism, concerning the validity of both the 
categories and the forms of judgment, which an appeal to empirical matters of fact, 
however certain we may be with respect to those matters, cannot in principle resolve.   
My efforts in the latter half of the dissertation were devoted to an examination 
of another Maimonian line of skeptical argument, one which I argue provides the 
materials for a possible response to the problem of the quaestio facti. This 
Maimonian line of argument, which I term ‘Maimon’s quaestio juris’, concerns the 
compatibility of Kant’s discursivity thesis with the possibility of objectively valid 
synthetic judgment. Maimon’s position is that we do make objectively valid 
mathematical and perceptual judgments, and that we cannot account for the 
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possibility of these forms of judgment unless we reject Kant’s discursivity thesis: 
unless we suppose, that is, that the understanding has an extra-conceptual capacity. 
Maimon’s quaestio juris is often said to identify problems of interactivity between 
the faculties, or of reconciling receptivity with spontaneity. This reading is vulnerable 
to a number of lines of criticism insofar as it appears to depend upon 
misunderstandings about the nature of Kant’s discursivity thesis. My intention in 
chapter four was to present an alternative formulation of this Maimonian line of 
argument: Maimon’s claim is that a non-discursive (i.e. non-conceptual) employment 
of the understanding is a condition on the possibility of objectively valid 
mathematical and perceptual judgments. The role of the understanding in warranting 
perceptual and mathematical judgment allows for a possible response to the quaestio 
facti insofar as objective warrant is not, in principle beyond the reach of the 
understanding. Ideas of the understanding are accessible to us insofar as they warrant 
judgment, and can be approximated, although never attained, conceptually.  
At this point, however, Maimon’s own position remains unstable for two 
reasons. Firstly, while Maimon’s rationalism means that we can approximate ideas of 
the understanding ever more closely by way of concepts, we have no way of 
determining (and in particular in the case of natural science) when we are in fact 
doing so, as opposed to employing illegitimate forms of synthesis, because the 
operations of the understanding, which are determined according to absolute 
conditions of objective thought, remain beyond our reach. Secondly, Maimon’s denial 
of discursivity leaves us with what seems to be an incoherent account of the subject. 
The question of how we might respond to this instability (and of how German 
Idealism can be understood as an attempt to address this instability) is a matter for 
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further research. I would like here, however, to offer some suggestions as to the form 
that this research might take.  
There is, I think, an important way in which Fichte can help us with respect to 
the problem of the quaestio facti: through the introduction (or re-introduction) of 
subjectivity as the highest principle of objective determination. In the Grundlage, 
Fichte makes the following claim: 
The skepticism of Maimon is ultimately based on the question of our right to apply 
the category of reality. This right can be derived from no other — we are absolutely 
entitled thereto. The fact is, rather, that all other possible rights must be derived from 
this; and even Maimon’s skepticism inadvertently presupposes it, in that he 
acknowledges the correctness of ordinary logic. — But we can point out something 
from which every category is itself derived: the self, as absolute subject. Of every 
other possible thing to which it may be applied, it has to be shown that reality is 
transferred to it from the self: — that it would have to exist, provided that the self 
exists. (Grundlage I, 99) 
Because Maimon cites the thought of an object in general as the ground of a priori 
determination, knowledge of the a priori determines of objectivity lies beyond the 
reach of the finite intellect. Maimon is mistaken, Fichte argues however, in thinking 
that a priori determination is determined by the form that the object must take. 
Instead, the a priori form of experience is determined by the necessary form of 
subjectivity. In fact, Fichte argues, that subjectivity is the highest principle from 
which all knowledge derives is already implicit in the KrV: 
That our proposition is the absolutely basic principle of all knowledge, was pointed 
out by Kant, in his deduction of the categories; but he never laid it down specifically 
as the basic principle. (I, 99-100) 
If the thought of an object in general is to be the first principle of the system of 
knowledge, as Maimon believes that it should, the quaestio facti remains 
unanswerable. Only an infinite, and not a finite, intellect has access to the object as an 
object of pure thought, and thus to the supposedly absolute conditions of objective 
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thought in general. If, as Fichte argues however, the first principle of the system of 
knowledge is the subject itself, then an examination of the structures of subjectivity 
will also serve as an examination of the necessary structures of objectivity: it will 
allow us to draw conclusions about what the world must be like if self-consciousness 
is to be possible.191 Fichte’s claim is that the legitimacy of the categories does not 
derive from their being conditions on the possibility of the thought of an object, but 
instead in their being conditions on the possibility of the thought of the subject. In the 
Transcendental Deduction, the subject (in the form of the original unity of 
apperception) plays this role insofar as synthesis according to the rules of thought is 
shown to be a condition on the possibility of subjectivity. In Fichte’s view, however, 
the particular categories that we employ are themselves conditions on the possibility 
of subjectivity, and therefore derive not from abstract forms of judgment, but from 
acts of the imagination by way of which the cognition of subjectivity can be 
constructed. In this way, then, the subject itself must be the ground of the legitimacy 
of transcendental judgments.  
My hope, then, is that this dissertation contributes both to debates that are 
internal to the Maimons scholarship, and to debates that have broader philosophical 
implications. I have attempted here to present Maimon’s as a compelling form of 
post-Kantian skepticism, and to make sense of the relationship between this 
                                                
191See Grundlage, I, 100: ‘Our principle has been overstepped, in the sense ascribed to it, by Spinoza. 
He does not deny the unity of empirical consciousness, but pure consciousness he completely 
rejects. … He separates pure and empirical consciousness. The first he attributes to God, who is never 
conscious of himself, since pure consciousness never attains to consciousness; the second he locates in 
the specific modifications of the Deity. So established, his system is perfectly consistent and 
irrefutable, since he takes his stand in a territory where reason can no longer follow him; but it is also 
groundless; for what right did he have to go beyond the pure consciousness given in empirical 
consciousness?’ 
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skepticism and Maimonian rationalism. I also hope, however, that in doing so I have 
helped to make a case for the wider significance of Maimon’s skepticism, both in the 
context of the history of philosophy (in particular in the development of German 
Idealism), and in the context of contemporary philosophy of perception.  
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